Essays in Empirical Macroeconomics by Koh, Wee Chian
  
 
 
ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL MACROECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
WEE CHIAN KOH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
JULY 2017 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by Wee Chian Koh 2017 
All Rights Reserved 
iii 
 
 
Declaration 
 
This thesis is my own work. 
Chapter 2 is published in Oxford Economic Papers: 
Koh, W. C. 2017. “Fiscal multipliers: new evidence from a large panel of countries.” 
Oxford Economic Papers 69 (3): 569–90. doi:10.1093/oep
Chapter 3 is published in International Economics and Economic Policy: 
/gpw066 
Koh, W. C. 2017. “Oil price shocks and macroeconomic adjustments in oil-exporting 
countries.” International Economics and Economic Policy 14 (2): 187–210. 
doi:10.1007/s10368-015-0333-z 
Chapter 4 is published in Review of Development Economics: 
Koh, W. C. 2017. “Fiscal policy in oil-exporting countries: the roles of oil funds and 
institutional quality.” Review of Development Economics 21 (3): 567–90. 
doi:10.1111/rode.12293 
Chapter 5 is published in Journal of Southeast Asian Economies: 
Koh, W. C. 2016. “Fiscal cyclicality in Brunei Darussalam.” Journal of Southeast Asian 
Economies 33 (1): 83–94. doi:10.1355/ae33-1e 
Chapter 6 is published in The Singapore Economic Review: 
Koh, W. C. 2016. “Sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in Brunei Darussalam.” The 
Singapore Economic Review. doi:10.1142/S0217590816500065 
 
_______________ 
Wee Chian Koh 
July 2017 
iv 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost, I thank the Chair of my PhD supervisory panel, Warwick McKibbin. 
Warwick has been exceptional in providing guidance and advice. His sharp intellect and 
intuition grounded on economic principles and policy experience are clearly evident in 
our regular discussions and have influenced how I think about real-world issues. He has 
also been very encouraging and reassuring, which has given me confidence to pursue 
independent research. I would also like to thank my other panel members, Renée Fry-
McKibbin and Joshua Chan, for their support and feedback on my work. 
The stimulating intellectual environment at the Australian National University (ANU) 
has thoroughly enriched my PhD experience. I have forged enduring friendships and 
enjoyed the discussions with fellow PhD students from the Crawford School of Public 
Policy, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA), Arndt-Corden 
Department of Economics, and Research School of Economics. In particular, I thank 
Dony Alex, Ben Ascione, Rohan Best, Alrick Campbell, Minhee Chae, Kimlong 
Chheng, Jamie Cross, Gan-Ochir Doojav, Ryan Edwards, Cody Hsiao, Shane Johnson, 
Anil Kavuri, Sanghyeok Lee, Anpeng Li, Larry Liu, Arjuna Mohottala, Matthew 
McKay, Bao Nguyen, Tomohito Okabe, Michinao Okachi, Manoj Pandey, Umbu Raya, 
Yashodha Pathirannehelage, Steve Thomas, Kai-Yun Tsai, Jiao Wang, Varang 
Wiriyawit, Benjamin Wong, and Jasmine Zheng. 
I am appreciative of the comments received at the presentations I made at the CAMA 
Macroeconomics Brown Bag seminar, 11th Australasian Development Economics 
Workshop (ADEW), Singapore Economic Review Conference 2015, 28th
I have also benefited from general discussions on policy issues, the academic profession 
and publication process, to specific comments on my work from many others. I thank 
 PhD 
Conference in Economics and Business, and the Crawford PhD Conference 2015. I 
gratefully acknowledge financial support from the following sources to attend the 
conferences: ANU Vice Chancellor’s Travel Grant, Crawford HDR Fund, and ADEW. 
v 
 
Anindya Banerjee, Fabrizio Carmignani, Rohan Fox, Timo Henckel, Stephen Howes, 
Asnawi Kamis, Phouphet Kyophilavong, Andy McKay, David Stern, Samuel Wills, 
Irene Yap, journal editors, and anonymous reviewers. I also acknowledge Jaromir 
Benes, Ryan Decker, and Inessa Love for sharing their MATLAB and Stata codes, 
which I adapted. Megan Poore has been extremely helpful in proofreading my papers.  
I am honoured to represent Brunei Darussalam to participate in the 2016 U.S. 
Professional Fellows Program, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State, to 
understand how academic and policy research influence U.S. policymaking. I am 
grateful for the opportunity to meet with Congressmen and staff from the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the Senate, think tank professionals, and academic researchers. In 
particular, I thank Sarah Maxim for hosting my fellowship at the University of 
California at Berkeley. I also thank Donald Emmerson from Stanford University, Sunny 
Wong from the University of San Francisco, and James McGann from the University of 
Pennsylvania for accommodating my visits. 
I am also fortunate to have secured full scholarship from the Centre for Strategic and 
Policy Studies, with funding provided by the Government of Brunei Darussalam. I 
thank Dato Paduka Haji Ismail Bin Haji Duraman and Diana Cheong for their approval 
and encouragement to pursue a PhD. 
My parents and sister have always been supportive of my pursuits. I thank them for 
constantly believing in me. 
Last but not least, I thank my wife and children for their patience in enduring my 
absence the past four years. Being away from the family has, at times, been agonizing. 
Envisioning a better future for the family is the only motivation I need to see through 
this challenging, yet intellectually rewarding, journey.  
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
To Wendy, Wenjie, & Jiayi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis is a collection of five essays in empirical macroeconomics. The first paper 
evaluates the effectiveness of fiscal policy in different economic environments. The 
results show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, fiscal multipliers are not necessarily 
smaller in countries relatively open to trade and financial flows and operating under 
flexible exchange rates. The relationship between the size of fiscal multipliers and the 
three dimensions of openness—trade openness, capital mobility, and exchange rate 
flexibility—hinges on the response of the real exchange rate and the degree of monetary 
policy accommodation, which underscores the importance of fiscal and monetary policy 
interaction in understanding the fiscal transmission mechanism.  
The second paper examines the effects of an adverse oil price shock in oil-
exporting countries under alternative exchange rate and fiscal policy arrangements. The 
results show that output and government consumption fall, as expected, but the 
responses are smaller and smoother in countries with flexible exchange rates and oil 
funds. This highlights the shock-absorbing property of flexible exchange rates and the 
macroeconomic stabilization role of oil funds, making a case for oil exporters to adopt 
more flexible exchange rates and establish oil funds as fiscal buffers. 
The third paper examines the roles of oil funds and institutional quality in reducing 
fiscal procyclicality and macroeconomic volatility in oil-exporting countries. The results 
show that oil funds are effective in reducing fiscal procyclicality in countries with high 
institutional quality. There is also a reduction in the procyclical bias in countries with 
low institutional quality but the evidence is less compelling. Nonetheless, oil funds are 
associated with reduced volatility of government consumption and the real exchange 
rate in countries with low institutional quality. These findings demonstrate the potency 
of oil funds in macroeconomic stabilization, but also reinforce the importance of good 
institutions. 
viii 
 
The fourth paper examines the conduct of fiscal policy in Brunei, focusing on the 
cyclical patterns in government expenditure. In spite of relatively large fiscal buffers in 
Brunei’s oil funds, the results provide evidence of procyclical fiscal policy, which 
exacerbates the business cycle. This behaviour is primarily driven by procyclical current 
expenditure while capital expenditure is largely acyclical. A key policy recommendation 
would be to adopt clear fiscal rules to integrate the oil funds into the country’s 
macroeconomic policy framework to delink government spending from volatile oil 
revenue. 
The fifth paper investigates the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in Brunei. 
The results show that oil price shocks account for only a small proportion of output 
fluctuations while productivity shocks have the largest share. Real exchange rate 
movements are largely driven by demand shocks while monetary shocks explain most 
of the variability in prices. Economic policies should focus on productivity 
improvement and capital investment to increase output in the long run, and the conduct 
of fiscal policy should take into account the impact on real exchange rate volatility. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Global economic events in the 21st century 
The revival and intensification of global integration towards an open international 
trading and financial system has been at the core of multilateral economic policies since 
the Second World War. Although globalization can contribute to economic growth and 
improvements in development outcomes, at least in theory, this interdependence in the 
global village also inherently poses serious threats. The Dot-com bubble burst was the 
first significant economic event in the new millennium, which prompted policy 
responses to avert a deep recession. The Federal Reserve in the United States (U.S.) 
subsequently eased monetary policy, perhaps for too long. The loose monetary policy 
stance is argued to have a hand in sparking the refinancing boom in the U.S. (see Taylor, 
2007), which led to the subprime mortgage crisis, collapse of the financial sector, and a 
real economic meltdown. This turmoil culminated in the Great Recession, drawing 
many parallels to the Great Depression in the 1930s (Temin, 2010; Eichengreen, 2015). 
The ensuing banking and financial crises in Iceland and Ireland, the sovereign debt 
crises in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIIGS), and the chaos of Brexit and 
the European Union are testaments to the interconnectedness of the world economy.  
Commodity prices, particularly of energy and base metals, increased dramatically at 
the turn of the 21st century. The ascent was briefly interrupted by the global financial 
crisis (GFC), before continuing their upward trajectory until the middle of 2014. The 
subsequent plunge in commodity prices has mounted enormous pressures on the fiscal 
and external balances of commodity exporters. More so than other commodities, oil 
price movements and the responses of oil-exporting countries have increasingly grabbed 
international attention. The prevailing environment of low oil prices is supposed to be 
“good news for the global economy”, proclaimed the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) chief, Christine Lagarde, at The Wall Street Journal CEO Council annual meeting 
in December 2014. This sentiment is similarly echoed in policy circles (see e.g., Arezki 
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and Blanchard, 2014; Husain et al., 2015; Vrontisi et al., 2015). However, the widely 
anticipated benefits have yet to materialize as the transmission channels to the real 
economy have become more complicated (Obstfeld et al., 2016). Global economic 
growth prospects remain bleak—the IMF and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) have repeatedly revised forecasts downwards (see 
IMF, 2016a; OECD, 2016). 
1.2 Global fiscal stimulus 
Monetary policy acted as the first line of defence in response to the GFC, but the limits 
of conventional monetary policy became increasingly apparent as policy interest rates in 
advanced economies approached the nominal zero lower bound (see Fig. 1.1). Fiscal 
policy was thus essential to aid in economic recovery. Many countries embarked on an 
unprecedented level of fiscal expansion unseen since the Second World War (Mauro et 
al., 2015), in the form of stimulus packages. The size of the fiscal stimulus in the G-20 
countries was estimated at US$2 trillion, about 1.4% of 2008 world GDP (IILS, 2011). 
Figure 1.2 shows the large output fall and the sharp increase in real government 
spending during the GFC, but the stimulus was unwound in the following years as 
substantial fiscal deficits emerged. Against the current backdrop of a lacklustre global 
economy, the IMF and OECD are again advocating a coordinated fiscal stimulus 
response by the G-20 countries (IMF, 2016b; OECD, 2016).1
The effectiveness of fiscal stimulus has been an intensely political subject over the 
past several years. There is also little consensus among economists, owing to 
contradictory theoretical predictions and mixed empirical evidence. Identifying 
exogenous fiscal spending shocks is an important element in measuring the size of fiscal 
multipliers. The standard approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), by assuming 
government spending does not respond to GDP in the same quarter, requires quarterly 
data for the identification scheme to be valid. Data availability is a major obstacle to 
obtain reliable estimates, especially in developing countries, which typically only have 
annual time series data that are sufficiently long.  
 
                                                 
1 McKibbin and Stoeckel (2012) examine the consequences of global fiscal adjustments and highlight the 
importance of a coordinated response to avoid worsening of global imbalances.  
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Fig. 1.1 Average policy interest rates 
 
Notes: Data sourced from IMF International Financial Statistics. The averages are weighted by GDP in 
current U.S. dollars. 
Fig. 1.2 Average growth rates of real GDP and real government expenditure 
 
Notes: Data sourced from IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2016. The averages are weighted by GDP 
in current U.S. dollars. 
An influential paper by Ilzetzki et al. (2013), based on a novel quarterly data set of 
44 countries, finds that fiscal multipliers are smaller in developing countries, in 
countries relatively open to trade, under flexible exchange rate regimes, and when 
public debt is high. Interestingly, the estimated multipliers are negative in the long run. 
A sobering policy implication arising from the study is that fiscal stimulus could 
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become counterproductive due to increasing global integration and adoption of flexible 
exchange rate arrangements. However, Dellas et al. (2005) allude to the importance of 
fiscal and monetary policy interactions in determining the relationship between the size 
of fiscal multipliers and the degree of openness (trade openness, capital mobility, 
exchange rate flexibility). A corollary to this point is that there might, in fact, not be a 
systematic relationship. 
1.3 The ‘new normal’ of low oil prices 
Apart from the oil price crashes of 1985–86 and 1990–91, during which the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) abandoned price targets and 
the First Gulf War respectively, crude oil prices remained relatively stable, hovering 
around US$30 per barrel in real terms between the mid 1980s and the end of the 20th 
century (see Fig. 1.3). The new millennium ushered in an era of oil price booms, 
reaching an apex of over US$140 per barrel in mid 2008. Oil prices fell dramatically 
during the GFC, but rebounded to over US$100 per barrel relatively quickly. The 
budgets of many oil-exporting countries were, unfortunately, predicated on the 
optimistic assumption that oil prices will remain high. This can be observed from the 
fiscal break-even oil price for, say, the United Arab Emirates, which averaged US$33 
per barrel over the period 2000–2012 but more than doubled to US$70 per barrel in 
2012–15 (see IMF, 2016c). Oil prices began to steeply decline in June 2014, amid weak 
global demand and the supply glut following the boom in U.S. shale oil production, and 
was exacerbated by OPEC’s decision to maintain production levels (Baffes et al., 2015). 
With projected fiscal break-even prices in 2016 ranging from US$48 per barrel for 
Kuwait to a staggering US$364 per barrel for Yemen (IMF, 2016c), the growing fiscal 
deficits necessitate abrupt macroeconomic adjustments in the short term. The 
macroeconomic effects of the oil price decline will depend on monetary and fiscal 
arrangements (see Arezki and Blanchard, 2014). Economic theory dating back to 
Friedman (1953) and Poole (1970) suggests that countries with flexible exchange rate 
regimes can adjust through currency depreciations when faced with real shocks. Indeed, 
Russia, which had been operating on a managed float, transitioned to a free floating 
regime in November 2014. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan also adopted a more flexible 
regime in August 2015 and January 2016 respectively. Nigeria is the latest to follow suit 
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in June 2016. There is ample empirical evidence documenting the merits of flexible 
exchange rates (e.g., Broda, 2004; Edwards and Levy Yeyati, 2005) although earlier 
studies find that the exchange rate regime does not seem to matter (e.g., Baxter and 
Stockman, 1989; Ghosh et al., 1997).  
For those with rigid exchange rate regimes such as a hard peg, currency board 
arrangement, or dollarized currency, monetary policy is constrained and fiscal policy 
therefore bears the burden of macroeconomic stabilization. These countries require 
substantial fiscal spending cuts, especially if there are insufficient fiscal buffers such as 
oil funds. Interestingly, the oil price boom beginning in the late 1990s coincided with 
the proliferation of oil funds (see Fig. 1.3). Saving surplus revenues during good times 
is a prudent macroeconomic policy, and the oil funds can be run down to finance fiscal 
deficits during bad times. Frankel et al. (2013) find that a third of the developing world 
has ‘graduated’ from fiscal procyclicality over the past decade. About half of this cohort 
comprises of oil exporters, suggesting oil funds could have played an important role. 
However, there is mixed empirical evidence on the effectiveness of resource funds. 
Some studies do not find convincing evidence of resource funds reducing the 
procyclical bias (e.g., Davis et al., 2001; Ossowski et al., 2008) but there are others with 
favourable results (e.g., Coutinho et al., 2014; Asik, 2015). 
Fig. 1.3 Real crude oil price and number of new oil funds established 
 
Notes: The real oil price is obtained by adjusting the nominal oil price by U.S. CPI; data sourced from 
IMF International Financial Statistics. Oil funds data sourced from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
No
. o
f f
un
ds
US
$ 
pe
r b
ar
re
l
Oil funds established
Real crude oil price
6 
 
1.4 Brunei’s macroeconomic policy challenges 
Brunei Darussalam, a small country on the northwest coast of Borneo Island in 
Southeast Asia, is ruled by a traditional monarch who has absolute executive and 
legislative powers. The official religion of the tiny sultanate is Islam, of which two-
thirds of the population of 400,000 are Muslims. Brunei’s economy is primarily driven 
by oil and gas, accounting for more than half of its GDP and over 90% of exports and 
government revenue. The high dependence on hydrocarbons is evident from Fig. 1.4, 
which shows the co-movements of Brunei’s GDP and government revenue with the 
international crude oil price. 
Fig. 1.4 Crude oil price and Brunei’s GDP and government revenue 
 
Notes: Oil price data sourced from IMF International Financial Statistics. GDP data sourced from World 
Bank World Development Indicators. Government revenue data obtained from the Brunei Department of 
Economic Planning and Development. 
Brunei’s implementation of the Shari’a law in 2014, much to the ire of international 
human rights groups, has catapulted the nation into the international spotlight and 
sparked a storm of controversy. However, a more pressing concern is the growing fiscal 
deficit amidst low oil prices. The government has announced a series of budgetary 
spending cuts and the fiscal deficit is projected to be an astounding 26% of GDP in 
2016, the second largest globally after Libya (IMF, 2016a). The economy is also set to 
contract for the fourth consecutive year. 
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Brunei’s natural resource rents are spent on building infrastructure, funding a large 
public sector, and maintaining universal subsidy programs such as free education and 
healthcare, low-cost public housing, old age pensions, as well as highly subsidized 
staple foods, public utilities, and petroleum products. Fiscal surpluses are accumulated 
in its oil fund, established in 1983 under the auspices of the Brunei Investment Agency 
(BIA). Before the GFC, BIA’s assets were estimated at US$100 billion (Demange, 
2009) but they have dwindled to US$40 billion in 2016 (SWFI, 2016). Nonetheless, this 
is still sufficient to finance fiscal deficits of the projected 2016 magnitude for about 20 
years. However, there are no clear rules on how the fund is utilized in the conduct of 
fiscal policy. Brunei’s oil fund has a Linaburg-Maduell transparency rating of 1, 
indicating that it is highly opaque and secretive. 
Brunei has been operating on a currency board arrangement since 1967, in which 
the Brunei dollar is pegged at par to the Singapore dollar. Brunei, therefore, has no 
monetary policy autonomy and fiscal policy becomes an essential macroeconomic 
stabilization tool. Devising clear and transparent fiscal rules to better integrate the oil 
fund into the country’s macroeconomic policy framework could help avoid unnecessary 
volatility in an environment that is already embroiled by uncertainty. The widely-touted 
successes of Norway and Chile in this regard are worthy of emulation.   
Brunei’s persistently low economic growth, with an average of 1.2% over the past 
three decades, is also alarming. This is a far cry from the nation’s growth aspiration of 
6% per annum. The perennial goal of economic diversification continues to elude 
Brunei, and its future prosperity is still very much subject to the vagaries of volatile oil 
prices. At the same time, oil production has fallen from a recent peak of 228 thousand 
barrels per day (tbpd) in 2006Q3 to 122 tbdp in 2015Q3 as oil wells are depleted. Oil 
prices are projected to remain low in the medium term (IMF, 2016a), and with proven 
oil reserves that can sustain current production for less than 25 years (BP, 2016), Brunei 
faces a dire economic future. There is an urgent need to develop a better understanding 
of the Brunei economy, which, unfortunately, has received scant attention in the 
economics literature. 
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1.5 Key research questions and findings 
This thesis is a collection of five self-contained papers. The principal focus is on 
empirical macroeconomics; in essence, applying econometric techniques to analyse 
issues of contemporary economic policy interest. The research topics are motivated by 
the discussions in the subsections above. I examine: the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus 
in different economic environments (Chapter 2); how exchange rate and fiscal policy 
help oil-exporting countries adjust during bad times (Chapter 3); the roles of oil funds 
and institutional quality in macroeconomic stabilization (Chapter 4); the conduct of 
fiscal policy in Brunei (Chapter 5); and the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in 
Brunei (Chapter 6). 
In terms of the methodological approach, Chapters 2 to 4 feature panel data 
analyses using samples of as many countries as permitted by data availability. The 
estimation techniques used are panel vector autoregression (VAR) models, with 
different ways of identifying shocks. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on time series analysis for 
a single country using structural VAR models.  
In Chapter 2, I evaluate the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus in different economic 
environments using a large annual data set of 120 countries from 1960 to 2014. To 
credibly identify a shock to fiscal spending shock in annual data, I employ an alternative 
methodology based on sign restrictions. In concordance with the existing literature, I 
find that fiscal multipliers are larger in advanced economies, when public debt is low, at 
a high level of financial development, in a financial crisis, and during business cycle 
downturns. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, fiscal multipliers are not 
necessarily smaller in countries that are relatively open to trade and financial flows and 
operating under flexible exchange rate regimes. The relationship between the size of 
fiscal multipliers and the three dimensions of openness—trade openness, capital 
mobility, and exchange rate flexibility—hinges on the response of the real exchange rate 
and the degree of monetary policy accommodation. I also show that the results in 
Ilzetzki et al. (2013), who find smaller fiscal multipliers in open economies and flexible 
exchange rate regimes, are not sensitive to the choice of data frequency or the 
identification methodology but are driven by the country sample. 
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In Chapter 3, I examine the macroeconomic effects of an adverse oil price shock in 
oil-exporting countries under different exchange rate and fiscal policy arrangements. 
The results show that output and government consumption fall, as expected. However, 
the output decline is smaller and smoother under flexible exchange rate regimes due to a 
large and immediate real exchange rate depreciation. There is also less need for 
contractionary fiscal policy as the real depreciation plays a sufficient dampening role. In 
contrast, there is only a small and delayed real depreciation under fixed exchange rate 
regimes, leaving fiscal policy to bear the bulk of the macroeconomic adjustment costs. 
Nonetheless, the presence of oil funds is associated with smaller spending cuts and, 
hence, a reduced output fall. These findings highlight the shock-absorbing property of 
flexible exchange rates and the potential macroeconomic stabilization role of oil funds 
in insulating against adverse oil price movements, making a case for oil exporters to 
adopt more flexible exchange rate regimes and establish oil funds as fiscal buffers. 
Oil-exporting countries face challenges in the conduct of fiscal policy due to 
volatile oil revenues, especially in countries with weak institutions. Many oil exporters 
have established oil funds to delink government expenditure from oil revenues; 
however, their effectiveness remains unresolved. In Chapter 4, I examine the roles of oil 
funds and institutional quality in reducing fiscal procyclicality and macroeconomic 
volatility in oil-exporting countries. The results show that oil funds are effective in 
reducing fiscal procyclicality in countries with high institutional quality. There is also a 
reduction in the procyclical bias in those with low institutional quality but the statistical 
evidence is weak. Nevertheless, oil funds are associated with reduced volatility of 
government consumption and the real exchange rate in countries with low institutional 
quality. These findings give credence to the macroeconomic stabilization role of oil 
funds but also reinforce the importance of good institutions. 
In Chapter 5, I examine the conduct of fiscal policy in Brunei, focusing on the 
cyclical patterns in government expenditure. The results provide evidence that fiscal 
policy in Brunei is procyclical, which has an expansionary effect on output and thus 
exacerbates the business cycle. This behaviour is primarily driven by procyclical current 
expenditure while capital expenditure is largely acyclical. The government should 
exercise caution to avoid adding cyclical pressures to the economy already afflicted by 
volatile oil prices. A key policy recommendation would be to adopt clear fiscal rules to 
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better integrate Brunei’s oil funds into the budgetary framework to delink government 
spending from volatile oil revenue. 
In Chapter 6, I investigate the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in Brunei. 
The results show that oil price shocks account for only a small proportion of output 
fluctuations while productivity shocks have the largest share. Real exchange rate 
movements are largely driven by demand shocks while monetary shocks explain most 
of the variability in prices. Economic policies should focus on productivity 
improvement and capital investment to increase output in the long run, and the conduct 
of fiscal policy should take into account the impact on real exchange rate volatility.  
1.6 Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapters 2 to 6 present the core research materials. 
Chapter 2 evaluates the effectiveness of fiscal policy in different economic 
environments. Chapter 3 examines the impact of an adverse oil price shock in oil-
exporting countries under alternative exchange rate and fiscal policy arrangements. 
Chapter 4 examines the roles of oil funds and institutional quality in reducing fiscal 
procyclicality and macroeconomic volatility in oil-exporting countries. Chapter 5 
examines the conduct of fiscal policy in Brunei, focusing on the cyclical patterns in 
government expenditure. Chapter 6 investigates the sources of macroeconomic 
fluctuations in Brunei. Chapter 7 concludes with a brief discussion of the policy 
implications of the empirical results and outlines possible avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Fiscal multipliers: new evidence from a large 
panel of countries 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of fiscal policy by employing a structural panel 
vector autoregression model with a shock to fiscal spending identified via theoretical 
robust sign restrictions. Using an annual data set of 120 countries over the period 1960–
2014, the results show that fiscal multipliers are larger in advanced economies, when 
public debt is low, at a high level of financial development, in a financial crisis, and 
during business cycle downturns. Contrary to conventional wisdom, fiscal multipliers 
are not necessarily smaller in countries that are relatively open to trade and capital flows 
and operating under flexible exchange rate regimes. The relationship between the size 
of fiscal multipliers and the three dimensions of openness—trade openness, capital 
mobility, and exchange rate flexibility—hinges on the response of the real exchange rate 
and the domestic monetary policy pursued. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The effectiveness of fiscal policy has regained renewed attention in recent years as 
fiscal stimulus measures were implemented around the world to aid economic recovery 
from the global financial crisis; followed by fiscal consolidations and the ensuing 
austerity debate. However, there is still no consensus on the size of fiscal multipliers. 
Disagreements among economists not only emerge from theoretical predictions, but also 
from contradictory empirical evidence due to the use of different estimation 
methodologies and sample countries. Inaccurate estimation of fiscal multipliers can lead 
to significant growth forecast errors (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013), which have important 
consequences in the design of macroeconomic policies; for instance, in setting 
unrealistic fiscal targets on fiscal balance and public debt. 
One of the central issues in estimating fiscal multipliers is the endogeneity problem 
between fiscal policy and output. The standard approach to identify exogenous fiscal 
shocks is to use the strategy of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) by assuming government 
expenditure does not respond to GDP in the same quarter. This restricts the country 
sample typically to advanced economies since quarterly data is required for the 
identification scheme to be valid.  Ilzetzki et al. (2013), whose paper is among the most 
cited within this strand of the literature, construct a novel quarterly data set of 44 
countries to examine the role of country characteristics. They find that long-run fiscal 
multipliers are smaller (in fact, the mean multipliers are negative) in developing 
countries, open economies, flexible exchange rate regimes, and periods of high public 
debt. These findings have important policy ramifications. With increasing global 
integration and countries moving towards exchange rate flexibility, fiscal stimulus could 
become counterproductive. If this view gains traction, it might potentially discourage 
policymakers in developing countries from pushing reforms to further open up their 
economies or transition towards flexible exchange rates, especially in countries where 
fiscal policy plays a prominent stabilization role. 
While there is general consensus that fiscal multipliers tend to be smaller in 
developing and high-debt countries, the empirical evidence on the roles of openness and 
the exchange rate regime on the effectiveness of fiscal policy is mixed. There are 
studies that concur with the results in Ilzetzki et al. (2013); for example, Born et al. 
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(2013) find smaller multipliers in flexible exchange rate regimes, but there are also 
others with contradictory findings; for instance, Dellas et al. (2005) find that the size of 
fiscal multipliers does not vary systematically with the exchange rate regime. 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether there are any empirical 
regularities on the size of fiscal multipliers; in particular to revisit the findings in 
Ilzetzki et al. (2013). The main motivation behind this research is partially attributed to 
Contreras and Battelle (2014) who question the robustness of the results in Ilzetzki et al. 
(2013). Using the same identification method with quarterly data, they could replicate 
the results based on the 44 countries in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) but some of the conclusions 
no longer hold when the country sample is extended to 55. This paper therefore 
naturally asks the following questions: (i) Are the results in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) still 
valid in a larger country sample, i.e., do they suffer from sample bias?; (ii) Are the 
results different with lower frequency data?; and (iii) How important is the 
identification method?  
This paper further contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of fiscal policy by 
also assessing, in a coherent empirical framework, whether the size of fiscal multipliers 
depend on the degree of international capital mobility, level of financial development, 
occurrence of a financial crisis, and state of the business cycle, building on the work of 
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) who examine the relevance of economic development, trade 
openness, exchange rate flexibility, and public debt burden.  
I construct a large annual data set comprising of 120 countries over the period 1960–
2014. To credibly identify a fiscal spending shock using annual data, I employ an 
alternative methodology based on sign restrictions. A shock to government spending is 
identified by restricting the impact responses of output and fiscal deficit to increase with 
government expenditure, which Pappa (2009) shows to hold in both prototypical Real 
Business Cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian models. To the best of my knowledge, no 
other studies use sign restrictions to identify a shock to fiscal spending in determining 
the size of fiscal multipliers conditional on the economic environment across a large 
country sample. A summary of the results in this paper and related panel data studies is 
provided in Table 2.A1 in Appendix 2.A. 
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Briefly, the main findings are as follows: (i) In concordance with existing literature, 
fiscal multipliers are larger in advanced economies, when public debt is low, at a high 
level of financial development, in a financial crisis, and during business cycle 
downturns; (ii) However, contrary to conventional wisdom, fiscal multipliers in 
countries that are relatively open to trade are not smaller than their closed counterparts. 
Although there is demand leakage through imports in open economies, the increase in 
private consumption more than offsets the decline in net exports; (iii) Fiscal multipliers 
are also not smaller in countries with relatively high international capital mobility, 
contradicting the predictions of the traditional Mundell-Fleming model. This can be 
explained by the shaper depreciation of the real exchange rate and the relaxation in 
monetary policy; (iv) In addition, fiscal multipliers in flexible exchange rate regimes are 
not smaller than fixed regimes. There is no evidence of monetary policy 
accommodation under fixed exchange rate regimes, contrary to what the Mundell-
Fleming model would suggest. Moreover, under flexible exchange rate regimes the real 
exchange rate does not appreciate in response to an increase in government spending; 
(v) The qualitative findings in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) can be obtained by using annual data 
for their country sample in both the standard structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
and sign restriction identification schemes. This suggests that the results in Ilzetzki et al. 
(2013) are not sensitive to data frequency and the identification methodology, but are 
driven by the country sample; and (vi) The key to understanding the divergence of the 
results surrounding the three measures of openness—trade openness, capital mobility, 
and exchange rate flexibility—are the response of the real exchange rate and the degree 
of monetary policy accommodation. This underscores the importance of fiscal and 
monetary policy interactions in determining the size of fiscal multipliers. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on the effects of discretionary fiscal 
policy and how different economic characteristics affect the size of fiscal multipliers. 
Section 2.3 provides a brief overview of the issues in estimating fiscal multipliers. 
Section 2.4 describes the theoretical restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock as 
well as the econometric framework. Section 2.5 presents the results on the effectiveness 
of fiscal stimulus, Section 2.6 discusses robustness checks, and Section 2.7 concludes. 
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2.2 Macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy: theory and empirics 
It is instructive to briefly discuss what theory says about the expected consequences of a 
fiscal expansion. In the context of the closed economy textbook IS-LM model, an 
increase in government spending shifts the IS curve to the right. Labour demand 
increases, resulting in higher real wages and a higher level of output and consumption. 
Interest rates also rise, which can crowd out investment. The open economy counterpart 
to the IS-LM model is the Mundell-Fleming model. Under a flexible exchange rate 
regime, a fiscal expansion raises real interest rates and the nominal exchange rate 
appreciates. With nominal price sluggishness, the real exchange rate therefore 
appreciates and the trade balance deteriorates, thus limiting the expansionary effects of 
higher government spending. If there is perfect capital mobility, the resulting reduction 
in net exports completely offsets the fiscal expansion. In contrast, under a fixed 
exchange rate regime the monetary authority increases money supply to keep the 
exchange rate fixed, resulting in higher output while net exports remain unchanged. 
These traditional models do not account for inter-temporal aspects of fiscal 
expansions. There are trade-offs between the short-run benefits and additional public 
debt accumulation that requires higher future tax increases or spending reductions. In 
neoclassical RBC models (e.g., Baxter and King, 1993) the discounted value of future 
tax rises generates a negative wealth effect that induces individuals to reduce private 
consumption and leisure. Labour supply increases, real wages fall and there is an 
increase in output. The increase in employment raises the marginal product of capital 
and attracts more private investment. Likewise, in a neoclassical open economy model 
setting (e.g., Baxter, 1995), the above dynamics are also at work. In addition, a fiscal 
expansion, which is typically more intensive in home-produced non-traded goods, leads 
to a real exchange rate appreciation (i.e., price of domestic goods increases relative to 
foreign goods) and a deterioration in the trade balance. 
The two theoretical frameworks are seemingly at odds on the response of private 
consumption—Keynesian models predict an increase whereas neoclassical models 
predict the opposite. Nonetheless, both models agree that a fiscal expansion leads to a 
real exchange rate appreciation. However, empirical evidence does not usually conform 
fully to these theoretical predictions. In particular, an increase in government spending 
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is typically followed by an increase in private consumption (e.g., Fatás and Mihov, 
2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002) and a real exchange rate depreciation (e.g., Kim and 
Roubini, 2008; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010; Ravn et al., 2012).  
Several approaches have been proposed to account for these empirical ‘puzzles’. 
Linnemann (2006) introduces non-separability of consumption and leisure in the 
household utility function. Due to consumption and leisure being substitutes, the 
reduction in leisure as a consequence of fiscal expansion increases the marginal utility 
of consumption. This positive effect on consumption could offset the negative wealth 
effect, and is more likely the higher the degree of substitutability between consumption 
and leisure and the lower the inter-temporal rate of substitution. Bouakez and Rebei 
(2007) introduce preferences which depend on private and public spending, along with 
habit formation. The complementarities between private and government consumption 
enable the model to generate a positive response of private consumption to a 
government spending shock. Galí et al. (2007) introduce non-Ricardian (rule-of-thumb) 
households that consume their current disposable income. If this group of consumers is 
sufficiently large, the positive effect on current consumption could offset the negative 
wealth effect of optimizing households. 
On the real exchange rate depreciation puzzle, Kollmann (2010) emphasizes that 
the real exchange rate can depreciate if government spending shocks are persistent and 
international financial markets are incomplete. Corsetti et al. (2012a) show that if 
government spending contributes to debt stabilization, fiscal expansion today induces 
expectations of future spending cuts; long-run real interest rates therefore do not rise 
and the real exchange rate depreciates. Ravn et al. (2012) reconcile the puzzle by 
introducing deep-habit formation, in which an increase in domestic aggregate demand 
provides firms with incentives to lower markups. The decline in domestic markups 
relative to foreign markups leads to a real exchange rate depreciation. 
The macroeconomic effects of a fiscal expansion also depend on key country 
characteristics. The following sub-sections discuss the theoretical predictions and 
empirical estimates in different economic environments. 
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2.2.1 Economic development 
Studies on advanced economies typically produce fiscal multipliers between zero and 
one in the first year (see Batini et al., 2014). Kraay (2012), Estevão and Samaké (2013), 
and Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that fiscal multipliers in advanced economies are larger 
than developing countries. Among the reasons put forth to explain why fiscal multipliers 
tend to be smaller in developing countries are implementation lags and weaker 
management in public spending and higher precautionary savings owing to instability 
and uncertainty.2
2.2.2 Trade openness 
 
According to Keynesian models, government spending has maximum potency when the 
effects are contained in the domestic economy. Fiscal multipliers are therefore expected 
to be smaller in open economies, which have a higher propensity to import, as a fiscal 
expansion leads to demand leakage through imports instead of an increase in domestic 
production to satisfy the increase in aggregate demand. The findings of Ilzetzki et al. 
(2013) support this conventional view; fiscal multipliers are smaller in countries which 
are relatively open to trade. They find similar results even with alternative definitions of 
trade openness such as using tariff rates and economy size. 
2.2.3 Capital mobility 
Another important dimension of globalization is increasing financial integration and the 
reduction of barriers to international capital flows. However, the role of capital mobility 
has attracted considerably less attention as a determinant of the size of the fiscal 
multiplier. According to the traditional Mundell-Fleming model, the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy is an inverse function of the degree of international capital mobility. 
Capital mobility gives rise to an exchange-rate induced crowding-out effect, 
diminishing the efficacy of fiscal stimuli. This core result also holds in open economy 
general equilibrium models with micro foundations (e.g., Sutherland, 1996). 
                                                 
2 Institutional factors could also be important in determining the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Developing 
countries tend to have lower institutional quality; to some extent, economic development captures the 
effect of institutions. 
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Contrary to conventional wisdom, Pierdzioch (2004) shows that a high degree of 
capital mobility can also increase the effectiveness of fiscal policy. He emphasizes the 
importance of taking into account the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy to 
understand the transmission of fiscal shocks. Adding a richer specification of the 
monetary policy rule into the model of Sutherland (1996), he finds that the output effect 
of a fiscal policy shock increases in the degree of capital mobility under nominal 
income targeting but the opposite is observed if the central bank keeps money supply 
constant. 
In addition, according to the optimizing consumption-smoothing view, a high 
degree of capital mobility allows forward-looking agents to smooth consumption 
through the dynamics of the current account. From this inter-temporal standpoint, lower 
impediments to capital movements allow the current account to act as a buffer in the 
face of shocks; hence the negative wealth effect is smaller and fiscal multipliers could 
be larger.  
2.2.4 Exchange rate regime 
As discussed earlier, the Mundell-Fleming model predicts that a fiscal expansion is 
ineffective under flexible exchange rates as it leads to an exchange rate appreciation 
which crowds out net exports. In contrast, fiscal policy is effective under fixed 
exchange rates since monetary expansion keeps the exchange rate unchanged. Monetary 
policy accommodation therefore plays a crucial role. The findings in Corsetti et al. 
(2012b), Born et al. (2013), and Ilzetzki et al. (2013) provide support for this traditional 
view. 
However, this conventional view does not go unchallenged. Dellas et al. (2005) 
show in an open economy New Keynesian model that fiscal multipliers can be larger 
under flexible exchange rates compared to a peg, depending on the domestic monetary 
policy pursued. This is primarily due to the depreciation of the real exchange rate in 
response to a fiscal expansion. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the monetary 
authority must follow a contractionary monetary policy to keep the nominal exchange 
rate unchanged, which partially offsets the fiscal stimulus. With flexible exchange rates, 
the currency depreciation has a positive effect on net exports. Hence, it is possible for 
the output effect to be larger in flexible exchange regimes. However, the preceding 
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argument holds only when the monetary policy pursued is an exogenous money supply 
rule. If the monetary policy is based on inflation targeting instead, the picture is 
reversed. In this case, under a flexible exchange rate regime the monetary authority 
reacts to inflationary pressures of the fiscal expansion by raising interest rates. The 
resulting effect could be a smaller multiplier compared to a fixed regime. Based on 
these findings, Dellas et al. (2005) emphasize that one should not expect to see a 
systematic relationship between exchange rate flexibility and the size of fiscal 
multipliers in cross-country studies, unless one also conditions for the domestic 
monetary policy rule. 
2.2.5 Debt burden 
When public debt is high, forward-looking agents anticipate that they are more likely to 
pay higher taxes sooner and therefore increase their savings (Sutherland, 1997). The 
anticipation of such an adjustment could have a contractionary effect which could offset 
the expansionary impact of higher government spending today. In a model with 
heterogeneous households, Perotti (1999) shows that when the debt level is high, 
distortionary taxes amplify the negative wealth effects of unconstrained households 
which could outweigh the positive effects of a fiscal expansion on the income and 
consumption of credit-constrained households. 
The few empirical studies thus far give credence to the notion that high debt is 
harmful. Kirchner et al. (2010) find evidence of higher debt-to-GDP ratios negatively 
affecting long-term fiscal multipliers in the Euro Area. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) estimate 
long-run fiscal multipliers of -3 in episodes of high government debt.   
2.2.6 Financial development 
The degree of financial development has an ambiguous effect on the size of fiscal 
multipliers, depending on how it affects liquidity constraints and how governments 
finance fiscal deficits (Spilimbergo et al., 2009). One view of a higher level of financial 
development is the availability of more savings possibilities for consumption 
smoothing. Economic agents therefore face lower credit and liquidity constraints, which 
implies smaller fiscal multipliers in more developed financial systems. However, one 
can also argue that there are more financing options for consumption and investment in 
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a more developed financial sector, hence, fiscal multipliers could be larger. The other 
aspect relates to the cost of government borrowing. In countries with limited access to 
financial markets, governments can only issue debt to finance deficits at high interest 
rates, which diminishes the effectiveness of fiscal policy. On the other hand, there is 
also the possibility that governments can issue debt to a captive domestic market in 
financially depressed countries, which increases the size of fiscal multipliers. 
2.2.7 Financial crisis 
In a financial crisis the proportion of credit-constrained agents typically increases, 
implying larger fiscal multipliers during such episodes. This can be seen in the New 
Keynesian model of Galí et al. (2007), whereby an increase in government spending 
increases the consumption demand of credit-constrained households, which reinforces 
the expansionary effects of fiscal policy. Using a panel of OECD countries, Corsetti et 
al. (2012b) find that fiscal multipliers are about two times larger during a financial 
crisis. However, Romer and Romer (2015) find that output declines are relatively 
moderate, depending on the severity and persistence of the distress.  
In the case of interest rates reaching the zero lower bound, which is the prevailing 
economic environment in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, fiscal stimulus is 
then fully accommodated since the policy rate remains unchanged at zero. Fiscal 
multipliers can be unusually high, between two and four (see Eggertsson, 2010; 
Christiano et al., 2011; Woodford, 2011). 
2.2.8 State of the business cycle 
During the expansionary phase of the business cycle, fiscal stimulus is less effective 
since at full employment, an increase in public demand crowds out private demand, thus 
leaving output unchanged. In the contractionary phase, credit-constrained agents cannot 
borrow to smooth consumption and fiscal stimulus therefore has more traction on 
output. While there is mounting evidence that the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus 
depend on the state of the business cycle, the issue is still evolving. Studies on advanced 
economies find that fiscal multipliers are larger during recessions than in expansions 
(e.g., Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Owyang et al., 2013; Riera-Crichton, 2015), 
but Ramey and Zubairy (2014) report the absence of any state dependence. 
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2.3 Estimating fiscal multipliers 
Empirically, estimating fiscal multipliers faces some challenges. Fiscal multipliers 
measure the change in output in response to an exogenous change in fiscal policy. 
Identifying exogenous shocks is difficult due to reverse causality—government 
spending affects GDP, but GDP also affects government spending. There are generally 
two approaches to identify fiscal spending shocks in the literature.3
The second is based on the SVAR approach to model dynamic relationships of 
endogenous variables (e.g., Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; 
Perotti, 2005). Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identify fiscal spending shocks by 
assuming that government expenditure does not respond to GDP in the same quarter; 
hence, exogenous fiscal policy can be isolated by using quarterly data and ordering 
government expenditure before GDP. Another empirical challenge is the lack of high-
frequency and long time series data, especially for developing countries. Many studies 
rely on the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification method which necessitates the 
use of quarterly data if the fiscal shocks are to be considered credible. 
 The first is based on 
the ‘natural experiment’ or narrative approach in identifying exogenous variation by 
using military spending (e.g., Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Edelberg et al., 1999; Burnside 
et al., 2004; Barro and Redlick, 2011). The main idea behind this approach is that 
military spending is determined by wars and can therefore be treated as exogenous. 
However, this argument is invalidated in many developing countries since wars could 
be due to prevailing economic conditions, thus making military spending endogenous to 
the economy. Another criticism points to the possibility of other fiscal shocks occurring 
around the same time, which raises doubts on the identification of military build-ups. 
Nevertheless, there are studies that apply the SVAR approach to lower frequency 
data. For instance, Beetsma et al. (2008) justify that the use of annual data provides 
several advantages. First, the identified fiscal shocks using annual data may correspond 
more closely to actual shocks since government expenditure decisions typically follow 
an annual cycle. Second, the role of anticipation effects is less relevant as a given shock 
is less likely to be anticipated one year beforehand. Anticipation effects are usually 
                                                 
3 Only empirical estimation approaches are discussed here. Batini et al. (2014) provides a summary on the 
pros and cons of empirical and model-based DSGE approaches. 
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present in VAR models estimated with quarterly data (Ramey, 2011). Third, seasonality 
effects are less important in annual data. 
Recent methodological advances utilize sign restrictions to identify fiscal shocks 
(e.g., Canova and Pappa, 2007; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Dungey and Fry, 2009; 
Pappa, 2009).4
2.4 Data and methodology 
 As Pappa (2009) notes, the sign restriction approach offers a few 
advantages over the conventional SVAR approach: it is theory-based, applicable to data 
with any frequency, and largely solves the problem of endogeneity and predictability of 
fiscal variables. 
2.4.1 Identifying a shock to fiscal spending 
Existing studies typically require quarterly data to identify a fiscal spending shock, 
which narrows the scope of analysis to advanced economies. Although Ilzetzki et al. 
(2013) use a larger quarterly data set, their sample is confined mainly to advanced and 
larger developing (emerging) economies. To examine the robustness of the empirical 
findings in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) for a larger country sample, especially including 
developing countries, an alternative approach to credibly identify a shock to fiscal 
spending is required since only annual data is available. The sign restriction 
methodology comes in handy in this context. 
I adopt the theoretical restrictions in Pappa (2009) to identify a shock to fiscal 
spending. Pappa (2009) shows that in both prototypical flexible price RBC and sticky 
price New Keynesian models, a fiscal spending shock increases output and the deficit 
on impact. These responses are robust for a wide range of parameterizations. 
Furthermore, other shocks cannot produce the same responses on impact. In particular, 
technology, labour supply, and monetary shocks decrease the fiscal deficit at least on 
impact. A shock to fiscal spending is therefore identified by employing the sign 
restrictions in Table 2.1.  
 
                                                 
4 The sign restriction methodology is originally developed by Faust (1998), Canova and De Nicolò 
(2002), and Uhlig (2005) applied to monetary policy analysis. 
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Table 2.1 Sign restrictions to identify a shock to fiscal spending 
 Government consumption GDP Fiscal balance 
Real exchange 
rate 
Fiscal spending 
shock > 0 > 0 < 0  
Notes: Sign restrictions hold only on impact. 
It is important to note that the fiscal policy analysed here is a deficit-spending 
scenario. Tax cuts can also increase output and the deficit. However, a deficit-financed 
tax cut fiscal policy does not usually lead to an increase in government expenditure. 
One way to ensure the identified shock is not polluted by tax cuts is to add another 
restriction that requires tax revenues to be zero or positive. Including this additional 
sign restriction does not change any of the results in the paper but requires estimating a 
larger VAR.5
A related issue in identifying a single shock is the ‘multiple shocks problem’ as 
highlighted in Fry and Pagan (2011), i.e., the set of responses could have been generated 
by more than one potential shock and there is insufficient information to discriminate 
among the shocks. A possible solution is to reject all the draws for which the 
unidentified shocks deliver impulse responses that are consistent with the signs of the 
identified shock. However, potentially some useful information is lost when such draws 
are discarded. An alternative solution, which is used in this paper, is to apply magnitude 
restrictions to disentangle the shocks. For instance, if two shocks have the same set of 
impulse responses, the shock in which the response of government consumption is 
larger is considered as a fiscal spending shock. This is similar to the approach taken in 
Peersman (2005) and Dungey and Fry (2009). 
 
2.4.2 The sign restriction approach 
A structural panel VAR model of 𝑚 variables can be represented as: 
                                                 
5  Government revenue is used as a proxy for tax revenue since long time series data on tax revenue is not 
available for many countries. Adding government revenue in the VAR decreases the sample size by about 
25%. 
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𝐵0𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = �𝐵𝑘𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡𝐾
𝑘=1
,     𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇 (2.1) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of the 𝑚 endogenous variables for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡,  𝐾 is the lag 
length, 𝐵0 is the contemporaneous coefficient vector of 𝑌𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝑘 is a 𝑚 x  𝑚 matrix of 
coefficient parameters, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 denotes the ‘fundamental’ or structural macroeconomic 
shocks. 
The reduced form representation of (2.1) is given by: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = �𝐴𝑘𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝐾
𝑘=1
,     𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇 (2.2) 
where  𝐴𝑘 = 𝐵𝑜−1𝐵𝑘, and 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐵𝑜−1𝜀𝑖,𝑡 are the reduced-form residuals with 𝑚 x  𝑚 
variance-covariance matrix 𝐸�𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡′ � = Σ. 
Given a set of sign restrictions imposed on the impulse responses, the sign 
restriction method searches over the space of possible impulse vectors to find those 
satisfying the criteria. To construct structural impulse response functions, an estimate of 
the matrix 𝐵�𝑜−1 in 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐵�𝑜−1𝜀𝑡 is required. Let 𝛴 = 𝑃𝛬𝑃′ and 𝐵 = 𝑃Λ0.5 such that 𝐵 
satisfies 𝐵𝐵′ = 𝛴. Then 𝐵�𝑜−1 = 𝐵𝐷 also satisfies 𝐵�𝑜−1�𝐵�𝑜−1�′ =  Σ for any orthogonal 
matrix 𝐷. The sign restrictions procedure used in this paper is based on the Householder 
transformation (see Rubio-Ramírez et al., 2010) and involves the following steps: 
(i) Draw an independent standard normal 𝑚 x  𝑚 matrix 𝑋 and derive the QR 
decomposition of 𝑋 such that 𝑋 = 𝑄𝑅 and 𝑄𝑄′ = 𝐼𝑚; 
(ii) Let 𝐷 = 𝑄′. Compute the impulse responses using the orthogonalization 
𝐵�𝑜
−1 = 𝐵𝐷 and keep the structural models that satisfy the sign restrictions; 
(iii) Repeat the first two steps until the number of admissible structural models 
reaches the desired number; 
(iv) Sort the structural models and select the one whose impulse responses are 
closest to the median values (median target method; see Fry and Pagan, 2011).6
                                                 
6 Since each structural model represents a different relationship between variables in the VAR, there 
exists a ‘multiple models problem’ as discussed in Fry and Pagan (2011). Presenting the median as a 
summary of the central tendency of impulse response across models appears to be a popular choice. 
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The impulse responses closest to the 16 and 84 percentiles are obtained in a 
similar fashion. 
2.4.3 Data, variables, and definitions 
The panel VAR model in eq. (2.2) consists of four variables (𝑚 = 4)—real government 
consumption, real GDP, ratio of fiscal balance to GDP, and the real exchange rate—and 
is estimated with fixed effects. The matrix 𝐴𝑘 is homogeneous across countries and 
time, but the fixed effects capture the country-specific time-invariant factors which 
allow for individual heterogeneity. Annual data from 1960 to 2014 is used, but data 
availability varies by country. Only countries with at least 10 observations are included, 
which yields a data set of 120 countries. The list of countries is provided in Table 2.A2 
in Appendix 2.A. The results remain qualitatively unaltered if only countries with at 
least 20 observations are selected (data set reduced to 82 countries); see Section 2.6 and 
Appendix 2.F. In view of the annual data frequency, one lag is used (𝐾 = 1) but results 
are robust with two lags.7
Table 2.2 Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test 
 The variables are entered as first log differences except for 
the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio. Table 2.2 shows that the variables are stationary based 
on the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test, which allows for unbalanced panels 
(see Im et al., 2003).  
 No time trend With time trend 
Variable Z-t-tilde bar statistic p-value 
Z-t-tilde bar 
statistic p-value 
∆𝑔 -23.83 0.00 -25.75 0.00 
∆𝑦 -20.98 0.00 -22.96 0.00 
𝑓 -10.98 0.00 -14.50 0.00 
∆𝑞 -25.40 0.00 -26.01 0.00 
                                                                                                                                               
However, the conventional approach of inferring an impulse response function from pointwise medians of 
the posterior distribution of admissible responses does not have a structural interpretation. Instead, the 
admissible structural model closest to the median is selected. 
7 Ilzetzki et al. (2013) show that their results are robust for 1 to 8 lags in their quarterly data set, which is 
equivalent to 1 to 2 lags in the annual data set here. Using a more formal statistical criterion suggests 1 
and 2 lags based on BIC and AIC respectively. 
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Notes: 𝑔 is log of real government consumption, 𝑦 is log of real GDP, 𝑓 is the fiscal balance-to-GDP 
ratio, 𝑞 is log of the real effective exchange rate, and ∆ is the first difference operator. The null and 
alternative hypothesis tests of the IPS panel unit root test are 𝐻𝑜: all panels contain unit roots vs. 𝐻𝑎: 
some panels are stationary.  
In the panel data estimations, the sample is divided into groups mainly following the 
classifications in Ilzetzki et al. (2013). Using the World Bank’s income classification in 
2000, ‘advanced economies’ are high-income countries with a GNI per capita of $9,266 
or more; all other countries are classified as ‘developing countries’. On the degree of 
trade openness, countries with an average trade-to-GDP ratio less than 60% are 
categorized as ‘low trade openness’, and all others as ‘high trade openness’. The degree 
of international capital mobility is based on the Chinn-Ito index, which is a de jure 
measure of capital account openness (see Chinn and Ito, 2006). Countries with an index 
score higher than the global median is classified as ‘high capital mobility’, and ‘low 
capital mobility’ otherwise. Episodes of ‘fixed’ and ‘flexible’ regimes are obtained from 
the de facto exchange rate regime classifications in Ilzetzki et al. (2010).8  Episodes of 
government debt-to-GDP ratio higher than 60% are considered ‘high debt’, and all 
others ‘low debt’, using data from the IMF’s Historical Public Debt Database (see 
Abbas et al. 2010). Domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP is used as an 
indicator of financial development. Episodes with ratios higher than 50% are classified 
as ‘high credit’, and ‘low credit’ otherwise. Financial crisis episodes are obtained from 
Reinhart (2010).9
                                                 
8 Fixed regimes include no separate legal tender, hard pegs, crawling pegs, and crawling bands narrower 
than or equal to ±2%. Eurozone countries therefore have fixed exchange rates. Flexible regimes include 
bands wider than the 2% threshold, managed floats, and free floats. Freely falling currencies and those 
with dual markets in which parallel market data is missing are excluded. 
 The deviation of GDP from the Hodrick-Prescott trend is used as a 
naive measure of the business cycle. Output deviations higher and lower than the trend 
are defined as ‘expansionary’ and ‘recessionary’ phases respectively. Table 2.A3 in 
Appendix 2.A provides further details on the variables and data sources. 
9 Romer and Romer (2015) classify financial distress on a finer scale instead of a binary variable. 
However, in the context of this paper, using a 0–1 classification is more appropriate because of the 
sample splitting approach. Moreover, it is unclear how to aggregate the fine classifications in Romer and 
Romer (2015). Their data set also includes 24 OECD countries only. 
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A few definitions are in order. The impact fiscal multiplier is defined as the ratio of 
the change in output (𝑦) to the change in government consumption (𝑔) at the impact 
impulse horizon. Since the variables are in first log differences, approximating growth 
rates, the ratio of the impulse responses can be interpreted as elasticities. The fiscal 
multiplier is then obtained by dividing the elasticity by the average ratio of government 
consumption to GDP in the sample: 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 =  ∆𝑦0
∆𝑔0
 �𝑔 𝑦������� �  
At longer horizons, the cumulative fiscal multiplier in year 𝑇 is defined as: 
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 (𝑇) =  ∑ (1 + 𝑖)−𝑡∆𝑦𝑡𝑇𝑡=0
∑ (1 + 𝑖)−𝑡∆𝑔𝑡𝑇𝑡=0   �𝑔 𝑦��������  
where 𝑖 is the median interest rate in the sample. Of particular interest is the long-run 
fiscal multiplier, where the full effects of a fiscal expansion are realized, defined as the 
cumulative multiplier when 𝑇 → ∞. 
2.5 Empirical results 
To examine the size of fiscal multipliers conditional on economic characteristics, the 
country sample is divided into groups. A drawback of this approach is that it allows only 
one dimension to be isolated at a time, which complicates the identification of distinct 
effects. Notwithstanding this limitation, the segregation of the country sample into 
meaningful sub-groups provides insights into how the fiscal transmission mechanism 
depends on the economic environment. Adopting a common estimation framework also 
allows progress to be made in finding empirical regularities that may verify or cast 
doubt on the results in the existing literature. 
2.5.1 Panel data estimation based on 44 countries 
The first empirical exercise is to run the panel data estimation using the 44 countries in 
Ilzetzki et al. (2013), but with the use of sign restrictions to identify a shock to fiscal 
spending in the annual data set. The question of interest is whether the findings in 
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Ilzetzki et al. (2013) still hold with an alternative identification method and lower 
frequency data. 
The cumulative fiscal multipliers are displayed in Figs 2.1 to 2.4. The solid line 
represents the median impulse response obtained from the set of admissible models 
from 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution which satisfy the imposed sign 
restrictions in Table 2.1. The dotted lines are the 16 and 84 percentile impulse 
responses. As the figures show, the qualitative results in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) can be 
reproduced even with the use of annual data and identifying a fiscal spending shock 
using sign restrictions—long-run fiscal multipliers are larger in advanced economies, 
countries with low trade openness, fixed exchange rate regimes, and a low debt 
environment.10
2.5.2 Panel data estimation based on 120 countries 
 The plots of the empirical distributions of the long-run cumulative 
multipliers are shown in Appendix 2.B, along with the corresponding non-parametric 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests. The tests indicate that the results 
are statistically significant. In addition, Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) results can also be 
obtained when the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification strategy is used; see 
Section 2.6 and Appendix 2.G. This illustrates their conclusions are not very sensitive to 
the choice of data frequency and the identification method. 
Next, the panel VAR is estimated using the large data set of 120 countries. The findings 
under different economic characteristics are discussed in turn. Emphasis is also placed 
on assessing the robustness of Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) results, i.e., whether their results 
suffer from sample bias. The plots of the empirical distributions of the long-run fiscal 
multipliers and their associated statistical tests are in Appendix 2.C. 
2.5.2.1 Economic development 
Cumulative fiscal multipliers in advanced economies and developing countries are 
shown in Fig. 2.5. The median impact multipliers are 0.97 and 0.63 for advanced and 
developing countries respectively. These are typical values reported for first-year 
multipliers. The multipliers increase to 1.28 and 0.78 in the long run, providing support 
                                                 
10 However, the quantitative estimates are clearly different. In particular, negative long-run fiscal 
multipliers are not observed.  
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Fig.2. 1 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in advanced and developing countries (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample) 
Advanced economies Developing countries 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Definition is based on the World Bank’s income classification in 2000. Advanced economies are high-income countries with GNI per capita of $9,266 or 
more, all others are categorized as developing countries. GNI per capita data available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of 
observations: Advanced – 635, Developing – 703. 
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Fig. 2.2 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high trade openness (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample) 
Low trade openness High trade openness 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Countries with an average trade-to-GDP ratio less than 60% are classified as low trade openness, and high trade openness otherwise. Trade-to-GDP data 
available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low trade openness – 715, High trade openness – 623. 
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Fig. 2.3 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country 
sample) 
Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes coded from 1–8 are classified as fixed regime, and 9–13 as flexible regime. De facto exchange rate regime classification is based on the fine 
classification in Ilzetzki et al. (2010) with data available from 1960–2010. Number of observations: Fixed regime – 736, Flexible regime – 385. 
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Fig. 2.4 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high public debt (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample) 
Low public debt High public debt 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes with debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60% are classified as high debt, and low debt otherwise. Debt-to-GDP data available from 1960–2012, 
obtained from IMF Historical Public Debt Database. Number of observations: Low debt – 933, High debt – 324. 
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that fiscal multipliers are larger in advanced economies. 
It is worth highlighting that the sharp results in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) are not 
observed with the large data set. The long-run multipliers in their study are 0.66 and -
0.63 for advanced and developing countries respectively, suggesting fiscal expansion is 
futile in developing countries. However, the results here show otherwise; although the 
fiscal multipliers in developing countries are smaller, there is still some expansionary 
effect.11
2.5.2.2 Trade openness 
 
Figure 2.6 displays the results in countries with low and high trade openness. A striking 
observation is that fiscal multipliers in economies which are relatively open to trade are 
not smaller than their closed counterparts. This is in contrast to the findings in Ilzetzki et 
al. (2013), whereby they obtain long-run multipliers of 1.1 and -0.46 in countries with 
low and high trade openness respectively. When the data set is extended from 44 
countries in Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) sample to 120 countries, the commonly accepted 
view that fiscal multipliers are smaller in countries relatively open to trade is no longer 
true. 
To understand why the results are not as expected a priori, the model is re-estimated 
by replacing GDP with private consumption, investment, and net exports. Figure 2.7 
plots the impulse responses of private consumption, investment, net exports, and the 
real exchange rate to a government consumption shock normalized to 1%. In countries 
relatively open to trade, net exports fall as expected due to a higher propensity of 
demand leakage through imports. However, there is an increase in private consumption, 
which more than compensates the decline in net exports. This helps to explain why 
fiscal multipliers in countries with high trade openness are not necessarily smaller. 
Interestingly, the empirical puzzles discussed in Section 2.2—increase in private 
                                                 
11 Ilzetzki et al. (2013) also examine the multiplier on government investment using a subset of their 
country sample and find no significant difference between advanced and developing countries. The 
impact of a government investment shock is not explored in the paper since data on government 
investment is not available for most countries. 
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consumption and a depreciation of the real exchange rate—are only observed in open 
economies.12
2.5.2.3 Capital mobility 
  
The cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high international capital 
mobility are shown in Fig. 2.8. They are evidently not smaller when capital movements 
are less restricted, contradicting the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model. The 
impulse responses in financially open economies are similar to those of high trade 
openness, i.e., sharper increase in private consumption and depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. This is not surprising since about three-quarters of the countries in the 
data set which are relatively open to trade also have high international capital mobility. 
The standard theory of inter-temporal consumption smoothing suggests that higher 
international capital flows would reduce the sensitivity of consumption to transitory 
changes in income, i.e., the negative wealth effect induced by a fiscal expansion would 
be smaller. This could explain why private consumption is higher in countries with high 
capital mobility. 
Pierdzioch (2004) offers an alternative view by focusing on the endogenous 
response of the monetary authority. In this vein, Fig. 2.9 plots the impulse responses of 
private consumption, the short-term interest rate, and the real exchange rate to a 1% 
government consumption shock. In countries with high capital mobility, monetary 
policy appears to be more accommodative to the fiscal expansion; interest rates fall by 
10 basis points on impact compared to 5 basis points in countries with more capital 
restrictions. The depreciation of the real exchange rate is also larger when capital is 
more mobile. These responses could well be a reflection of the underlying domestic 
monetary policy pursued, so perhaps one should not expect empirical results to conform 
to theoretical predictions of models which do not incorporate fiscal and monetary policy 
interactions.  
                                                 
12 There is some empirical support for the ambiguity of the response of the real exchange rate at the 
individual country level. da Silva et al. (2015) find that the effects are not uniform even in countries that 
are relatively homogeneous—an increase in government spending leads to a real exchange rate 
depreciation in Brazil and Chile, but an appreciation in Mexico. 
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2.5.2.4 Exchange rate regime 
Figure 2.10 shows the fiscal multipliers in episodes of fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes. The multipliers in flexible regimes are not smaller than those in fixed regimes, 
again contradicting the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model and the findings of 
Ilzetzki et al. (2013). They estimate long-run multipliers of 1.4 for fixed regimes and -
0.69 for flexible regimes. 
The sources of divergence from Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) results centre on the 
responses of monetary policy and the real exchange rate. According to the Mundell-
Fleming model, fiscal expansion is more effective under fixed exchange rate regimes as 
the monetary authority increases money supply to prevent the domestic currency from 
appreciating, i.e., monetary policy accommodates the rise in output. On the other hand, 
the real exchange rate is allowed to appreciate under flexible regimes which results in a 
reduction in net exports and thus offsets the increase in government spending; output 
therefore remains unchanged. 
To examine these theoretical predictions of the traditional Keynesian model, Fig. 
2.11 displays the impulse responses of private consumption, the short-term interest rate, 
and the real exchange rate to a 1% government consumption shock. There is no 
evidence of monetary policy accommodation in fixed exchange rate regimes. Instead, 
the median impulse response shows that the monetary authority increases the interest 
rate instead and the real exchange rate appreciates. Given the large data set which 
includes many developing countries, a currency peg might not be perfectly credible in 
these countries. It is conceivable that a fiscal expansion triggers uncertainty in the 
domestic currency and the monetary authority therefore increases the interest rate to 
defend the currency. 
There is also no evidence of a real exchange rate appreciation in flexible exchange 
rate regimes. The median impulse response instead indicates a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate and a loosening of monetary policy, which helps to explain why fiscal 
multipliers can be larger in flexible regimes. In fact, this non-uniformity in the response 
of the real exchange rate across exchange rate regimes is not without precedent. 
Bénétrix and Lane (2013) find that a fiscal shock appreciates the real exchange rate in 
European Monetary Union (EMU) countries, but a depreciation is observed in a sample 
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of floating-currency economies (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States). 
 An important conclusion from the analysis here is that the size of fiscal multipliers 
hinges on the degree of monetary accommodation and the response of the real exchange 
rate. This is the central tenet of the model in Dellas et al. (2005) as discussed in Section 
2.2. 
2.5.2.5 Debt burden 
Fiscal multipliers in episodes of high and low public debt are displayed in Fig. 2.12. 
They are significantly smaller when the debt burden is high. This echoes the results of 
Ilzetzki et al. (2013). However, their long-run estimates are -0.36 and -3 for low and 
high debt episodes respectively, suggesting that fiscal stimulus is counter-productive 
even at low debt levels, which is rather puzzling. Although the long-run fiscal multiplier 
in episodes of debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60% in this paper is low at 0.40, there is still 
some output gain from fiscal expansions. I also experiment with the debt-to-GDP ratio 
and find that fiscal multipliers are close to zero when the debt burden is larger than 
100%, which is the definition used in Perotti (1999). 
2.5.2.6 Financial development 
Figure 2.13 shows the fiscal multipliers in low and high levels of financial development. 
Fiscal stimulus is about twice as effective in more developed financial systems. Going 
back to the discussion in Section 2.2.6, this suggests that governments are able to 
finance deficits at relatively low interest rates with better access to borrowing. Also, a 
more developed financial sector provides ample financing options for consumption and 
investment. It also implies that a high credit-to-GDP ratio is not a good indicator of 
savings opportunities. If so, one would expect smaller fiscal multipliers in episodes of 
high credit-to-GDP ratio due to lower liquidity constraints to smooth consumption.  
2.5.2.7 Financial crisis 
Episodes of financial crisis are a better reflection of liquidity and credit constraints. As 
Fig. 2.14 shows, fiscal multipliers are three times larger during a financial crisis since 
agents typically have lower access to credit to smooth consumption. This finding lends 
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support to the use of fiscal stimuli as a stabilization tool in alleviating the impact of a 
financial crisis.  
2.5.2.8 State of the business cycle 
Figure 2.15 shows the fiscal multipliers across business cycle phases. They are 
significantly larger during contractions compared to expansions. While existing studies 
which find that fiscal stimulus is more effective in recessions typically focus on 
advanced economies, the findings here provide evidence that the conclusion remains 
robust in a large panel of countries. It is worthwhile to note that recessions could 
emerge due to financial crises, but the results in Section 2.5.2.7 above shows that fiscal 
multipliers are larger during financial distress compared to a general definition of cycle 
downturns. 
2.6 Robustness checks 
I conduct two important robustness checks on the results. First, I use the conventional 
identification approach following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Admittedly, the use of 
annual data renders the identification of a fiscal spending shock less credible, as the 
approach relies on the crucial assumption that policymakers take more than a quarter to 
learn about a GDP shock, and hence ordering government expenditure before GDP in a 
quarterly VAR model captures the exogenous part of discretionary fiscal spending. 
Nonetheless, as a robustness exercise, it is useful to check whether the findings in 
Section 2.5 hold. Such a strategy using annual data is also used in Beetsma et al. (2008), 
who find that results based on annual data are relatively robust.  
As before, the reduced-form panel VAR specification in eq. (2.2) is estimated with 
fixed effects and one lag; results are unaltered with two lags. In the panel VAR model, 
government consumption is ordered first, followed by GDP, fiscal balance, and the real 
exchange rate. The cumulative fiscal multipliers, derived from impulse responses of 
GDP to a government consumption shock, are displayed in Appendix 2.D. The 
estimated multipliers are generally smaller than those obtained via sign restrictions in 
Section 2.5.2, but the conclusions are equally valid: no observable output contractions 
from fiscal expansions; larger fiscal multipliers in advanced economies, when public 
debt is low, in developed financial systems, in a financial crisis, and during cycle 
 38 
 
downturns; and contrary to Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) study, fiscal stimulus in open 
economies and flexible exchange rates are not necessarily less effective. 
Second, I amend the sample selection criteria to include only countries with at least 
20 observations, which results in a data set of 82 countries. This is to ascertain whether 
sample bias is still present in Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) study by extending their sample 
only from 44 to 82 countries. The estimated multipliers are shown in Appendix 2.E. The 
results are in total agreement with the findings for the data set of 120 countries. These 
conclusions are also obtained when sign restrictions are used; see Appendix 2.F. 
I then turn to the estimation for Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample. The 
cumulative fiscal multipliers are displayed in Appendix 2.G. The qualitative conclusions 
of Ilzetzki et al. (2013) can be obtained even with the use of the Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) approach on annual data. The divergence of the findings still centres on openness 
and exchange rate regimes. 
To summarize, the qualitative findings in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) can be reproduced 
with the use of either the sign restriction or Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach on 
annual data. However, when a larger annual data set of either 82 or 120 countries is used 
with a shock to fiscal spending identified using either the sign restriction or 
conventional SVAR approach, the findings on openness and exchange rate flexibility are 
no longer valid. This illustrates that data frequency and the identification method are not 
as sensitive as the country sample composition.  
2.7 Conclusion 
The proliferation of fiscal stimulus packages implemented in recent years and the 
subsequent fiscal consolidations have revived the debate on the size of fiscal 
multipliers. The crucial element required to properly assess the effectiveness of fiscal 
stimuli is to credibly identify fiscal spending shocks, which is often plagued with 
problems. 
This paper adopts the sign restriction methodology to identify a fiscal spending 
shock in a large annual panel data set of 120 countries from 1960 to 2014. The results 
show that fiscal stimulus has an expansionary effect on output, with multipliers in the 
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range of 0.4–1.8. Fiscal multipliers are larger in a financial crisis and also during 
business cycle downturns more generally, supporting the widespread use of fiscal 
stimulus packages to aid in economic recovery. Fiscal multipliers are also considerably 
lower in developing countries and under high debt burden, pointing to the importance of 
better public expenditure management, which is usually lacking in developing 
countries, and a need to establish sustainable fiscal debt frameworks.  
Contrary to what many economists believe, fiscal multipliers are not necessarily 
smaller in countries that are relatively open to trade and financial flows and operating 
under flexible exchange rate regimes. The size of fiscal multipliers also depends on the 
response of the real exchange rate and the domestic monetary policy pursued. It should 
therefore not be taken for granted that the effectiveness of fiscal policy fits nicely in the 
paradigm of conventional macro modelling frameworks. With increasing global 
integration and adoption of inflation targeting regimes, there is a need for further 
research to understand fiscal and monetary policy interactions; in particular, on how the 
fiscal transmission mechanism depends on the three dimensions of openness—trade 
openness, capital mobility, and exchange rate flexibility.  
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Fig. 2.5 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in advanced and developing countries (120 country sample) 
Advanced economies Developing countries 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Definition is based on the World Bank’s income classification in 2000. Advanced economies are high-income countries with GNI per capita of $9,266 or 
more, all others are categorized as developing countries. GNI per capita data available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of 
observations: Advanced – 986, Developing – 2249. 
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Fig. 2.6 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high trade openness (120 country sample) 
Low trade openness High trade openness 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Countries with an average trade-to-GDP ratio less than 60% are classified as low trade openness, and high trade openness otherwise. Trade-to-GDP data 
available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low trade openness – 1405, High trade openness – 1830. 
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Fig. 2.7 Impulse responses to a 1% government consumption shock in countries 
with low and high trade openness (120 country sample) 
 Low trade openness High trade openness 
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Notes: Impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from 
the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line 
denotes the median impulse response and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 percentile values. Countries 
with an average trade-to-GDP ratio less than 60% are classified as low trade openness, and high trade 
openness otherwise. 
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Fig. 2.8 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high international capital mobility (120 country sample) 
Low capital mobility High capital mobility 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Countries with an average Chinn-Ito capital account openness index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) lower than the global median are classified as low capital 
mobility, and high capital mobility otherwise. The Chinn-Ito index data is available from 1970–2014. Number of observations: Low capital mobility – 1161, High capital 
mobility – 2031. 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
 44 
 
Fig. 2.9 Impulse responses to a 1% government consumption shock in countries 
with low and high international capital mobility (120 country sample) 
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Notes: Impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from 
the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line 
denotes the median impulse response and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 percentile values. Countries 
with an average Chinn-Ito capital account openness index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) lower than the global 
median are classified as low capital mobility, and high capital mobility otherwise. 
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Fig. 2.10 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes (120 country sample) 
Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes coded from 1–8 are classified as fixed regime, and 9–13 as flexible regime. De facto exchange rate regime classification is based on the fine 
classification in Ilzetzki et al. (2010) with data available from 1960–2010. Number of observations: Fixed regime – 1977, Flexible regime – 711. 
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Fig. 2.11 Impulse responses to a 1% government consumption shock in episodes of 
de facto fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes (120 country sample) 
 Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
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Notes: Impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from 
the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line 
denotes the median impulse response and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 percentile values. Episodes 
coded from 1–8 are classified as fixed regime, and 9–13 as flexible regime. De facto exchange rate 
regime classification is based on the fine classification in Ilzetzki et al. (2010). 
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Fig. 2.12 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high public debt (120 country sample) 
Low public debt High public debt 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes with debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60% are classified as high debt, and low debt otherwise. Debt-to-GDP data available from 1960–2012, 
obtained from IMF Historical Public Debt Database. Number of observations: Low debt – 2081, High debt – 890. 
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Fig. 2.13 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high credit (120 country sample) 
Low credit High credit 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes with credit-to-GDP ratio exceeding 50% are classified as high credit, and low credit otherwise. Credit-to-GDP data available from 1960–2014, 
obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low credit – 1946, High credit – 1187. 
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Fig. 2.14 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes without and with financial crisis (120 country sample) 
No financial crisis Financial crisis 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes with financial crisis are obtained from Reinhart (2010), defined as type I and II banking crisis. Data available from 1960–2010 for a smaller 
subset of countries. Number of observations: No financial crisis – 1493, Financial crisis – 270. 
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Fig. 2.15 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in expansionary and recessionary phases of the business cycle (120 country sample) 
Expansions Contractions 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Phases of expansions and contractions obtained from deviation of output from the Hodrick-Prescott trend as a measure of the business cycle. Data 
available from 1960–2014. Number of observations: Expansions – 1577, Recessions – 1658. 
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Appendix 2.A 
Table 2.A1 Summary of selected panel data studies on the size of fiscal multipliers 
Authors No. of 
countries 
Data 
frequency 
Methodology Country characteristics Impact fiscal 
multiplier 
Long-run fiscal 
multiplier 
This paper 120 Annual SVAR with 
sign 
restrictions 
Advanced economies 
Developing countries 
Low trade openness 
High trade openness 
Low capital mobility 
High capital mobility 
Fixed exchange rate regime 
Flexible exchange rate regime 
Low debt 
High debt 
Low credit 
High credit 
No financial crisis 
Financial crisis 
Expansions 
Contractions 
0.97 
0.63 
0.55 
0.78 
0.63 
0.80 
0.74 
0.91 
0.92 
0.53 
0.62 
1.05 
0.40 
1.77 
0.51 
0.86 
1.28 
0.78 
0.53 
1.18 
0.77 
1.09 
0.91 
1.23 
1.14 
0.40 
0.68 
1.46 
0.58 
1.80 
0.58 
0.93 
Beetsma et al. (2008) 14 (EU) Annual SVAR Advanced economies 
Open economies 
1.2 
0.83 
 
  
52 
Closed economies 1.43 
Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) 
24 (OECD) Semi-
annual 
Smooth 
transition VAR 
Expansions 
Contractions 
-0.20 
0.46 
 
Kraay (2012) 29 Annual Natural 
experiment 
Developing countries 0.48  
Ravn et al. (2012) 4 Quarterly SVAR Advanced economies 0.52  
Born et al. (2013) 24 (OECD) Semi-
annual 
SVAR Fixed exchange rate regime 
Flexible exchange rate regime 
1.5 
0.5 
 
Estevão and Samaké 
(2013) 
 Annual SVECM Advanced economies 
Emerging market economies 
Low income countries 
Oil producing countries 
0.43 
0.34 
0.17 
0.31 
0.78 
1.04 
-0.33 
0.44 
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 44 Quarterly SVAR Advanced economies 
Developing countries 
Open economies 
Closed economies 
Fixed exchange rate regime 
Flexible exchange rate regime 
Low debt 
High debt 
0.39 
-0.03 
-0.08 
0.61 
0.15 
0.14 
-0.04 
-0.03 
0.66 
-0.63 
-0.46 
1.1 
1.4 
-0.69 
-0.36 
-3 
Contreras and Battelle 
(2014) 
55 Quarterly SVAR Advanced economies 
Developing countries 
Open economies 
0.36 
0.39 
0.27 
0.38 
0.88 
0.23 
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Closed economies 
Fixed exchange rate regime 
Flexible exchange rate regime 
Low debt 
High debt 
0.62 
0.41 
0.29 
0.44 
0.37 
1.76 
1.06 
0.54 
1.49 
0.39 
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Table 2.A2 List of countries and structural characteristics 
Country Years included 
Income 
classification 
Trade % 
GDP 
Chinn-Ito 
index 
Exchange 
rate regime 
Debt % 
GDP 
Credit % 
GDP 
% years in 
financial 
crisis 
% years in 
recessionary 
phase 
Algeria 1997–2013 DEV 64.0 0.16 7.9 38.6 11.2 0.00 0.53 
Argentina 1994–2014 DEV 29.5 0.42 5.1 65.0 15.9 0.29 0.38 
Armenia 2003–2012 DEV 67.6 1.00 9.0 27.2 19.4 N/A 0.70 
Australia 1970–2013 ADV 34.7 0.69 10.7 21.9 65.6 0.10 0.39 
Austria 1976–2014 ADV 78.2 0.87 3.4 56.0 85.1 0.09 0.54 
Azerbaijan 1993–2012 DEV 88.3 0.22 4.0 15.6 9.3 N/A 0.50 
Bahamas, The 1990–2014 ADV 96.4 0.06 2.0 30.2 64.3 N/A 0.52 
Bahrain 1990–2011 DEV 147.0 0.97 2.0 22.8 47.6 N/A 0.50 
Bangladesh 2001–2011 DEV 36.0 0.16 5.5 46.0 31.9 N/A 0.64 
Barbados 1974–2006 DEV 103.6 0.19 2.0 46.3 43.8 N/A 0.58 
Belarus 1992–2012 DEV 130.2 0.11 5.1 19.7 18.3 N/A 0.57 
Belgium 1971–2013 ADV 122.0 0.82 3.1 95.4 44.9 0.08 0.51 
Belize 1990–2012 DEV 114.8 0.21 2.0 70.3 47.4 N/A 0.52 
Benin 2001–2012 DEV 46.4 0.16 2.0 39.3 18.2 N/A 0.50 
Bhutan 1990–2009 DEV 84.8 0.16 2.0 57.0 12.9 N/A 0.65 
Bolivia 1990–2013 DEV 59.6 0.63 6.1 63.9 45.4 0.24 0.46 
Botswana 1976–2014 DEV 102.9 0.55 6.9 19.7 16.6 N/A 0.56 
Brazil 1975–2008 DEV 19.9 0.12 10.2 58.4 50.9 0.18 0.53 
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Brunei 
Darussalam 1990–2013 ADV 106.5 N/A 8.0 1.4 43.1 N/A 0.58 
Bulgaria 1988–2014 DEV 99.6 0.43 2.0 74.2 47.0 N/A 0.56 
Burkina Faso 1973–2005 DEV 36.1 0.15 2.1 35.9 12.5 N/A 0.45 
Burundi 1971–2012 DEV 34.0 0.13 6.7 70.4 11.5 N/A 0.57 
Cambodia 2002–2012 DEV 126.7 0.62 7.0 33.3 18.6 N/A 0.55 
Canada 1971–2013 ADV 58.8 1.00 8.5 71.4 93.9 0.08 0.42 
Chile 1990–2014 DEV 63.9 0.51 9.9 23.7 74.6 0.00 0.52 
China 1979–2013 DEV 35.9 0.11 8.0 12.6 94.4 0.25 0.54 
Colombia 1961–2011 DEV 31.2 0.13 9.7 25.2 29.3 0.16 0.53 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 1994–2010 DEV 52.7 0.18 13.0 173.6 2.0 N/A 0.47 
Costa Rica 1970–2006 DEV 75.8 0.37 6.5 51.6 22.0 0.11 0.51 
Croatia 1996–2013 DEV 79.2 0.59 8.0 40.8 50.7 N/A 0.61 
Cyprus 1976–2003 ADV 115.5 0.20 6.3 37.1 105.9 N/A 0.57 
Czech 
Republic 1995–2014 DEV 113.3 0.79 8.0 26.5 44.9 N/A 0.50 
Denmark 1995–2014 ADV 87.4 1.00 4.8 47.5 134.6 0.19 0.50 
Dominican 
Republic 1961–2000 DEV 57.4 0.08 9.4 34.1 21.9 0.03 0.48 
Ecuador 1961–2007 DEV 38.8 0.47 5.2 46.3 16.1 0.13 0.45 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 2002–2012 DEV 54.5 0.90 6.7 85.1 43.7 0.00 0.55 
El Salvador 1969–2013 DEV 61.3 0.45 6.0 42.5 33.4 0.02 0.49 
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Estonia 1995–2012 DEV 129.2 0.93 2.0 5.9 55.6 N/A 0.67 
Ethiopia 1990–2011 DEV 34.0 0.15 7.0 88.3 17.1 N/A 0.45 
Fiji 1970–1997 DEV 102.1 0.29 N/A 26.7 25.5 N/A 0.43 
Finland 1975–2014 ADV 63.5 0.86 5.2 32.0 66.6 0.11 0.40 
France 1971–2014 ADV 46.3 0.70 4.4 45.0 84.9 0.13 0.48 
Georgia 1998–2014 DEV 81.0 0.71 8.6 40.7 21.5 N/A 0.53 
Germany 1971–2014 ADV 53.1 1.00 9.1 48.4 86.0 0.15 0.43 
Greece 1995–2012 ADV 50.4 0.85 1.8 112.3 65.7 0.25 0.56 
Guatemala 1961–2014 DEV 45.6 0.66 4.7 23.9 18.1 0.06 0.61 
Honduras 1965–2006 DEV 79.5 0.48 5.3 52.9 30.2 0.07 0.60 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China 1981–2014 ADV 300.9 1.00 2.6 31.0 159.5 N/A 0.38 
Hungary 1995–2013 DEV 132.4 0.77 8.9 67.1 40.8 0.25 0.63 
Iceland 1998–2013 ADV 82.0 0.50 10.0 55.4 151.7 0.31 0.63 
India 1990–2013 DEV 33.0 0.16 6.7 72.5 34.0 0.29 0.54 
Indonesia 2000–2014 DEV 55.8 0.62 11.1 47.5 27.5 0.27 0.60 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 1970–2007 DEV 42.5 0.22 9.2 26.8 25.9 N/A 0.55 
Ireland 1971–2002 ADV 113.6 0.55 5.4 63.7 47.3 0.00 0.47 
Israel 1996–2013 ADV 70.7 0.79 7.6 85.8 80.7 N/A 0.33 
Italy 1971–2011 ADV 43.0 0.61 6.1 89.5 62.4 0.18 0.49 
Japan 1994–2013 ADV 24.9 0.98 13.0 161.7 193.9 0.47 0.60 
Jordan 1977–2014 DEV 122.1 0.61 4.3 94.4 65.5 N/A 0.53 
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Kazakhstan 1998–2013 DEV 85.6 0.16 7.1 13.8 31.2 N/A 0.56 
Kenya 1970–2012 DEV 58.4 0.36 6.3 43.7 27.0 0.22 0.53 
Korea, Rep. 1970–2014 DEV 65.9 0.35 7.9 18.6 70.3 0.29 0.42 
Kuwait 1993–2013 ADV 91.7 0.77 5.2 38.9 55.6 N/A 0.52 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 1993–2014 DEV 105.0 0.57 7.5 70.2 9.7 N/A 0.68 
Latvia 1996–2014 DEV 97.5 0.97 9.2 18.8 49.1 N/A 0.74 
Lebanon 1995–2014 DEV 84.8 0.75 2.0 143.8 79.3 N/A 0.50 
Lesotho 1987–2007 DEV 166.5 0.20 2.0 82.4 16.0 N/A 0.48 
Lithuania 1999–2014 DEV 132.9 0.91 4.7 24.9 47.9 N/A 0.75 
Luxembourg 1995–2013 ADV 285.1 N/A 1.8 9.7 84.9 N/A 0.53 
Madagascar 2000–2011 DEV 69.2 0.39 12.0 65.2 10.0 N/A 0.50 
Malaysia 1970–2013 DEV 144.5 0.63 6.2 53.1 87.8 0.24 0.43 
Mali 1976–2002 DEV 52.7 0.35 2.0 90.2 16.6 N/A 0.59 
Mauritius 1990–2009 DEV 123.8 0.70 8.3 49.5 57.8 0.00 0.50 
Mexico 1980–2012 DEV 43.5 0.54 9.7 46.9 18.8 0.29 0.45 
Moldova 1995–2012 DEV 128.1 0.17 7.1 62.3 22.5 N/A 0.44 
Morocco 2002–2012 DEV 74.0 0.16 5.3 57.6 56.7 N/A 0.45 
Namibia 1990–2011 DEV 96.2 0.13 2.0 21.4 41.4 N/A 0.50 
Nepal 1976–2013 DEV 41.4 0.17 5.9 45.3 23.4 N/A 0.63 
Netherlands 1971–2011 ADV 109.9 0.81 4.1 58.1 86.2 0.08 0.59 
New Zealand 1986–2013 ADV 57.8 0.99 12.0 42.5 97.4 0.16 0.61 
Nicaragua 1995–2012 DEV 71.6 0.93 5.0 154.7 22.5 0.31 0.50 
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Nigeria 2003–2012 DEV 57.0 0.30 7.6 24.8 19.0 0.00 0.50 
Norway 1995–2014 ADV 70.3 0.97 12.0 41.6 69.4 0.00 0.45 
Oman 2001–2012 DEV 89.9 0.96 2.0 10.7 37.9 N/A 0.58 
Pakistan 1990–2013 DEV 34.2 0.16 7.3 66.4 23.7 N/A 0.33 
Panama 1988–2005 DEV 159.0 1.00 1.0 72.5 75.4 0.11 0.44 
Papua New 
Guinea 1975–2004 DEV 99.3 0.28 7.0 46.5 18.8 N/A 0.53 
Paraguay 1977–2012 DEV 99.5 0.41 9.1 29.1 21.8 0.18 0.47 
Peru 1971–2013 DEV 34.2 0.57 8.1 37.8 19.4 0.23 0.49 
Philippines 1985–2014 DEV 77.4 0.36 8.2 57.3 30.4 0.31 0.60 
Poland 1995–2013 DEV 69.1 0.36 11.4 45.8 33.3 0.06 0.37 
Portugal 1995–2014 ADV 66.7 0.99 1.8 67.4 123.5 0.19 0.40 
Qatar 1981–2013 ADV 90.0 1.00 2.0 36.8 36.4 N/A 0.45 
Romania 1995–2014 DEV 73.2 0.63 11.8 22.8 25.3 0.31 0.65 
Russian 
Federation 1999–2013 DEV 56.3 0.41 8.2 26.8 32.0 0.17 0.73 
Rwanda 1968–2008 DEV 31.9 0.18 7.3 44.5 6.7 N/A 0.44 
Saudi Arabia 1969–2014 DEV 78.0 0.89 2.0 55.7 20.4 N/A 0.54 
Seychelles 1993–2003 DEV 110.3 0.69 7.0 119.9 20.5 N/A 0.45 
Sierra Leone 1999–2012 DEV 48.4 0.07 9.7 115.4 4.3 N/A 0.57 
Singapore 1976–2014 ADV 354.2 0.94 11.0 83.2 89.3 0.06 0.51 
Slovak 
Republic 1995–2014 DEV 141.1 0.45 7.3 32.4 43.3 N/A 0.50 
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Slovenia 1995–2014 ADV 116.4 0.67 6.0 28.7 52.8 N/A 0.65 
South Africa 1961–2014 DEV 52.6 0.16 9.5 38.3 95.5 0.06 0.41 
Spain 1971–2007 ADV 40.9 0.61 5.3 37.8 83.5 0.24 0.41 
Sri Lanka 1990–2011 DEV 72.9 0.47 6.6 91.0 25.5 0.19 0.50 
Sudan 1994–2014 DEV 30.2 0.22 7.0 136.6 7.2 N/A 0.52 
Swaziland 1981–2012 DEV 152.6 0.28 2.7 22.2 18.8 N/A 0.53 
Sweden 1995–2014 ADV 81.5 0.99 11.4 57.3 102.3 0.00 0.60 
Switzerland 1980–2007 ADV 87.2 0.43 9.3 49.7 139.8 0.00 0.61 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 1990–2007 DEV 68.4 0.00 10.0 135.3 10.3 N/A 0.44 
Tanzania 1991–2012 DEV 47.2 0.17 8.7 72.1 8.7 N/A 0.50 
Thailand 1966–2003 DEV 65.1 0.41 4.5 28.7 67.4 0.37 0.58 
Tunisia 1990–2005 DEV 86.4 0.23 8.0 58.5 61.3 0.31 0.50 
Turkey 2005–2014 DEV 52.7 0.36 11.5 42.9 45.5 0.00 0.20 
Uganda 1999–2012 DEV 42.8 0.99 8.3 53.1 10.1 N/A 0.57 
Ukraine 1999–2013 DEV 104.3 0.11 4.5 31.9 47.1 N/A 0.67 
United Arab 
Emirates 2002–2014 ADV 141.5 1.00 2.0 11.6 57.4 N/A 0.46 
United 
Kingdom 1990–2014 ADV 54.1 1.00 10.8 53.3 137.9 0.24 0.60 
United States 1961–2009 ADV 17.9 1.00 10.0 52.5 119.4 0.22 0.47 
Uruguay 1990–2012 DEV 46.4 0.89 8.9 56.3 31.3 0.05 0.43 
Venezuela 1961–2009 DEV 47.5 0.51 4.2 25.3 29.3 0.22 0.45 
  
60 
Notes: Advanced economies (ADV) are based on the World Bank’s classification of high income countries in 2000; all other countries are classified as developing (DEV). 
Chinn-Ito normalized index is a de jure measure of capital account openness (see Chinn and Ito, 2006). Exchange rate regimes are based on the de facto fine classifications 
in Ilzetzki et al. (2010). Data on debt is obtained from the IMF Historical Public Debt Database. Financial crisis episodes are taken from Reinhart (2010), defined as type I 
and II banking crisis. Recessionary phases are the output deviations lower than trend from a Hodrick-Prescott filter. Trade and credit data are obtained from World 
Development Indicators. The values of the country characteristics are the averages of the included years. N/A denotes data not available. 
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Table 2.A3 Variables and data sources 
Variables Definition Source 
Real government 
consumption 
General government final consumption 
expenditure (constant LCU) WDI, IFS 
Real GDP GDP (constant LCU) WDI, IFS 
Fiscal balance % GDP 
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) 
General government deficit (% of GDP) 
General government balance (% of GDP) 
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) 
WDI, IFS 
OECD 
Eurostat 
CEIC Data 
Real exchange rate Real effective exchange rate (2007=100) Darvas (2012) 
Economic development 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 
Advanced: GNI per capita ≥ $9,266 
Developing: GNI per capita < $9,266 WDI 
Trade openness 
Trade (% of GDP) 
Low trade openness: Trade % GDP ≤ 60% 
High trade openness: Trade % GDP > 60% WDI 
International capital 
mobility 
Chinn-Ito normalized index 
Low mobility: Index ≤ global median 
High mobility: Index > global median Chinn and Ito (2006) 
Exchange rate regime 
Fixed: fine classification 1–8 
Flexible: fine classification 9–13  
Ilzetzki et 
al. (2010) 
Debt burden 
Gross general government debt (% of GDP) 
Low debt: Debt % GDP ≤ 60% 
High debt: Debt % GDP > 60% HPDD 
Financial development 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
Low credit: Credit % GDP ≤ 50% 
High credit: Credit % GDP > 50% WDI 
Financial crisis Banking crisis types I and II Reinhart (2010) 
State of the business 
cycle 
Deviation of output from Hodrick-Prescott 
trend 
Expansions: deviation higher than trend 
Contractions: deviation lower than trend 
Author’s 
calculations 
Notes: WDI – World Bank World Development Indicators, IFS – IMF International Financial Statistics, 
HPDD – IMF Historical Public Debt Database. The primary data source is WDI, supplemented by 
alternative sources. The data source with the longer time series is used. 
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Real effective exchange rate data is obtained from http://bruegel.org/publications/datasets/real-effective-
exchange-rates-for-178-countries-a-new-database/. 
Chinn-Ito capital account openness index is obtained from http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-
Ito_website.htm. 
Exchange rate regime data is obtained from http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ilzetzki/IRRBack.htm. 
Financial crisis data is obtained from http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/7/. 
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Appendix 2.B – Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions 
tests of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers for 44 countries 
Fig. 2.B1 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
advanced and developing countries (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.B1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in advanced and developing countries (Ilzetzki et al.’s 
(2013) country sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Advanced 0.000 1.000  
Developing -0.319 0.000  
Combined 0.319 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller in advanced economies. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The second line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger in 
advanced economies. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0. The third line shows that the two-
tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.B2 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
countries with low and high trade openness (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.B2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high trade openness 
(Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Low trade openness 0.000 1.000  
High trade openness -0.452 0.000  
Combined 0.452 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller in countries with low trade openness. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. The second line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
larger in countries with low trade openness. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0. The third 
line shows that the two-tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.B3 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) 
country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.B3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange 
rate regimes (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Fixed 0.000 1.000  
Flexible -0.359 0.000  
Combined 0.359 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller under fixed exchange rate regimes. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. The second line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
larger under fixed exchange rate regimes. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0. The third line 
shows that the two-tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.B4 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
episodes of low and high public debt (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.B4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high public debt (Ilzetzki et 
al.’s (2013) country sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Low public debt 0.000 1.000  
High public debt 0.581 0.000  
Combined 0.581 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller when public debt is low. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The second line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger 
when public debt is low. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0. The third line shows that the 
two-tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Appendix 2.C – Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions 
tests of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers for 120 countries 
Fig. 2.C1 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
advanced and developing countries (120 country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.C1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in advanced and developing countries (120 country 
sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Advanced 0.000 1.000  
Developing -0.411 0.000  
Combined 0.411 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller in advanced economies. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The second line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger in 
advanced economies. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0. The third line shows that the two-
tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.C2 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
countries with low and high trade openness (120 country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.C2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high trade openness (120 
country sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Low trade openness 0.512 0.000  
High trade openness 0.000 1.000  
Combined 0.512 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller in countries with low trade openness. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0.  The 
second line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger in 
countries with low trade openness. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The third line shows that the two-tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.C3 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
countries with low and high international capital mobility (120 country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.C3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high international capital 
mobility (120 country sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Low capital 
mobility 0.307 0.000  
High capital 
mobility 0.000 1.000  
Combined 0.307 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller in countries with low capital mobility. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0.  The 
second line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger in 
countries with low capital mobility. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The third line shows that the two-tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.C4 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes (120 country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.C4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange 
rate regimes (120 country sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Fixed 0.274 0.000  
Flexible 0.000 1.000  
Combined 0.274 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller under fixed exchange rate regimes. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0.  The second 
line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger under fixed 
exchange rate regimes. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The third 
line shows that the two-tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.C5 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
episodes of low and high public debt (120 country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.C5 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high public debt (120 country 
sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Low public debt 0.000 1.000  
High public debt 0.633 0.000  
Combined 0.633 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller when public debt is low. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The second line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger 
when public debt is low. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0. The third line shows that the 
two-tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.C6 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
episodes of low and high credit (120 country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.C6 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high credit (120 country 
sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Low credit -0.500 0.000  
High credit 0.000 1.000  
Combined 0.500 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller when access to credit is low. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0.  The second line 
tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger when access to 
credit is low. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The third line shows 
that the two-tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.C7 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
episodes without and with financial crisis (120 country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.C7 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes without and with financial crisis (120 
country sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No financial crisis -0.960 0.000  
Financial crisis 0.000 1.000  
Combined 0.960 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller when there is no financial crisis. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0.  The second 
line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger when there is 
no financial crisis. The p-value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The third line 
shows that the two-tailed test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Fig. 2.C8 Empirical distributions of long-run cumulative fiscal multipliers in 
expansionary and recessionary phases of the business cycle (120 country sample) 
 
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel 
VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to 
identify a fiscal spending shock. The empirical distributions plotted above are the cumulative multipliers 
at the 20th year horizon for all accepted draws. 
 
Table 2.C8 Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions tests of long-run 
cumulative fiscal multipliers in expansionary and recessionary phases of the 
business cycle (120 country sample) 
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Expansions 0.315 0.000  
Contractions 0.000 1.000  
Combined 0.315 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The first line tests the alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is 
smaller during expansions. This hypothesis is confirmed with a p-value of 0.  The second line tests the 
alternative hypothesis that the long-run cumulative fiscal multiplier is larger during expansions. The p-
value of 1 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The third line shows that the two-tailed 
test rejects the equality of the two distributions. 
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Appendix 2.D – estimated cumulative fiscal multipliers using standard SVAR for 120 countries 
Fig. 2.D1 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in advanced and developing countries (120 country sample); standard SVAR 
Advanced economies Developing countries 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Definition is based on the World Bank’s income classification in 2000. Advanced economies are high-income countries with GNI per capita of $9,266 or more, 
all others are categorized as developing countries. GNI per capita data available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: 
Advanced – 986, Developing – 2249. 
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Fig. 2.D2 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high trade openness (120 country sample); standard SVAR 
Low trade openness High trade openness 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Countries with an average trade-to-GDP ratio less than 60% are classified as low trade openness, and high trade openness otherwise. Trade-to-GDP data 
available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low trade openness – 1405, High trade openness – 1830. 
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Fig. 2.D3 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high international capital mobility (120 country sample); standard 
SVAR 
Low capital mobility High capital mobility 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Countries with an average Chinn-Ito capital account openness index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) lower than the global median are classified as low capital mobility, 
and high capital mobility otherwise. The Chinn-Ito index data is available from 1970–2014. Number of observations: Low capital mobility – 1161, High capital mobility – 
2031. 
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Fig. 2.D4 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes (120 country sample); 
standard SVAR 
Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes coded from 1–8 are classified as fixed regime, and 9–13 as flexible regime. De facto exchange rate regime classification is based on the fine 
classification in Ilzetzki et al. (2010) with data available from 1960–2010. Number of observations: Fixed regime – 1977, Flexible regime – 711. 
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Fig. 2.D5 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high public debt (120 country sample); standard SVAR 
Low public debt High public debt 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes with debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60% are classified as high debt, and low debt otherwise. Debt-to-GDP data available from 1960–2012, obtained 
from IMF Historical Public Debt Database. Number of observations: Low debt – 2081, High debt – 890. 
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Fig. 2.D6 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high credit (120 country sample); standard SVAR 
Low credit High credit 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes with credit-to-GDP ratio exceeding 50% are classified as high credit, and low credit otherwise. Credit-to-GDP data available from 1960–2014, 
obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low credit – 1946, High credit – 1187. 
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Fig. 2.D7 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes without and with financial crisis (120 country sample); standard SVAR 
No financial crisis Financial crisis 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes with financial crisis are obtained from Reinhart (2010), defined as type I and II banking crisis. Data available from 1960–2010 for a smaller subset of 
countries. Number of observations: No financial crisis – 1493, Financial crisis – 270. 
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Fig. 2.D8 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in expansionary and recessionary phases of the business cycle (120 country sample); standard 
SVAR 
Expansions Contractions 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Phases of expansions and contractions obtained from deviation of output from the Hodrick-Prescott trend as a measure of the business cycle. Data available 
from 1960–2014. Number of observations: Expansions – 1577, Contractions – 1658. 
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Appendix 2.E – estimated cumulative fiscal multipliers using standard SVAR for 82 countries 
Fig. 2.E1 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in advanced and developing countries (82 country sample); standard SVAR 
Advanced economies Developing countries 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Definition is based on the World Bank’s income classification in 2000. Advanced economies are high-income countries with GNI per capita of $9,266 or more, 
all others are categorized as developing countries. GNI per capita data available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: 
Advanced – 855, Developing – 1761. 
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Fig. 2.E2 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high trade openness (82 country sample); standard SVAR 
Low trade openness High trade openness 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Countries with an average trade-to-GDP ratio less than 60% are classified as low trade openness, and high trade openness otherwise. Trade-to-GDP data 
available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low trade openness – 1258, High trade openness – 1358. 
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Fig. 2.E3 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high international capital mobility (82 country sample); standard 
SVAR 
Low capital mobility High capital mobility 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Countries with an average Chinn-Ito capital account openness index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) lower than the global median are classified as low capital mobility, 
and high capital mobility otherwise. The Chinn-Ito index data is available from 1970–2014. Number of observations: Low capital mobility – 937, High capital mobility – 
1679. 
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Fig. 2.E4 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes (82 country sample); standard 
SVAR 
Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes coded from 1–8 are classified as fixed regime, and 9–13 as flexible regime. De facto exchange rate regime classification is based on the fine 
classification in Ilzetzki et al. (2010) with data available from 1960–2010. Number of observations: Fixed regime – 1604, Flexible regime – 591. 
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Fig. 2.E5 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high public debt (82 country sample); standard SVAR 
Low public debt High public debt 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes with debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60% are classified as high debt, and low debt otherwise. Debt-to-GDP data available from 1960–2012, obtained 
from IMF Historical Public Debt Database. Number of observations: Low debt – 1700, High debt – 691. 
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Fig. 2.E6 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high credit (82 country sample); standard SVAR 
Low credit High credit 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes with credit-to-GDP ratio exceeding 50% are classified as high credit, and low credit otherwise. Credit-to-GDP data available from 1960–2014, 
obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low credit – 1523, High credit – 1016. 
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Fig. 2.E7 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes without and with financial crisis (82 country sample); standard SVAR 
No financial crisis Financial crisis 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes with financial crisis are obtained from Reinhart (2010), defined as type I and II banking crisis. Data available from 1960–2010 for a smaller subset of 
countries. Number of observations: No financial crisis – 1319, Financial crisis – 240. 
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Fig. 2.E8 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in expansionary and recessionary phases of the business cycle (82 country sample); standard 
SVAR 
Expansions Contractions 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Phases of expansions and contractions obtained from deviation of output from the Hodrick-Prescott trend as a measure of the business cycle. Data available 
from 1960–2014. Number of observations: Expansions – 1305, Contractions – 1334. 
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Appendix 2.F – estimated cumulative fiscal multipliers using sign restrictions for 82 countries 
Fig. 2.F1 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in advanced and developing countries (82 country sample); sign restrictions 
Advanced economies Developing countries 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Definition is based on the World Bank’s income classification in 2000. Advanced economies are high-income countries with GNI per capita of $9,266 or 
more, all others are categorized as developing countries. GNI per capita data available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of 
observations: Advanced – 855, Developing – 1761. 
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Fig. 2.F2 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high trade openness (82 country sample); sign restrictions 
Low trade openness High trade openness 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Countries with trade-to-GDP ratio less than 60% are classified as low trade openness, and high trade openness otherwise. Trade-to-GDP data available 
from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low trade openness – 1258, High trade openness – 1358. 
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Fig. 2.F3 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high international capital mobility (82 country sample); sign 
restrictions 
Low capital mobility High capital mobility 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Countries with a Chinn-Ito capital account openness index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) lower than the global mean are classified as low capital mobility, and 
high capital mobility otherwise. The Chinn-Ito index data is available from 1970–2014. Number of observations: Low capital mobility – 937, High capital mobility – 
1679. 
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Fig. 2.F4 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes (82 country sample); sign 
restrictions 
Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes coded from 1–8 are classified as fixed regime, and 9–13 as flexible regime. De facto exchange rate regime classification is based on the fine 
classification in Ilzetzki et al. (2010) with data available from 1960–2010. Number of observations: Fixed regime – 1604, Flexible regime – 591. 
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Fig. 2.F5 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high public debt (82 country sample); sign restrictions 
Low public debt High public debt 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes with debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60% are classified as high debt, and low debt otherwise. Debt-to-GDP data available from 1960–2012, 
obtained from IMF Historical Public Debt Database. Number of observations: Low debt – 1700, High debt – 691. 
 
 
 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
  
96 
Fig. 2.F6 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high credit (82 country sample); sign restrictions 
Low credit High credit 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes with credit-to-GDP ratio exceeding 50% are classified as high credit, and low credit otherwise. Credit-to-GDP data available from 1960–2014, 
obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low credit – 1523, High credit – 1016. 
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Fig. 2.F7 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes without and with financial crisis (82 country sample); sign restrictions 
No financial crisis Financial crisis 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Episodes with financial crisis are obtained from Reinhart (2010), defined as type I and II banking crisis. Data available from 1960–2010 for a smaller 
subset of countries. Number of observations: No financial crisis – 1319, Financial crisis – 240. 
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Fig. 2.F8 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in expansionary and recessionary phases of the business cycle (82 country sample); sign 
restrictions 
Expansions Contractions 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with 1,000 sample draws from the posterior 
distribution satisfying the sign restrictions to identify a fiscal spending shock. The solid line denotes the median fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 16 and 84 
percentile values. Phases of expansions and contractions obtained from deviation of output from the Hodrick-Prescott trend as a measure of the business cycle. Data 
available from 1960–2014. Number of observations: Expansions – 1305, Contractions – 1334. 
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Appendix 2.G – estimated cumulative fiscal multipliers using standard SVAR for 44 countries 
Fig. 2.G1 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in advanced and developing countries (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample); standard SVAR 
Advanced economies Developing countries 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Definition is based on the World Bank’s income classification in 2000. Advanced economies are high-income countries with GNI per capita of $9,266 or more, 
all others are categorized as developing countries. GNI per capita data available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: 
Advanced – 635, Developing – 703. 
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Fig. 2.G2 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in countries with low and high trade openness (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample); 
standard SVAR 
Low trade openness High trade openness 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Countries with an average trade-to-GDP ratio less than 60% are classified as low trade openness, and high trade openness otherwise. Trade-to-GDP data 
available from 1960–2014, obtained from World Development Indicators. Number of observations: Low trade openness – 715, High trade openness – 623. 
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Fig. 2.G3 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of de facto fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country 
sample); standard SVAR 
Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes coded from 1–8 are classified as fixed regime, and 9–13 as flexible regime. De facto exchange rate regime classification is based on the fine 
classification in Ilzetzki et al. (2010) with data available from 1960–2010. Number of observations: Fixed regime – 736, Flexible regime – 385. 
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Fig. 2.G4 Cumulative fiscal multipliers in episodes of low and high public debt (Ilzetzki et al.’s (2013) country sample); standard 
SVAR 
Low public debt High public debt 
  
Notes: Fiscal multipliers are calculated from the impulse responses to a government consumption shock obtained from an unbalanced panel VAR model with government 
consumption ordered before GDP. The solid line denotes the mean fiscal multiplier and the dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals obtained from 1,000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. Episodes with debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 60% are classified as high debt, and low debt otherwise. Debt-to-GDP data available from 1960–2012, obtained 
from IMF Historical Public Debt Database. Number of observations: Low debt – 933, High debt – 324. 
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Chapter 3 
Oil price shocks and macroeconomic 
adjustments in oil-exporting countries 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the macroeconomic effects of an adverse oil price shock under 
different exchange rate and fiscal policy arrangements in 40 oil-exporting countries 
from 1973 to 2010 using panel vector autoregression techniques. The results show that 
output and government consumption fall in response to an oil price decline. However, 
the output response is significantly smaller and smoother in countries with flexible 
exchange rate regimes due to a larger and immediate real exchange rate depreciation. 
There is also less need for contractionary fiscal policy as the real depreciation appears to 
play a sufficient dampening role. In contrast, countries with fixed exchange rate regimes 
experience a small and delayed real depreciation, leaving fiscal policy to bear the bulk 
of the macroeconomic adjustments costs. Nevertheless, the presence of oil funds in 
these countries is associated with smaller fiscal spending cuts and hence a reduced 
output fall. These findings highlight the shock-absorbing property of flexible exchange 
rates and the potential macroeconomic stabilization role of oil funds in insulating 
against adverse oil price movements, making a case for oil exporters to adopt more 
flexible exchange rate regimes and establish oil funds as fiscal buffers. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Crude oil prices have fallen from around US$110 per barrel in June 2014 to US$45 per 
barrel as of September 2016. The sources of this oil price plunge can be attributed to 
several factors: weak global demand especially from China and Europe; a supply glut 
following the boom in U.S. shale oil production; relatively little supply disruptions 
despite geopolitical tensions and sanctions in the Middle East and Russia; OPEC’s 
decision in November 2014 to maintain production levels at 30 million barrels per day; 
and the appreciation of the U.S. dollar (Baffes et al., 2015). Many oil-exporting 
countries are vulnerable to oil price declines since oil accounts for a large proportion of 
total exports and government revenue. These countries are likely to experience 
significant economic and political pressures from a continuing oil price fall. With 
projected fiscal break-even prices in 2016 ranging from US$48 per barrel for Kuwait to 
US$364 per barrel for Yemen (IMF, 2016c), the fiscal deficits necessitate abrupt 
macroeconomic adjustments in the short term. 
The macroeconomic effects of the oil price decline will depend on monetary and 
fiscal arrangements (see Arezki and Blanchard, 2014). Oil-exporting countries with 
flexible exchange rate regimes can adjust through currency depreciations, though there 
are risks of uncontrolled depreciations and persistent high inflation. A case in point is 
Russia: the Ruble has depreciated by more than 80% against the U.S. dollar between 
June 2014 and Septermber 2016, partially offsetting the decline in oil prices.13
Economic theory dating back to Friedman (1953) and Poole (1970) suggests that a 
flexible exchange rate regime allows a smoother output adjustment to real shocks 
through changes in the nominal exchange rate. In contrast, a fixed exchange rate regime 
 For those 
with rigid exchange rate regimes such as a peg to the U.S. dollar, monetary policy is 
constrained and fiscal policy therefore bears the burden of macroeconomic stabilization. 
These countries require substantial fiscal spending cuts particularly if there are 
insufficient fiscal buffers such as oil funds. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s peg to the U.S. 
dollar amidst falling oil prices will translate to budget deficits; however, it has 
accumulated a stockpile of foreign currency, which can be used to finance the deficits. 
                                                 
13 Russia had operated on a managed float since 1999 but transitioned to a free floating regime in 
November 2014, earlier than originally planned, partly as a result of the sharp fall in oil prices. 
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requires a contractionary monetary policy to maintain the peg and all adjustment 
therefore takes place in the real economy at a rate permitted by nominal stickiness. In a 
related strand of research, the ‘commodity currency’ literature emphasizes a generally 
robust exchange rate response to commodity price shocks, especially in countries with a 
flexible exchange rate (e.g., Chen and Rogoff, 2003; Cashin et al., 2004; Bodart et al., 
2012). Several economists have advocated that oil-exporting countries adopt flexible 
exchange rate regimes to better insulate against oil price shocks (e.g., Frankel, 2005; 
Setser, 2008). Although the empirical validity of the insulating property of flexible 
exchange rates has not been specifically assessed for oil-exporting countries, there are a 
handful of related studies. Broda (2004) and Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005) examine 
the impact of terms of trade shocks in developing countries while Hoffmann (2007) 
focuses on the effects of world interest rate and output shocks; Céspedes and Velasco 
(2011) examine the effects of commodity price shocks in commodity exporters; Rafiq 
(2011) analyses the impact of various macroeconomic shocks in GCC countries; Chia et 
al. (2012) examines the impact of terms of trade and foreign interest rate shocks in 
Asian countries; and Al-Abri (2013) investigates the effects of oil price shocks in 
OECD countries. These studies provide evidence of the shock-absorbing property of 
flexible exchange rates but earlier studies suggest otherwise (e.g., Baxter and Stockman, 
1989; Ghosh et al., 1997). 
A policy prescription usually advocated for oil exporters to reduce the extent of 
fiscal procyclicality and macroeconomic volatility is to set up oil funds, which gained 
popularity from the late 1990s. By channelling surplus oil revenues to the oil funds 
during booms and running down the funds during cyclical downturns to finance budget 
deficits, governments can smooth fiscal expenditure and reduce macroeconomic 
volatility. However, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of oil funds (or more 
generally, resource funds) as a macroeconomic stabilization tool is mixed. Davis et al. 
(2001), Crain and Devlin (2003), and Ossowski et al. (2008) do not find any convincing 
evidence that these funds are effective; in contrast, Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007), Coutinho 
et al. (2014), Sugawara (2014), and Asik (2015) conclude that they are useful in 
reducing fiscal procyclicality and/or macroeconomic volatility. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the macroeconomic effects of an adverse 
oil price shock under different exchange rate (fixed vs. flexible) and fiscal (no oil funds 
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vs. with oil funds) policy in oil-exporting countries using panel vector autoregression 
(VAR) techniques. In particular, the main policy questions of interest are whether oil 
exporters can indeed be better off by adopting a flexible exchange rate, and if 
establishing oil funds further contribute to smoother output adjustment. In the existing 
empirical literature, these policy issues are usually treated in isolation—the focus is 
either on the insulating properties of flexible exchange rate regimes or on the 
macroeconomic stabilization role of oil funds. A key contribution of this paper is thus to 
link both exchange rate and fiscal policy in oil-exporting countries in a coherent 
empirical framework. This paper also includes a more comprehensive coverage of 40 
oil-exporting countries and uses a more updated data set covering the post-Bretton 
Woods period from 1973 to 2010 based on the de facto exchange rate classification by 
Ilzetzki et al. (2010). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data 
and methodology. Section 3.3 presents the empirical results on the macroeconomic 
effects of an adverse oil price shock in fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Section 
3.4 extends the analysis to examine the role of oil funds, and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Data and methodology 
3.2.1 Classification of exchange rate regimes and oil funds 
The sample of oil-exporting countries is selected based on the following criteria: net oil 
exports of at least 50 thousand barrels per day; or share of oil exports in total exports of 
at least 30%; or oil exports as a percentage of GDP of at least 20%; or oil rents as a 
percentage of GDP of at least 20%. This ensures that all significant oil exporters are 
included, which minimizes selection bias. Table 3.A1 in Appendix 3.A lists the 40 
countries, of which 36 are emerging and developing countries.14
It is now widely acknowledged that there is considerable disparity between de jure 
and de facto exchange rate regimes, i.e., between what countries say and what they do 
(see Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005). Empirical 
 
                                                 
14 Timor-Leste and Turkmenistan also satisfy the criteria but are excluded as their exchange rate regimes 
are not properly classified as either fixed or flexible; see Ilzetzki et al. (2010). 
107 
 
analyses using de jure classifications risk yielding misleading results (see Rogoff et al., 
2004). There are three well-established approaches to classify a country’s de facto 
exchange rate regime: Ilzetzki et al. (2010), which updates Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
and is largely based on the behaviour of parallel, market-determined exchange rates; 
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), which uses cluster analysis; and Klein and 
Shambaugh (2006), which is a modification of Shambaugh (2004) based on whether the 
official exchange rate stays within a two percent band against the base currency.15
Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of exchange rate regimes in the 40 oil-exporting 
countries covering the post-Bretton Woods period from 1973 to 2010 based on the 
coarse classification of Ilzetzki et al. (2010). Most oil exporters either have a fixed or an 
intermediate exchange rate regime; very few actually float freely. As such, the analysis 
in this paper is constrained to a fixed versus flexible (intermediate and float) exchange 
rate regime instead of a more nuanced tripartite regime classification. 
 The 
main exchange rate regime classification used in this paper is based on Ilzetzki et al. 
(2010) as the data is updated to 2010; the other two classifications are included as 
robustness checks. 
Oil funds fall under the umbrella of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Data from the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute shows the total asset size of SWFs to be about US$7.4 
trillion as of June 2016, of which 57% are oil and gas funds (SWFI, 2016). Oil funds are 
typically set up with the objective of either saving for the future to address issues with 
regards to fiscal sustainability and intergenerational equity, or to smooth fiscal 
expenditure and stabilize macroeconomic volatility.16
                                                 
15 See Tavlas et al. (2008) for a summary of these approaches, and also references on other exchange rate 
classifications. 
 Table 3.1 lists the oil-exporting 
countries and their oil funds’ establishment year. In 1990 only seven oil exporters have 
set up oil funds; this number grew to 18 in 2000 and there are now 31 oil-exporting 
countries with oil funds. 
16 Oil funds with a stated savings objective usually also allow discretionary transfers to the budget to 
smooth expenditures during the down cycle. Most oil funds have dual objectives of savings and 
stabilization. 
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Fig. 3.1 Exchange rate regime classifications of oil-exporting countries from 1973 to 
2010 based on Ilzetzki et al. (2010)
 
Notes: Fixed is based on coarse class 1 (hard pegs and de facto peg); Intermediate combines coarse 
classes 2 and 3 (crawling pegs, bands and managed float); Float is coarse class 4 (freely floating); Coarse 
classes 5 (freely falling) and 6 (dual market with parallel market data missing) are excluded. See Ilzetzki 
et al. (2010) for details. 
 
Table 3.1 Oil-exporting countries and oil funds 
No oil funds With oil funds 
Argentina Algeria (2000) Gabon (1998) Qatar (2005) 
Congo, Rep. Angola (2012) Iran, Islamic Rep. (2000) 
Russian Federation 
(2004) 
Denmark Azerbaijan (1999) Iraq (2003) Saudi Arabia (1952) 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Bahrain (2006) Kazakhstan (2000) Sudan (2002) 
Indonesia Brunei Darussalam (1983) Kuwait (1953) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago (2000) 
Malaysia Cameroon (1974) Libya (2006) United Arab Emirates (1976) 
Syrian Arab Rep. Canada (1976) Mexico (2000) Venezuela, RB (1998) 
Tunisia Chad (1999–2006) Nigeria (2004)  
United Kingdom Colombia (1995) Norway (1990)  
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Vietnam Ecuador (2002) Oman (1980)  
Yemen, Rep. Equatorial Guinea (2002) 
Papua New Guinea 
(2011)  
Source: Tsani (2013), SWFI (2016), Truman (2008). 
Notes: Establishment year of the oil fund is in parenthesis. The oil fund in Chad was abolished in 2006. 
3.2.2 Variables and data sources 
Since the primary objective of this paper is to examine the macroeconomic adjustments 
in oil-exporting countries under different exchange rate regimes and fiscal policy 
arrangements in response to an adverse oil price shock, the variables of interest and 
expressed in natural logarithms are the real oil price (𝑜), real GDP (𝑦), real government 
consumption (𝑔), consumer price (𝑝), and the real exchange rate (𝑞). Annual data 
covering the post-Bretton Woods period from 1973 to 2010 is used, but data availability 
varies by country (i.e., the panel is unbalanced). The variables and data sources are 
summarized in Table 3.A2 in Appendix 3.A. 
Government consumption is chosen to characterize a country’s fiscal stance 
following the arguments in Kaminsky et al. (2004) that the fiscal variable should be 
instruments within policymakers’ control. According to Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), there 
are two key fiscal policy instruments—government consumption (as opposed to 
government spending, which also includes transfers and debt service) and tax rates (as 
opposed to tax revenues, which depend on the business cycle). However, tax rates are 
not readily available for most countries.  
Results of the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test (see Im et al., 2003) for 
the variables are shown in Table 3.2. The test allows for unbalanced panels. The null 
hypothesis that all panels contain a unit cannot be rejected when the variables are in log 
levels. However, when taking first log differences, evidence of stationarity is clear. 
Table 3.3 displays the results of the panel cointegration tests developed by Westerlund 
(2007). All four tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the 
variables. Therefore, based on the panel unit root and cointegration test results, 
variables in log differences are used in the empirical analysis using panel VAR 
techniques. 
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Table 3.2 Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test 
Variable Z-t-tilde bar statistic p-value Variable 
Z-t-tilde 
bar statistic p-value 
𝑜 8.94 1.00 Δ𝑜 -19.59 0.00 
𝑦 22.87 1.00 Δ𝑦 -14.26 0.00 
𝑔 22.13 1.00 Δ𝑔 -16.85 0.00 
𝑝 20.28 1.00 Δ𝑝 -10.47 0.00 
𝑞 -0.82 0.21 Δ𝑞 -15.46 0.00 
Notes: 𝐻𝑜: All panels contain unit roots, 𝐻𝑎: Some panels are stationary. 
Table 3.3 Westerlund panel cointegration tests 
Variables 
Gt Ga Pt Pa 
Z-
value 
p-
value 
Z-
value 
p-
value 
Z-
value 
p-
value 
Z-
value 
p-
value 
𝑜, 𝑦,𝑔,𝑝, 𝑞 7.62 1.00 9.95 1.00 9.91 1.00 8.35 1.00 
Notes: 
3.2.2 Panel VAR estimation 
The Gt and Ga statistics test 𝐻𝑜: 𝜑𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖 vs. 𝐻𝑎: 𝜑𝑖 < 0 for at least 𝑖, starting from a 
weighted average of the individually estimated coefficients 𝜑𝑖 and their t-ratios respectively. Rejection of 
𝐻𝑜 implies existence of a cointegrating relationship for at least one of the cross-sectional units. The Pt and 
Pa statistics test 𝐻𝑜: 𝜑𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖 vs. 𝐻𝑎: 𝜑𝑖 < 0 for all 𝑖, using the pooled information over all cross-
sectional units. Rejection of 𝐻𝑜 is taken as evidence of cointegration for the whole panel. The tests 
includes a constant and trend. Results are obtained using the Stata codes xtwest by Persyn and Westerlund 
(2008). 
Besides selection bias and selecting the appropriate fiscal policy variable (addressed by 
including a large sample of oil exporters and using government consumption 
respectively), other empirical challenges involved in robustly determining the 
importance of exchange rate regimes and oil funds in the macroeconomic adjustments 
of oil-exporting countries are unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. The choice of 
exchange rate regime and the decision to establish an oil fund are not random events but 
could possibly be due to time-invariant country-specific unobserved characteristics. In 
addition, endogeneity issues could arise, for example, due to potential reverse causality 
of fiscal policy and GDP. To address these empirical concerns, this paper uses the panel 
VAR methodology which combines the conventional VAR approach that treats all 
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variables as endogenous, with the dynamic panel data estimation approach that allows 
for unobserved heterogeneity, first employed in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). 
The reduced-form panel VAR specification is of the form: 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = Γ0 + Γ1𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (3.1) 
where 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of endogenous variables �Δ𝑜𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑞𝑖,𝑡�′ for 
country 𝑖 in year 𝑡, Γ0 is the vector of intercepts, Γ1 is the coefficient matrix of the 
lagged variables, 𝑓𝑖 denotes time-invariant country fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the vector 
consisting of the error terms that are assumed to be uncorrelated across 𝑖 and 𝑡. In view 
of the annual data frequency, only one lag is included in the specification; results remain 
unchanged with two lags. 
Implementing the VAR procedure on panel data requires imposing the restriction 
that the same underlying structure holds for each cross-sectional unit (country), i.e., the 
coefficients in the matrix Γ1 are the same for all countries. This constraint is usually 
violated in practice; a way to overcome this is to introduce fixed effects, which allows 
for individual heterogeneity (Love and Zicchino, 2006). The conventional mean-
difference procedure that is commonly used to remove fixed effects might lead to biased 
coefficient estimates since the fixed effects are correlated with the lagged dependent 
variables, which gives rise to the problem of ‘dynamic panel bias’ (Nickell, 1981), and 
hence ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is inappropriate. A solution to the 
problem is to take the first differences of each equation in the model in eq. (3.1), which 
removes both the constant term and the individual effect. However, the differenced 
lagged dependent variables are still correlated with the error terms. But with the fixed 
effects swept out, a straightforward method is to construct instrument variables using 
the twice lagged dependent variables and estimate using two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
(see Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).  
However, a problem with the first-difference approach in the case of the application 
in this paper is that it magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels (Roodman, 2009). For 
instance, if 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is missing in the data, then Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 and Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 are also missing in the 
transformed data. A procedure known as the Helmert transformation of forward mean-
differencing, or forward orthogonal deviations, is applied to avoid this problem (see 
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Arellano and Bover, 1995). Instead of subtracting the previous observation of a variable 
in the first-difference approach, the Helmert procedure subtracts the average of all the 
future observations and thus preserves the sample size in panels with gaps. 
More specifically, let 𝑧?̅?,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑧𝑖,𝑠(𝑇𝑖−𝑡)𝑇𝑖𝑠=𝑡+1  denote the means obtained from the 
future values of 𝑧𝑖,𝑡, which is a variable in the vector 𝑍𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑇𝑖 is the last year of a 
country’s time series. The transformed variable is thus: 
𝑧𝑖,𝑡∗ = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡(𝑧𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧?̅?,𝑡)                   (3.2) 
where 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = � 𝑇𝑖−𝑡𝑇𝑖−𝑡+1 is the weight used to equalize variances. The error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 also 
undergoes a similar transformation: 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡∗ = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡(𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?,𝑡)                   (3.3) 
The final transformed panel VAR takes the form: 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡∗ = Γ1𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1∗ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡∗                              (3.4) 
This procedure also preserves the orthogonality between the transformed variables and 
the lagged regressors. Since the lagged observations do not enter the formula, they can 
be used as instruments to estimate the coefficients consistently by generalized method 
of moments (GMM).  
In a panel VAR context, the focus is on the dynamic impulse responses of the 
variables in response to shocks. Specifically in this paper, the interest is in the 
macroeconomic adjustments in response to an adverse oil price shock. The key 
identification assumption is that domestic variables do not have an immediate influence 
on global oil prices. This assumption might be challenged by some based on the premise 
that the OPEC is an effective cartel in controlling oil prices by coordinating oil 
production. However, there is no evidence of OPEC demonstrating such influence 
(Kilian, 2014).17
                                                 
17 According to Kilian (2009), oil price shocks have historically been driven mainly by global aggregate 
demand and precautionary demand shocks rather than oil supply shocks. 
 It is important to note that domestic variables can affect the global oil 
price after a lag, which differs from the exogeneity assumption imposed in studies on 
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terms of trade shocks (e.g., Broda, 2004; Chia et al., 2012). The variables are therefore 
recursively ordered as follows: changes in real oil price (Δ𝑜) is ordered first, followed 
by real GDP growth (Δ𝑦), real government consumption growth (Δ𝑔), inflation (Δ𝑝), 
and real exchange rate changes (Δ𝑞). As the analysis focuses on the effects of oil price 
shocks, the ordering of the other variables is immaterial. 
3.3 Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers 
3.3.1 Dynamic impulse responses to an adverse oil price shock 
To examine whether the macroeconomic adjustments in oil-exporting countries differ 
across exchange rate regimes in response to an adverse oil price shock, the country-year 
observations are split into two groups: one in which the countries operate under a fixed 
exchange rate regime and the other under a flexible exchange rate regime.18
Figure 3.2 displays the dynamic impulse responses of the variables under fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes following an oil price shock normalized to negative 10% 
to allow comparison between the two groups and also for ease of interpretation of the 
results. The solid lines are the impulse responses while the dotted lines represent two 
standard deviation error bands. In response to an adverse oil price shock, real GDP falls 
under both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, but the magnitudes and adjustment 
speeds are clearly different. Under a fixed regime, real GDP falls by 0.4% on impact 
and reaches a peak of more than 0.6% after the first year before the effect gradually 
dissipates. In contrast, real GDP contracts by 0.3% under a flexible regime and the 
negative effect is statistically significant only on impact. Real government consumption 
falls under both exchange rate regimes, by 1% in with fixed exchange rates at its peak 
after a year and by and 0.8% for flexible exchange rates, as governments cut back fiscal 
 Therefore 
the coefficients of the variables in the panel VAR estimation, Γ1 in eq. (3.1), are allowed 
to differ across exchange rate regimes. In addition, to avoid the influence of changing 
exchange rate regimes, only observations with the same exchange rate regime over at 
least three consecutive years are included. This is a standard rule of thumb in the 
literature (e.g., Broda, 2004; Hoffmann, 2007).  
                                                 
18 This is akin to assigning dummy variables for fixed and flexible regimes in the panel VAR 
specification. 
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spending in response to lower accrued oil revenues, indicating procyclical fiscal policy 
as documented in other studies on oil-exporting countries (e.g., Erbil, 2011). 
Fig. 3.2 Impulse responses to a -10% oil price shock under fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes 
         Fixed exchange rate regime                  Flexible exchange rate regime 
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Notes: Solid lines are the point estimates of the impulse responses. Dotted lines represent error bands of 
two standard deviations (5th and 95th
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 percentile) generated using Monte Carlo with 1,000 replications. 
Exchange rate classification is based on Ilzetzki et al. (2010); sample period 1973–2010. 
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The differences in the output response across the exchange rate regimes can be 
explained by the response of the real exchange rate. With a fixed exchange rate regime, 
nominal exchange rates remain unchanged and the small real depreciation of 0.3%, after 
a one period lag, is achieved through a decrease in domestic prices. However, with 
flexible exchange rate regimes, the real exchange rate depreciates immediately by 0.4% 
and peaks at 0.8% after a year through a nominal depreciation, which partially offsets 
the adverse effects of an adverse oil price shock that necessitates a reduction in real 
government consumption. This finding is evidence of the shock-absorbing property of 
flexible exchange rates. 
Table 3.4 shows the statistical tests (t-test) of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of (negative) oil price changes are equal under both fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes.19
Table 3.4 Coefficients of oil price changes (negative) under fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes in various classifications 
 The different macroeconomic adjustments in the responses of 
real GDP and the real exchange rate are confirmed in the statistical test results. 
Classification Regime 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒒 
IRR 
Fixed -0.0488 -0.0640 -0.0063 -0.0279 
Flexible 0.0006*** -0.0803 -0.0008 -0.0736^ 
LYS 
Fixed -0.0381 -0.0560 -0.0128 0.0033 
Flexible -0.0114^ -0.0530 0.0283 -0.1418** 
KS 
Fixed -0.0442 -0.0629 -0.0044 0.0089 
Flexible -0.0336 -0.0734 0.0109 -0.1572*** 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. IRR – Ilzetzki et al. (2010), 
sample period 1973–2010; LYS – Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), sample period 1973–2004; KS – 
Klein and Shambaugh (2006), sample period 1973–2004. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Since the panel VAR estimation consists of only one lag, a t-test can be used to test the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes are the same. For two or more lags, a 
F-test or Wald test can be used to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients in all the lags are the same. 
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3.3.2 Alternative exchange rate regimes 
Since exchange rate regimes are classified according to various approaches, there can be 
considerable differences in the assignment of a country-year observation even among de 
facto schemes. Klein and Shambaugh (2010) note that the degree of agreement among 
the classifications of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), 
and Shambaugh (2004) range between 73% and 86%. In this section, the panel VAR 
model is estimated using the exchange rate classifications of Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) and Klein and Shambaugh (2006) to assess if the findings in 
Section 3.3.1 based on Ilzetzki et al. (2010) are robust. These classifications will be 
referred to as LYS, KS, and IRR, respectively. 
Figure 3.3 displays the impulse responses for the alternative exchange rate 
classifications in response to an oil price shock normalized to negative 10%. The 
impulse responses based on the IRR classification in Section 3.3.1 are also included for 
comparison purposes. The dotted lines represent the impulse responses under a fixed 
exchange rate regime while the solid lines are the impulse responses under a flexible 
regime. It is clear that output contraction is smaller with flexible exchange rates across 
all the classifications with a range of 0.2% to 0.3%, and the macroeconomic adjustment 
is faster and less volatile. This can be attributed to the relatively large real depreciation 
between 0.8% and 1.6%, depending on the exchange rate classification, offsetting the 
impact of the decrease in real government consumption. While prices remain relatively 
unchanged in the IRR classification, they are evidently higher in the LYS and KS 
classifications plausibly due to the larger real exchange rate depreciation, which results 
in higher import prices passing through to domestic prices. With fixed exchange rates, 
real GDP falls by about 0.5% to 0.7% at its peak after a year. There is relatively little 
real depreciation since nominal exchange rates remain fixed and prices do not fall much. 
The bulk of the output contraction is due to fiscal spending cuts. This finding illustrates 
the burden of fiscal policy to bear most of the macroeconomic adjustment costs with a 
fixed exchange rate policy, which limits the ability of monetary policy to play an 
important stabilization role. 
The statistical test results of the differences in the responses of real GDP and real 
exchange rate in the LYS and KS classifications are summarized in Table 3.4. The 
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ability of flexible exchange rates to soften the impact of an adverse oil price shock in 
oil-exporting countries on output is therefore robust to the choice of de facto exchange 
rate classifications. 
Fig. 3.3 Impulse responses to a -10% oil price shock under alternative exchange 
rate regime classifications 
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Notes: Dotted and solid lines are the point estimates of the impulse responses under a fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regime, respectively.  Exchange rate classification: IRR – Ilzetzki et al. (2010), sample 
period 1973–2010; LYS – Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), sample period 1973–2004; KS – Klein 
and Shambaugh (2006), sample period 1973–2004. 
3.3.3 Shock asymmetry 
The results in Section 3.3.1 are based on the assumption that oil price shocks are 
symmetric, i.e., the coefficient matrix Γ1 in eq. (3.1) is of equal magnitude but with 
opposite signs in response to positive and negative shocks. This section examines 
whether the previous findings are robust to asymmetric oil price shocks, i.e., the 
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coefficients are allowed to vary depending on whether the shock is positive or negative. 
Following Mork (1989), positive and negative oil price shocks are defined as: 
Δ𝑜𝑡
+ = max (0,Δ𝑜𝑡)                   (3.5) 
Δ𝑜𝑡
− = min (0,Δ𝑜𝑡)                              (3.6) 
Figure 3.4 displays the impulse responses of the variables to asymmetric oil price 
shocks normalized to 10%. The dotted lines correspond to the responses to a positive 
shock while the solid lines are the responses to a negative shock. In response to a 
positive oil price shock, real GDP increases under both fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes but the magnitudes and adjustment speeds are clearly different. In a similar but 
opposite fashion, real GDP falls in response to a negative oil price shock as expected; 
again the effects are different across the exchange rate regimes. In either case, the 
output response and its corresponding adjustment are more muted under a flexible 
regime. Procyclical fiscal policy is also evident from the impulse responses, as real 
government consumption increases in booms and decreases in busts. The differences in 
the output response can be explained by the response of the real exchange rate. In 
response to a positive oil price shock, there is a relatively large real exchange rate 
appreciation under a flexible regime, which tends to limit current account surpluses and 
offset the expansionary fiscal policy. Therefore, real GDP does not increase by as much 
as that in a fixed exchange rate regime. Likewise, there is a large real exchange rate 
depreciation in response to a negative oil price shock under a flexible regime, which 
tends to reduce current account deficits and also offset the fiscal spending cuts. Real 
GDP is thus less severely affected compared to that in a fixed exchange rate regime. 
The findings here again highlight the macroeconomic stabilization role of flexible 
exchange rates, even when oil price shocks are allowed to be asymmetric. The statistical 
test results of the difference in the responses of real GDP and real exchange rate under 
asymmetric oil price shocks are summarized in Table 3.5. Therefore, regardless of the 
nature of the shock (i.e., linear or asymmetric) or the choice of de facto exchange rate 
classification (IRR, LYS, or KS), the shock-absorbing property of flexible exchange 
rates is evidently robust. 
119 
 
Fig. 3.4 Impulse responses to asymmetric oil price shocks of 10% under fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes 
        Fixed exchange rate regime                  Flexible exchange rate regime 
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Notes: Dotted and solid lines are the point estimates of the impulse responses under a positive and 
negative oil price shock, respectively. Exchange rate classification is based on Ilzetzki et al. (2010); 
sample period 1973–2010. 
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Table 3.5 Coefficients of asymmetric oil price changes under fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes 
Oil price shock Regime 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒒 
Positive 
Fixed 0.0660 0.1199 -0.0084 0.0107 
Flexible -0.0176* 0.0995 0.0245 0.1022^ 
Negative 
Fixed -0.0963 -0.0904 -0.0308 -0.0348 
Flexible -0.0168** -0.1477 0.0232^ -0.1238^ 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. Exchange rate classification 
is based on Ilzetzki et al. (2010); sample period 1973–2010. 
3.4 Oil funds as a macroeconomic stabilization tool 
3.4.1 Dynamic impulse responses to an adverse oil price shock 
The results in Section 3.3 provide empirical evidence that flexible exchange rates can 
stabilize output in oil-exporting countries in the face of adverse oil price shocks. Output 
contraction under flexible exchange rate regimes is significantly lower and the 
responses are smoother than in fixed regimes. However, fiscal policy also plays an 
important role in oil-exporting countries, especially in those with fixed exchange rates, 
which renders monetary policy ineffective.20
This section explores the role of oil funds in macroeconomic stabilization by 
extending the analysis in the previous section to examine the effects of an adverse oil 
price shock under different exchange rate and fiscal policy arrangements. The strategy is 
to segregate the data into four groups: (i) fixed exchange rate regime without oil funds; 
(ii) fixed exchange rate with oil funds; (iii) flexible exchange rate regime without oil 
funds; and (iv) flexible exchange rate regime with oil funds. For example, data for 
Gabon prior to the establishment of its oil fund in 1998 are in the ‘fixed exchange rate 
and no oil funds’ group, while data from 1998 onwards are in the ‘fixed exchange rate 
with oil funds’ group. For Norway, whose oil fund was established in 1990, the data 
prior to 1990 are in the ‘flexible exchange rate and no oil funds’ group and data 
 
                                                 
20 The policy trilemma in international economics posits that it is impossible to have fixed exchange rates, 
free capital mobility, and independent monetary policy at the same time. 
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thereafter in the ‘flexible exchange rate with oil funds’ group. There is therefore a clear 
distinction between periods with fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, as well as 
between periods with and without oil funds. In essence, Γ1 in eq. (3.1) differs across the 
four groups. 
Figure 3.5 displays the impulse responses to an oil price shock normalized to 
negative 10%. Under fixed exchange rate regimes, real GDP and real government 
consumption decrease in response to an adverse oil price shock; however, there is a 
notable difference in the responses depending on whether there are oil funds in place.  
The output contraction appears more muted and less volatile in the presence of oil 
funds as there are fiscal buffers to prevent a drastic reduction in fiscal spending. Real 
government consumption falls by 1.2% at its peak after a year with oil funds but the 
decline is 1.9% in the absence of oil funds. However, this difference is not significant 
from a statistical viewpoint as shown in the second row of panels in Table 3.6, owing to 
the relatively small sample size.21
With flexible exchange rate regimes, there is no marked difference in the response 
of real government consumption even in the presence of oil funds. However, this 
observation should not be taken to imply that oil funds are ineffective in countries with 
flexible exchange rates. Instead, it points to the shock-absorbing property of flexible 
exchange rates, thus relieving fiscal policy from bearing a large proportion of the 
adjustment costs. Therefore oil funds need not play a major macroeconomic 
stabilization role in countries with flexible exchange rates. The apparent smaller output 
contraction in the case with oil funds can be explained by the relatively larger real 
exchange rate depreciation on impact. 
 Nevertheless, the findings here still suggest the 
potency of oil funds in cushioning the impact of adverse oil price shocks in oil-
exporting countries with a fixed exchange rate regime, albeit weak statistical evidence. 
As will be seen in Section 3.4.2, all the sensitivity tests show that oil funds help to 
reduce the extent of fiscal spending cuts and hence output contraction, though again the 
statistical significance suffers due to small sample size. Despite the lack of strong 
statistical support, the consistency of the various sensitivity tests is positive indication 
of the importance of oil funds in macroeconomic stabilization. 
                                                 
21 Recall that the proliferation of oil funds only began in the late 1990s. 
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Fig. 3.5 Impulse responses to a -10% oil price shock under different exchange rate 
and fiscal policy arrangements 
        Fixed exchange rate regime                  Flexible exchange rate regime 
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Notes: Dotted lines are the point estimates of the impulse responses without oil funds (NoSWF), while 
solid lines represent those with oil funds (WithSWF). Exchange rate classification is based on Ilzetzki et 
al. (2010); sample period 1973–2010. 
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Table 3.6 Coefficients of oil price changes (negative) under different exchange rate 
and fiscal policy arrangements 
Regime Oil funds 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒒 
Fixed No -0.0655 -0.1271 0.0181 -0.0210 
Flexible No -0.0084* -0.0793 -0.0035 -0.0906^ 
Fixed No -0.0655 -0.1271 0.0181 -0.0210 
Fixed Yes -0.0276 -0.0726 0.0069 -0.0055 
Flexible No -0.0084 -0.0793 -0.0035 -0.0906 
Flexible Yes 0.0311^ -0.0663 -0.0041 -0.0750 
Fixed Yes -0.0276 -0.0726 0.0069 -0.0055 
Flexible Yes 0.0311** -0.0663 -0.0041 -0.0750* 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. Exchange rate classification 
is based on Ilzetzki et al. (2010); sample period 1973–2010. 
These important findings provide three key insights to the macroeconomic 
adjustments in oil-exporting countries in the face of adverse oil price shocks. First, oil 
exporters with flexible exchange rates experience less severe output contraction with 
smoother responses as the real exchange rate depreciation helps to cushion the negative 
effects. Second, with flexible exchange rates there is less need for contractionary fiscal 
policy as the macroeconomic adjustments take place via the immediate real exchange 
rate depreciation. While fiscal buffers such as oil funds can help, the automatic real 
depreciation appears to play a sufficient dampening role. Third, in oil exporters with 
fixed exchange rates, oil funds are a potentially useful stabilization tool to prevent large 
fiscal spending cuts which can amplify the business cycle. 
The empirical results thus lend support to the case for oil-exporting countries to 
adopt more flexible exchange rate policies since they are vulnerable to oil price shocks, 
given their high dependence on oil for exports and government revenue. For oil-
exporting countries that have a ‘fear of floating’, establishing oil funds to provide 
sufficient fiscal space is important for macroeconomic stabilization so that government 
spending does not have to be dependent on volatile oil revenues. 
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3.4.2 Robustness checks 
This section examines the robustness of the main results to various sensitivity tests. 
First, the data period is restricted to 1990–2010 whereby the panel data is less 
unbalanced. Second, advanced economies (i.e., Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the 
United Kingdom) are excluded. Third, national real oil prices (oil price converted to 
national currency and deflated by CPI) are used instead of a common real oil price 
series. Fourth, institutional quality is added as a control variable, given that various 
studies highlight the importance of institutions in reducing fiscal procyclicality and 
macroeconomic volatility (e.g., Ossowski et al., 2008; Sugawara, 2014).22 Finally, fifth, 
money supply is included as a proxy of the domestic monetary policy stance since a 
related strand of research focuses on the endogenous response of monetary policy to oil 
price shocks, which can have indirect effects on output (e.g., Bernanke et al., 1997).23
The results of the sensitivity tests in Tables 3.B1 to 3.B5 in Appendix 3.B highlight 
that the qualitative findings of Section 3.4.1 are not altered. In oil-exporting countries 
with fixed exchange rate regimes, the presence of oil funds is associated with a smaller 
reduction in real GDP and real government consumption, as seen in the coefficients in 
the second row of panels in Tables 3.B1 to 3.B5. Despite the lack of statistical 
significance at conventional levels due to small sample size, the consistency of the 
various sensitivity tests provide some indication that oil funds are a potential useful 
stabilization tool. The larger real exchange rate depreciation and smaller output 
contraction under flexible exchange rate regimes are also evident in all the tests (see the 
first and fourth row of panels), highlighting the insulating property of flexible exchange 
rates. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Oil prices have been plummeting since June 2014, causing many oil exporters to face 
immense economic and political pressures. As a consequence, the fiscal deficits in oil-
                                                 
22 Institutional quality data is taken from Kunčič (2014), using the average of legal, political, and 
economic institutions. The data is from 1990 to 2010. 
23 Money supply (M2) is used since interest rate data is not available for many of the oil-exporting 
countries. Interest rate is also not the core monetary policy instrument in most of these countries. 
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exporting countries necessitate abrupt macroeconomic adjustments, the extent to which 
depends on exchange rate and fiscal policies. Economic theory postulates that oil-
exporting countries with flexible exchange rates can adjust better when faced with 
adverse oil price shocks; in addition, those with adequate fiscal buffers such as oil funds 
can prevent a drastic reduction in government spending. The objective of this paper is to 
examine the empirical validity of these economic arguments. 
Applying panel vector autoregression techniques to 40 oil-exporting countries in 
the post-Bretton Woods period from 1973 to 2010, the results show that output and 
government consumption fall in response to an adverse oil price shock. However, the 
output response is significantly smaller and smoother in oil exporters with flexible 
exchange rates due to the immediate real exchange rate depreciation, which partially 
offsets the fiscal spending cuts. In contrast, oil-exporting countries under fixed 
exchange rate regimes see a small and delayed real exchange rate depreciation achieved 
via a fall in domestic prices. The bulk of the macroeconomic adjustments therefore take 
place through fiscal contractions. However, the fall in output and government 
consumption in countries with oil funds is more muted as these funds provide fiscal 
space to finance budget deficits, albeit weak statistical evidence due to small sample 
size. These findings highlight the shock-absorbing property of flexible exchange rates as 
well as the potency of oil funds as a macroeconomic stabilization tool to insulate oil 
exporters from adverse oil price shocks. There is therefore a case to be made in favour 
of oil-exporting countries to adopt more flexible exchange rate regimes and establish oil 
funds as fiscal buffers. 
A few caveats are in order. There is also a need to take into account the role of fixed 
exchange rate regimes in anchoring expectations about an oil exporter’s exchange rate. 
A small change in the confidence of a currency, especially in developing countries, can 
quickly lead to a downward spiral of its value as well as persistent inflation, as 
evidenced by the currency crises episodes in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s. It is 
also worthwhile to note that the partial equilibrium nature of the analysis in this paper 
does not take into account the potential endogenous responses to oil price declines in 
oil-importing countries, which could have spillover effects. For example, an oil price-
induced monetary policy adjustment in the U.S. has a direct impact on oil-exporting 
countries that peg to the U.S. dollar. In addition, oil price declines also result in lower 
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savings by oil exporters, which could affect global interest rates and global imbalances; 
for instance, through a reduction in petrodollar recycling (see e.g., Arezki and Hasanov, 
2013; Belke and Gros, 2014). These potentially important channels are not explicitly 
considered in the reduced-form econometric analysis in this paper, but are implicitly 
incorporated in the estimated effects. In addition, oil funds are not a panacea and their 
effectiveness could also depend on the country’s institutional quality and operational 
aspects governing the funds. 
An area for future research is to examine how oil price declines driven by supply 
and demand in the global crude oil market affect oil-exporting countries. This is 
important as the unfolding of supply-driven and demand-driven oil price shocks are 
inherently different. For instance, Cashin et al. (2014) find that a supply-driven oil price 
shock has a significant impact on oil-exporting countries that possess large proven oil 
reserves but the effect is muted for those with limited reserves. Interestingly, such cross-
country differences are absent in a demand-driven oil price shock. Habib et al. (2016) 
find that oil-exporting countries with floating currencies experience a nominal exchange 
rate depreciation following oil demand shocks, but not oil supply shocks. These results 
illustrate the importance of the source of oil price fluctuations and policymakers would 
have to pay close attention to international developments to design appropriate policy 
responses according to the nature of the oil price decline.  
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Appendix 3.A 
Table 3.A1 List of oil-exporting countries 
Country Group Net oil exports
a Oil exports 
% Exportsb 
Oil exports 
% GDPc 
Oil rents % 
GDPc c 
Algeria DEV 954.3 92.5 37.9 17.4 
Angola DEV 1,359.9 93.0 69.2 53.5 
Argentina DEV 128.5 12.4 2.8 3.7 
Azerbaijan DEV 495.2 82.7 44.7 43.9 
Bahrain DEV -225.4 59.7 54.1 18.0 
Brunei 
Darussalam DEV 171.1 85.5 62.3 30.5 
Cameroon DEV 36.1 35.9 9.8 8.6 
Canada ADV 1,039.0 15.4 5.3 2.3 
Chad DEV 96.5 78.3 37.5 34.3 
Colombia EME 337.9 28.1 4.8 6.2 
Congo, Rep. DEV 251.8 83.8 67.5 64.2 
Denmark ADV 151.9 6.0 3.0 1.9 
Ecuador DEV 324.6 46.2 13.5 18.5 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. EME 75.0 18.4 4.5 8.7 
Equatorial 
Guinea DEV 295.6 97.4 100.8 74.8 
Gabon DEV 237.5 79.9 46.8 45.0 
Indonesia EME 80.8 9.7 3.0 4.2 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. DEV 2,289.0 85.0 22.0 29.4 
Iraq DEV 1,740.6 N/A 42.6 53.7 
Kazakhstan DEV 911.0 52.4 26.1 30.1 
Kuwait DEV 1,520.9 81.5 49.6 50.3 
Libya DEV 1,184.2 100 59.4 49.5 
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Malaysia EME 172.4 7.2 7.4 6.7 
Mexico EME 1,703.6 12.4 3.5 5.7 
Nigeria DEV 2,162.1 97.7 38.5 28.3 
Norway ADV 2,235.8 30.6 13.2 12.0 
Oman DEV 731.3 81.0 45.4 37.8 
Papua New 
Guinea DEV 30.3 22.4 12.5 15.5 
Qatar EME 875.8 87.4 53.6 22.2 
Russian 
Federation EME 4,571.6 41.0 13.5 15.5 
Saudi Arabia DEV 6,888.5 83.9 42.9 44.1 
Sudan DEV 294.0 79.8 13.8 16.9 
Syrian Arab 
Rep. DEV 168.5 34.4 12.5 22.8 
Timor-Leste DEV 59.4 N/A N/A N/A 
Trinidad and 
Tobago DEV -23.4 32.7 21.6 12.1 
Turkmenistan DEV 44.5 75.0 37.0 28.8 
Tunisia DEV 47.8 9.6 4.5 3.6 
United Arab 
Emirates EME 2,113.9 40.6 27.8 19.4 
United 
Kingdom ADV 88.2 6.2 1.8 1.1 
Venezuela, RB DEV 1,767.2 82.7 25.0 28.0 
Vietnam DEV 294.0 15.3 10.3 8.4 
Yemen, Rep. DEV 252.4 79.0 27.5 28.4 
Notes: a 
Source: 
Advanced economies (ADV) are based on the classification in IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO), October 2016; Emerging economies (EME) are those included in the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) Emerging Markets Index; Developing countries (DEV) are the remaining 
unclassified countries. 
b Thousand barrels per day, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA); 2000–2012 average. 
c
 
 Oil exports from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO); Total exports, oil rents and GDP from World 
Bank World Development Indicators (WDI); 2000–2012 average. N/A denotes not available. 
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Table 3.A2 Variables and data sources 
Variables Definition a Symbol Sourceb 
Real oil price Crude oil price (U.S. dollars per barrel) deflated using U.S. CPI 𝑜 IFS 
Real GDP GDP (constant local currency in billions) 𝑦 WDI, WEO 
Real 
government 
consumption 
Government consumption expenditure 
(current local currency in billions) 
deflated using national CPI 
𝑔 WDI, IFS 
Prices Consumer price index (CPI) 𝑝 WDI, IFS, WEO 
Real exchange 
rate Real effective exchange rate (REER) 𝑞 Darvas (2012)  
Notes: a All variables are expressed in natural logarithm. 
b
 
 IFS – IMF International Financial Statistics, WDI – World Bank World Development Indicators, WEO – 
IMF World Economic Outlook. The primary source of the domestic variables is WDI, but if a longer time 
series is available in IFS or WEO, the alternative database is used. CPI for United Arab Emirates is 
obtained from the UAE National Bureau of Statistics. 
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Appendix 3.B 
Table 3.B1 Coefficients of oil price changes (negative) under different exchange 
rate and fiscal policy arrangements; data period 1990–2010 
Regime Oil funds 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒒 
Fixed No -0.0484 -0.1794 0.0234 -0.0542 
Flexible No -0.0005^ -0.0766 0.0209 -0.1151 
Fixed No -0.0484 -0.1794 0.0234 -0.0542 
Fixed Yes -0.0149 -0.0851 0.0163 -0.0125 
Flexible No -0.0005 -0.0766 0.0209 -0.1151 
Flexible Yes 0.0207 -0.0837 0.0025 -0.1180 
Fixed Yes -0.0149 -0.0851 0.0163 -0.0125 
Flexible Yes 0.0207^ -0.0837 0.0025 -0.1180^ 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
 
Table 3.B2 Coefficients of oil price changes (negative) under different exchange 
rate and fiscal policy arrangements; advanced economies excluded 
Regime Oil funds 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒒 
Fixed No -0.0697 -0.1426 0.0199 -0.0237 
Flexible No -0.0125* -0.0955 -0.0015 -0.1116^ 
Fixed No -0.0697 -0.1426 0.0199 -0.0237 
Fixed Yes -0.0276 -0.0726 0.0069 -0.0055 
Flexible No -0.0125 -0.0955 -0.0015 -0.1116 
Flexible Yes 0.0513^ -0.1182 0.0019 -0.0952 
Fixed Yes -0.0276 -0.0726 0.0069 -0.0055 
Flexible Yes 0.0513* -0.1182 0.0019 -0.0952^ 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 3.B3 Coefficients of oil price changes (negative) under different exchange 
rate and fiscal policy arrangements; national real oil price series 
Regime Oil funds 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒒 
Fixed No -0.0422 -0.0946 -0.0002 -0.0250 
Flexible No -0.0021^ -0.0530 0.0037 -0.0568 
Fixed No -0.0422 -0.0946 -0.0002 -0.0250 
Fixed Yes 0.0018* -0.0067 0.0051 0.0001 
Flexible No -0.0021 -0.0530 0.0037 -0.0568 
Flexible Yes 0.0252 -0.0686 0.0002 -0.0211 
Fixed Yes 0.0018 -0.0067 0.0051 0.0001 
Flexible Yes 0.0252 -0.0686 0.0002 -0.0211 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
 
Table 3.B4 Coefficients of oil price changes (negative) under different exchange 
rate and fiscal policy arrangements; control for institutional quality 
Regime Oil funds 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒒 
Fixed No -0.0592 -0.1300 0.0064 -0.0485 
Flexible No 0.0048** -0.0921 0.0344 -0.1271 
Fixed No -0.0592 -0.1300 0.0064 -0.0485 
Fixed Yes -0.0162 -0.0776 0.0140 -0.0098 
Flexible No 0.0048 -0.0921 0.0344 -0.1271 
Flexible Yes -0.0083 -0.0269 0.0067 -0.0692 
Fixed Yes -0.0162 -0.0776 0.0140 -0.0098 
Flexible Yes -0.0083 -0.0269 0.0067 -0.0692^ 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 3.B5 Coefficients of oil price changes (negative) under different exchange 
rate and fiscal policy arrangements; including money supply 
Regime Oil funds 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒎 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒒 
Fixed No -0.0620 -0.1008 0.0020 0.0144 -0.0177 
Flexible No -0.0099* -0.0912 -0.0142 0.0042 -0.0833^ 
Fixed No -0.0620 -0.1008 0.0020 0.0144 -0.0177 
Fixed Yes -0.0156 -0.0665 -0.0866 0.0135 -0.0040 
Flexible No -0.0099 -0.0912 -0.0142 0.0042 -0.0833 
Flexible Yes -0.0033 -0.0107** -0.1249* -0.0019 -0.0127 
Fixed Yes -0.0156 -0.0665 -0.0866 0.0135 -0.0040 
Flexible Yes -0.0033 -0.0107 -0.1249 -0.0019 -0.0127 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Chapter 4 
Fiscal policy in oil-exporting countries: the 
roles of oil funds and institutional quality 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Oil-exporting countries face challenges in the conduct of fiscal policy due to volatile oil 
revenues, especially in countries with weak institutions. Many oil exporters have 
established oil funds to delink government expenditure from oil revenues; however, 
their effectiveness remains unresolved. This paper examines the roles of oil funds and 
institutional quality in reducing fiscal procyclicality and macroeconomic volatility in 42 
oil-exporting countries from 1960 to 2014 using panel vector autoregression techniques. 
The results show that oil funds are effective in reducing fiscal procyclicality in countries 
with high institutional quality. There is also a reduction in the procyclical bias in those 
with low institutional quality but the statistical evidence is weak. Nevertheless, oil funds 
are associated with reduced volatility of government consumption and the real exchange 
rate in countries with low institutional quality. These findings give credence to the 
macroeconomic stabilization role of oil funds but also reinforce the importance of good 
institutions. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In spite of the potential benefits that natural resource endowments could bring to 
resource-rich countries, the underperformance of economic growth and unsatisfactory 
development outcomes are well documented (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995; Auty, 
2001). This phenomenon is being referred to as the ‘resource curse’.24 There are five 
main explanations of the resource curse: the ‘Dutch Disease’ hypothesis (Corden and 
Neary, 1982); volatile international resource prices that cause macroeconomic 
uncertainty (Lane, 2003); unproductive spending on ‘white elephant’ projects (Gelb, 
1986) and underinvestment in human capital (Gylfason, 2001); procyclical fiscal 
policies and inappropriate monetary policy frameworks (Frankel, 2011); and political 
economy arguments of resource abundance (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 1997; Tornell and 
Lane, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001). These problems are even more severe in oil-
exporting countries owing to the fact that oil is a ‘point-source’ and ‘lootable’ resource 
and hence conflict, corruption, and rent-seeking are more likely compared with diffuse 
resources (Mehlum et al., 2006; Arezki and Brückner, 2009).25 In addition, oil exporters 
are subject to larger terms of trade shocks and, to some extent, the high macroeconomic 
volatility in these countries can be attributed to procyclical fiscal policies that amplify 
the boom-bust cycle.26
Among the policy prescriptions advocated to reduce the dependence on volatile oil 
revenues to alleviate fiscal procyclicality, macroeconomic volatility, and limit Dutch 
disease symptoms in oil-exporting countries is to set up oil funds, which gained 
popularity from the late 1990s.
 
27
                                                 
24 van der Ploeg (2011) provides a survey of the literature on the resource curse. 
 Oil funds fall under the umbrella of sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs). Data from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute shows the total asset size 
of SWFs to be about US$7.4 trillion as of June 2016, of which 57% are oil and gas 
funds (SWFI, 2016). Oil funds are typically set up with the objective of either saving for 
the future to address issues with regards to fiscal sustainability and intergenerational 
25 Oil-exporting countries have more authoritarian governments and they stay in power longer compared 
to their non-oil counterparts. 
26 Oil prices are at least twice as volatile as other minerals or agricultural products. 
27 Other policy options include economic diversification, conservative oil price budget forecasts, hedging 
oil price risk, and fiscal rules (see Devlin and Lewin, 2005). 
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equity, or to smooth fiscal expenditure and stabilize the economy.28 As the economic 
argument goes, governments can smooth expenditures and prevent excessive 
macroeconomic volatility by channelling surplus oil revenues to the oil funds during 
booms and finance budget deficits during cycle downturns by transfers from these 
funds.29 They are therefore related to a broader literature on fiscal procyclicality.30 The 
fact that fiscal policy is procyclical in developing countries has been documented in 
many studies (e.g., Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky et al., 2004; Talvi and Végh, 
2005; Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008; Carneiro and Garrido, 2015).31
There are only a handful of papers that quantitatively investigate the importance of 
oil funds (or natural resource funds) and institutions on the conduct of fiscal policy.
 The same result holds 
when narrowing the sample to resource-rich countries (Céspedes and Velasco, 2014) 
and oil-exporting developing countries (Erbil, 2011). In the political economy context, 
Arezki et al. (2011) find that procyclical government spending in resource-rich 
countries is moderated by the quality of political institutions. More generally, Frankel et 
al. (2013) find that a third of the developing world have ‘graduated’ from fiscal 
procyclicality over the past decade, and the key determinant is institutional quality. 
Interestingly, about half of this graduation cohort comprises of oil exporters, the period 
that coincides with the proliferation of oil funds (see Fig. 1.3 in Chapter 1). 
32
                                                 
28 Oil funds with a stated savings objective usually also allow discretionary transfers to the budget to 
smooth expenditures during the down cycle. Most oil funds have dual objectives of savings and 
stabilization. 
 
The findings of existing studies are somewhat mixed. Davis et al. (2001) find that 
resource funds do not have a significant impact on government spending and are largely 
redundant based on 12 selected countries (11 oil exporters and Chile) from 1965 to 
29 There are also political economy arguments for oil funds, e.g., governments have strong political 
incentives to overspend and oil funds can potentially tie the hands of the government (see Humphreys and 
Sandhu, 2007). 
30 Lane (2003) discusses why procyclical fiscal policy is not optimal from either Keynesian or 
neoclassical theoretical considerations. Halland and Bleaney (2011) review the causes of fiscal 
procyclicality in developing countries. 
31 Fiscal policy in advanced economies is countercyclical or at worst acyclical (see Arreaza et al., 1998; 
Lane, 2003). 
32 While Fasano (2000) does not use econometric techniques, he looks at case studies of in six countries 
and finds that oil funds are generally successful in Kuwait and Norway but not in Venezuela. 
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1999. Crain and Devlin (2003) find that resource funds can in fact increase fiscal 
spending volatility, particularly in oil-exporting countries. Ossowski et al. (2008) use a 
larger panel data set of 31 countries from 1992 to 2005 and conclude that fiscal 
outcomes are not due to oil funds but they find that higher institutional quality is 
associated with lower correlation between government revenue and expenditure. 
Likewise, Bova et al. (2016) do not find evidence that adopting fiscal rules and resource 
funds have reduced the procyclical bias in non-renewable commodity exporters; 
however, they find that better institutional quality reduces procyclicality. 
In contrast, Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) use a panel data set of 15 oil-exporting 
countries from 1973 to 2003 and find that oil funds are negatively correlated with 
volatility of money, prices, and to a lesser extent real exchange rates. Coutinho et al. 
(2014) provide evidence of fiscal procyclicality in resource-rich countries but the effect 
is lower when there is a resource fund and also in more democratic regimes. Sugawara 
(2014) finds that resource funds contribute to smoothing government expenditure 
volatility but political institutions is also a significant factor. Asik (2015) provides 
evidence in favour of oil funds in reducing fiscal procyclicality and volatility of fiscal 
expenditures in 29 oil-exporting countries from 1980 to 2012 but she does not find any 
statistically significant association between fiscal performance and institutional quality. 
The lack of consensus in the empirical literature is perhaps not surprising since 
studies on oil funds are usually plagued with several problems—choosing the 
appropriate fiscal policy variable, sample selection bias, unobserved heterogeneity, and 
endogeneity. The novelty of this paper and its contribution are: (i) using a more 
comprehensive coverage of 42 oil-exporting countries over the period 1960–2014, 
which is the largest data set compiled to date; (ii) employing panel vector 
autoregression (VAR) techniques to address these empirical issues; and (iii) investigate 
both the roles of oil funds and institutional quality in reducing fiscal procyclicality and 
macroeconomic volatility in a coherent empirical framework.33
                                                 
33 Existing papers on oil or natural resource funds typically use traditional panel data methods and regress 
changes of a fiscal variable on GDP growth and other control variables. They also focus only either on 
fiscal procyclicality or macroeconomic volatility. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to use panel 
VAR methods to investigate the effectiveness of oil funds. It also differs from panel VAR studies on the 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
empirical challenges and the econometric approach. Section 4.3 presents the results on 
the roles of oil funds and institutional quality. Section 4.4 explores further issues 
pertaining to fiscal cyclicality. Section 4.5 subjects the empirical results to a battery of 
robustness checks, and Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Data and methodology 
4.2.1 Empirical issues 
Fiscal policy is defined to be procyclical if it is expansionary in booms and 
contractionary in recessions (Kaminsky et al., 2004). In general, existing studies 
typically regress government consumption growth on GDP growth; a statistically 
significant positive coefficient indicates evidence of procyclical fiscal policy. Similarly, 
existing studies regress measures of macroeconomic volatility on selected explanatory 
variables. Oil funds enter these regressions as a dummy variable interacted with GDP 
growth and the statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term 
determines its effectiveness. 
Among the main empirical challenges in establishing a robust relationship between 
oil funds and fiscal outcomes are using the appropriate discretionary fiscal policy 
variable, sample selection bias, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity. The first 
issue in analysing fiscal policy is to decide which variable is most appropriate to 
characterize a country’s fiscal stance. Kaminsky et al. (2004) emphasize that if one is 
interested in macroeconomic policy, then the focus should be on instruments within 
policymakers’ control. According to Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), there are two key fiscal 
policy instruments—government consumption (as opposed to government spending, 
which also includes transfers and debt service) and tax rates (as opposed to tax 
revenues, which depend on the business cycle). However, tax rates are not readily 
available for most countries and are therefore not useful in cross-country studies. 
Another related issue is whether to scale fiscal variables with GDP. Kaminsky et al. 
(2004) and Ilzetzki and Végh (2008) criticize that fiscal variable ratios to GDP include 
                                                                                                                                               
effects of oil price shocks in oil-exporting countries which do not examine the importance of oil funds 
and institutions (e.g., Omojolaibi and Egwaikhide, 2014). 
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business cycle movements and hence interpretation of the results on fiscal procyclicality 
is difficult. For instance, during boom times GDP will increase. Using a fiscal variable 
scaled to GDP will tend to underestimate the extent of procyclical fiscal policy. For the 
above reasons, the fiscal policy variable in this paper focuses on government 
consumption expenditure. 
Selection bias is also a drawback in existing studies, whereby only a subset of oil 
exporters is included. The findings of these panel studies are therefore not necessarily 
representative of the average experience of oil-exporting countries as a group. This 
paper covers 42 oil-exporting countries and includes those with and without oil funds. 
The countries selected satisfy at least one of the following criteria: net oil exports of at 
least 50 thousand barrels per day; share of oil exports in total exports of at least 30%; oil 
exports as a percentage of GDP of at least 20%; and oil rents as a percentage of GDP of 
at least 20%. This ensures that all significant oil exporters are included, which 
minimizes selection bias. Table 4.A1 in Appendix 4.A lists the 42 countries, of which 38 
are emerging and developing countries. 
The decision to establish an oil fund is not a random event but could possibly be 
due to time-invariant country-specific unobserved characteristics. To overcome this 
problem, existing studies use the fixed effects estimator to purge the impact of time-
invariant variables. Endogeneity issues arise due to potential reverse causality of fiscal 
policy and GDP. The literature on fiscal procyclicality is based on the premise that fiscal 
policy responds to output and hence exacerbates the business cycle, but as Jaimovich 
and Panizza (2007) argue, causality can also run in the opposite direction. A solution 
that is frequently employed is to instrument GDP growth but an associated problem is in 
finding appropriate instrument variables. The methodology used in this paper is based 
on panel VAR techniques, which offer several advantages: they combine the 
conventional VAR approach that treats all variables as endogenous, with the dynamic 
panel data estimation approach that allows for unobserved heterogeneity, first employed 
in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). Details on the panel VAR estimation are discussed in 
Section 4.2.3. 
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4.2.2 Variables and data sources 
It is timely to take a brief digression to discuss the expected effects oil funds have on 
the macroeconomy. Figure 4.1 shows a highly stylized transmission mechanism of oil 
windfalls in oil-exporting countries. When oil prices increase, there is a boom as export 
earnings, GDP, and government revenue increase. Fiscal policy is typically the main 
mechanism in which oil price shocks are transmitted into the economy (Husain et al., 
2008) and with procyclical fiscal policy there is increased demand for both imports and 
domestic goods. The associated monetary expansion can lead to higher inflation. There 
is also a real exchange rate appreciation either through a nominal appreciation in the 
case of a floating exchange rate regime or via inflation in the case of a fixed exchange 
rate regime. The real exchange rate appreciation can also have Dutch disease effects on 
the non-oil tradable sector. Conversely, when oil prices decrease, government spending 
is cut back and this boom-bust cycle induces macroeconomic volatility. The oil fund 
comes in as a vehicle to stabilize the economy, by saving excess revenue in booms and 
funding the deficit during downturns so that government spending does not have to 
depend on the direction of oil prices. If oil funds are successful, one should expect to 
see less procyclical fiscal policy and lower macroeconomic volatility. 
Fig. 4.1 Stylized transmission of oil windfalls 
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Using the panel VAR approach, the analysis in this paper therefore focuses on the 
direction and magnitude of the impulse responses of government consumption (to gauge 
fiscal procyclicality), as well as the standard deviation of the impulse responses (as a 
measure of volatility) of the domestic macroeconomic variables. Annual data from 1960 
to 2014 is used but data availability varies by country (i.e., the panel is unbalanced). 
The variables included in the panel VAR and expressed in natural logarithms are real oil 
price (𝑜), real GDP (𝑦), real government consumption (𝑔), price (𝑝), money supply (𝑚), 
and the real exchange rate (𝑞). The variables and data sources are summarized in Table 
4.A2 in Appendix 4.A. 
Results of the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test (see Im et al., 2003) for 
the variables are shown in Table 4.1. This test allows for unbalanced panels. The null 
hypothesis that all panels contain a unit cannot be rejected when the variables are in log 
levels. However, evidence of stationarity is clear when taking first log differences, 
which approximates growth rates. Table 4.2 shows the results of the four panel 
cointegration tests developed by Westerlund (2007). All four tests fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration among the variables. Therefore, based on the panel unit 
root and cointegration test results, variables in log differences are used in the empirical 
analysis. 
Table 4.1 Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test 
Variable Z-t-tilde bar statistic p-value Variable 
Z-t-tilde 
bar statistic p-value 
𝑜 1.36 0.91 Δ𝑜 -22.69 0.00 
𝑦 24.29 1.00 Δ𝑦 -16.91 0.00 
𝑔 18.34 1.00 Δ𝑔 -18.74 0.00 
𝑝 27.95 1.00 Δ𝑝 -11.63 0.00 
𝑚 44.45 1.00 Δ𝑚 -17.25 0.00 
𝑞 -1.45 0.07 Δ𝑞 -18.72 0.00 
Notes: 𝐻𝑜: All panels contain unit roots, 𝐻𝑎: Some panels are stationary. 
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Table 4.2 Westerlund panel cointegration tests 
Variables 
Gt Ga Pt Pa 
Z-
value 
p-
value 
Z-
value 
p-
value 
Z-
value 
p-
value 
Z-
value 
p-
value 
𝑜,𝑦,𝑔,𝑝, m, 𝑞 6.51 1.00 10.53 1.00 8.70 1.00 8.76 1.00 
Notes: The Gt and Ga statistics test 𝐻𝑜: 𝜑𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖 vs. 𝐻𝑎: 𝜑𝑖 < 0 for at least 𝑖, starting from a 
weighted average of the individually estimated coefficients 𝜑𝑖 and their t-ratios respectively. Rejection of 
𝐻𝑜 implies existence of a cointegrating relationship for at least one of the cross-sectional units. The Pt and 
Pa statistics test 𝐻𝑜: 𝜑𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖 vs. 𝐻𝑎: 𝜑𝑖 < 0 for all 𝑖, using the pooled information over all cross-
sectional units. Rejection of 𝐻𝑜 is taken as evidence of cointegration for the whole panel. The tests 
includes a constant and trend. Results are obtained using the Stata codes xtwest by Persyn and Westerlund 
(2008). 
4.2.3 Panel VAR estimation 
The reduced-form panel VAR specification is of the form: 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = Γ0 + Γ1𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (4.1) 
where 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of endogenous variables �Δ𝑜𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑞𝑖,𝑡�′ 
for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡, Γ0 is the vector of intercepts, Γ1 is the coefficient matrix of the 
lagged variables, 𝑓𝑖 denotes time-invariant country fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the vector 
consisting of the error terms that are assumed to be uncorrelated across 𝑖 and 𝑡. In view 
of the annual data frequency, only one lag is included in the specification. 
Implementing the VAR procedure on panel data requires imposing the restriction 
that the same underlying structure holds for each cross-sectional unit (country), i.e., the 
coefficients in the matrix Γ1 are the same for all countries. This constraint is usually 
violated in practice; a way to overcome this is to introduce fixed effects, which allows 
for individual heterogeneity (Love and Zicchino, 2006). The conventional mean-
difference procedure that is commonly used to remove fixed effects might lead to biased 
coefficient estimates since the fixed effects are correlated with the lagged dependent 
variables, which gives rise to the problem of ‘dynamic panel bias’ (Nickell, 1981), and 
hence ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is inappropriate. Taking the first 
difference of each equation in the model in eq. (4.1) removes both the constant term and 
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the individual effect; however, the differenced lagged dependent variables are still 
correlated with the error terms. But with the fixed effects swept out, a straightforward 
method is to construct instrument variables using the twice lagged dependent variables 
and estimate using two-stage least squares (2SLS) (see Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).  
However, a problem with the first-difference approach in the case of the application 
in this paper is that it magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels (Roodman, 2009). For 
instance, if 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is missing in the data, then Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 and Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 are also missing in the 
transformed data. A procedure known as the Helmert transformation of forward mean-
differencing, or forward orthogonal deviations, is applied to avoid this problem (see 
Arellano and Bover, 1995). Instead of subtracting the previous observation of a variable 
in the first-difference approach, the Helmert procedure subtracts the average of all the 
future observations and thus preserves the sample size in panels with gaps. 
More specifically, let 𝑧?̅?,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑧𝑖,𝑠(𝑇𝑖−𝑡)𝑇𝑖𝑠=𝑡+1  denote the means obtained from the 
future values of 𝑧𝑖,𝑡, which is a variable in the vector 𝑍𝑖,𝑡, and 𝑇𝑖 is the last year of a 
country’s time series. The transformed variable is thus: 
𝑧𝑖,𝑡∗ = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡(𝑧𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑧?̅?,𝑡)        (4.2) 
where 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = � 𝑇𝑖−𝑡𝑇𝑖−𝑡+1 is the weight used to equalize variances. The error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 also 
undergoes a similar transformation: 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡∗ = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡(𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?,𝑡)        (4.3) 
The final transformed panel VAR takes the form: 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡∗ = Γ1𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1∗ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡∗         (4.4) 
This procedure also preserves the orthogonality between the transformed variables and 
the lagged regressors; hence they can be used as instruments to estimate the coefficients 
consistently by generalized method of moments (GMM).  
To compute the impulse responses, the Cholesky decomposition is used to identify 
the shocks in the panel VAR system. The recursive ordering of the variables in the 
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system is such that a variable does not react contemporaneously to other variables 
below it but reacts to those above it. After one period (year), all variables react to all the 
shocks. Changes in real oil price (Δ𝑜) is ordered first as it is assumed that domestic 
variables do not have an immediate influence on global oil prices. This assumption 
might be challenged by some based on the premise that OPEC is an effective cartel in 
controlling oil prices by coordinating oil production. However, there is no evidence of 
OPEC demonstrating such influence (Kilian, 2014). 
The domestic variables are ordered next in the order: real GDP growth (Δ𝑦), real 
government consumption growth (Δ𝑔), inflation (Δ𝑝), money supply growth (Δ𝑚), and 
real exchange rate changes (Δ𝑞). With annual data, it is debatable whether GDP or 
government consumption should be ordered first. The standard ordering using quarterly 
data follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002) by assuming output does not 
contemporaneously affect government spending due to implementation lags. However, 
this identifying assumption becomes less credible with annual data. For instance, 
government spending can react to output changes after a quarter and the effects will thus 
be captured in the annual data. In panel VAR studies of oil-exporting countries, Husain 
et al. (2008) order output before government spending whereas the reverse is specified 
in Espinoza and Prasad (2012). In the baseline specification here, GDP is ordered before 
government consumption.34
4.3 Empirical results 
 The ordering of the remaining variables is standard in the 
VAR literature. 
4.3.1 Overview of fiscal cyclicality and macroeconomic volatility in 
oil-exporting countries 
Before turning to the estimation results, it is worthwhile to explore the data for possible 
insights into fiscal cyclicality and macroeconomic volatility in oil-exporting countries. 
It is instructive to segregate the sample into periods before and after the establishment 
of oil funds, as well as by countries with high and low institutional quality (IQ), since 
this demarcation is also used in the econometric analysis. Table 4.3 lists the countries  
                                                 
34 Reversing the order does not change the main results. See Section 4.5 on robustness checks. 
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Table 4.3 Oil-exporting countries and oil funds 
No oil funds With oil funds 
Argentina Algeria (2000) Gabon (1998) Qatar (2005) 
Congo, Rep. Angola (2012) Iran, Islamic Rep. (2000) 
Russian Federation 
(2004) 
Denmark Azerbaijan (1999) Iraq (2003) Saudi Arabia (1952) 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Bahrain (2006) Kazakhstan (2000) Sudan (2002) 
Indonesia Brunei Darussalam (1983) Kuwait (1953) Timor-Leste (2005) 
Malaysia Cameroon (1974) Libya (2006) Trinidad and Tobago (2000) 
Syrian Arab Rep. Canada (1976) Mexico (2000) Turkmenistan (2008) 
Tunisia Chad (1999–2006) Nigeria (2004) United Arab Emirates (1976) 
United Kingdom Colombia (1995) Norway (1990) Venezuela, RB (1998) 
Vietnam Ecuador (2002) Oman (1980)  
Yemen, Rep. Equatorial Guinea (2002) 
Papua New Guinea 
(2011)  
Source: Tsani (2013), SWFI (2016), Truman (2008). 
Notes: Establishment year of the oil fund is in parenthesis. The oil fund in Chad was abolished in 2006. 
with and without oil funds, including the years in which the funds were set up. Table 4.4 
splits the countries by IQ. IQ data is obtained from the World Institutional Quality 
Ranking data set by Kunčič (2014), who computes the latent quality of legal, political, 
and economic institutions for 197 countries using factor analysis on a large number of 
institutional proxy variables.35
                                                 
35 A popular institutional quality database is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data set, e.g., 
used in Frankel et al. (2013). However, data for some of the countries included in this paper are not 
available in ICRG. For consistency reasons, this paper uses Kunčič (2014), which covers all countries. 
 The scores across the three dimensions are then 
averaged. Countries with IQ scores higher (lower) than the global median are classified 
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as high (low) IQ.36
Table 4.4 Oil-exporting countries and institutional quality score 
 There are more oil-exporting countries with low IQ scores compared 
to high scores. 
High institutional quality Low institutional quality 
Argentina 
(0.528) Oman (0.573) Algeria (0.374) 
Equatorial 
Guinea (0.211) 
Saudi Arabia 
(0.433) 
Bahrain (0.590) Papua New Guinea (0.547) Angola (0.345) Gabon (0.435) Sudan (0.247) 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
(0.562) 
Qatar (0.523) Azerbaijan (0.405) 
Indonesia 
(0.445) 
Syrian Arab 
Rep. (0.349) 
Canada (0.871) Trinidad and Tobago (0.661) 
Cameroon 
(0.371) 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. (0.362) 
Timor-Leste 
(0.503) 
Denmark 
(0.901) 
United Arab 
Emirates 
(0.568) 
Chad (0.252) Iraq (0.262) Tunisia (0.482) 
Kuwait (0.582) 
United 
Kingdom 
(0.864) 
Colombia 
(0.476) 
Kazakhstan 
(0.432) 
Turkmenistan 
(0.130) 
Malaysia 
(0.547)  
Congo, Rep. 
(0.344) Libya (0.290) 
Venezuela, RB 
(0.360) 
Mexico (0.569)  Ecuador (0.454) Nigeria (0.408) 
Vietnam 
(0.366) 
Norway (0.843)  Egypt, Arab Rep. (0.444) 
Russian 
Federation 
(0.415) 
Yemen, Rep. 
(0.378) 
Source: Kunčič
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are the institutional quality scores. The scores range from a minimum of 0 
to a maximum of 1; higher scores indicate better institutional quality. 
 (2014), 2000–2010 average of legal, political and economic institutions. 
 
 
                                                 
36 It can be argued that the countries in the high IQ group defined here should only be confined to the 
advanced economies and the remainder classified as medium IQ. A robustness check in Section 4.5 shows 
that the main results remain unchanged after excluding the advanced economies. Section 4.4.2 treats IQ 
as a continuous variable and hence avoids splitting countries into subsamples. 
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Figures 4.2a and 4.2b plot the correlation of the cyclical components of GDP and 
government consumption in high and low IQ countries respectively.37
Fig. 4.2a Correlation of the cyclical components of GDP and government 
consumption in high IQ countries 
 The cyclical 
components are extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The light-coloured bars 
correspond to the correlation in the periods without oil funds while the dark-coloured 
bars represent the correlation in the periods with oil funds. Comparing the two figures, 
an immediate observation is that fiscal policy tends to be less procyclical in high IQ 
countries, in both the periods with or without oil funds, as seen by the height of the bars. 
This clearly demonstrates a link between institution quality and the conduct of fiscal 
policy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Similar plots are obtained using simple correlation of GDP growth and government consumption 
growth instead of the cyclical components of GDP and government consumption. To be consistent with 
the literature (e.g., Kaminsky et al., 2004; Frankel et al., 2013), the correlations of the cyclical 
components are presented. 
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Fig. 4.2b Correlation of the cyclical components of GDP and government 
consumption in low IQ countries 
 
Focusing on high IQ countries, an interesting observation in Fig. 4.2a is that fiscal 
policy is even less procyclical during periods with oil funds. The case that stands out 
most is Norway, often cited for the success of integrating its oil fund into the country’s 
overall macroeconomic policy framework. Fiscal policy turned from a procylical to a 
countercyclical stance after its oil fund was established in 1990. Other countries that 
also run countercyclical fiscal policy with oil funds in place are Canada, Kuwait, and 
the United Arab Emirates. Although fiscal policy is still procyclical in the rest of the 
high IQ countries, there is noticeably some improvement in reducing this bias during 
periods with oil funds. This is a positive indication on the effectiveness of oil funds. 
However, the picture is not as vivid in low IQ countries. While fiscal procyclicality 
has reduced considerably in some countries during periods with oil funds (e.g., Algeria, 
Russia), there are others in which this bias has worsened (e.g., Ecuador, Venezuela). 
Nevertheless, by comparing the periods with and without oil funds in Fig. 4.2b, there 
appears to be an overall reduction in fiscal procyclicality in low IQ countries as a group. 
Turning to macroeconomic volatility, Tables 4.5a and 4.5b show the standard 
deviation of the growth rates of the variables in high and low IQ countries respectively. 
Comparing the two groups, it is clear that volatility is smaller in high IQ countries 
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regardless whether there are oil funds or not. This again points to the importance of 
good institutions. In high IQ countries there is some reduction in macroeconomic 
volatility in the presence of oil funds, but the improvement is relatively mild since 
volatility is already considerably low even without oil funds. The volatility reduction is 
more pronounced in low IQ countries during periods with oil funds, demonstrating their 
usefulness in macroeconomic stability.  
Table 4.5a Standard deviation of the growth rates of variables in high IQ countries 
Country 
𝐲 𝐠 𝐩 𝐦 𝐪 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
Argentina 0.06  0.27  0.76  0.66  0.28  
Bahrain 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.04 
Brunei 
Darussalam  0.02  0.11  0.01  0.11  0.02 
Canada 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.05 
Denmark 0.02  0.04  0.03  0.08  0.03  
Kuwait  0.13  0.14  0.03  0.09  0.07 
Malaysia 0.03  0.07  0.03  0.14  0.05  
Mexico 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.06 
Norway 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 
Oman  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.09  0.06 
Papua New 
Guinea 0.05  0.07  0.04  0.14  0.07  
Qatar 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.03 
United Arab 
Emirates  0.06  0.12  0.03  0.09  0.07 
United 
Kingdom 0.02  0.03  0.02  0.14  0.05  
Average 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.03 
Notes: NoSWF – without oil funds; WithSWF – with oil funds. 
Variables: 𝑦 - real GDP; 𝑔 - real government consumption; 𝑝 – price; 𝑚 - money supply; 𝑞 - real 
exchange rate. 
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Table 4.5b Standard deviation of the growth rates of variables in low IQ countries 
Country 
𝐲 𝐠 𝐩 𝐦 𝐪 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
No 
SWF 
With 
SWF 
Algeria 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.04 
Angola 0.07 0.01 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.01 0.28 0.06 0.07 0.05 
Azerbaijan 0.15 0.08 0.36 0.15 1.31 0.06 1.16 0.20 0.86 0.08 
Cameroon 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.11 
Chad 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.07 
Colombia 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.08 
Congo, Rep. 0.05  0.17  0.05  0.18  0.14  
Ecuador 0.03 0.02 0.33 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.22 0.07 0.13 0.05 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 0.03  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.18  
Equatorial 
Guinea 0.25 0.11 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.01 0.40 0.18 0.13 0.05 
Gabon 0.11 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.22 0.08 0.46 0.36 
Indonesia 0.04  0.10  0.08  0.10  0.16  
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 0.10 0.04 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.22 0.08 0.46 0.36 
Iraq  0.04  0.23  0.16  0.11  0.16 
Kazakhstan 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.09 1.03 0.03 0.72 0.15 0.25 0.06 
Libya 0.10 0.01 0.19 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.04 
Nigeria 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.32 0.06 
Russia 0.07 0.05 0.19 0.06 0.45 0.03 0.29 0.09 0.26 0.07 
Saudi Arabia  0.07  0.12  0.07  0.13  0.08 
Sudan 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.17 0.25 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.34 0.07 
Syrian Arab 
Rep. 0.07  0.14  0.09  0.07  0.19  
Timor-Leste 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.05 
Tunisia 0.02  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.03  
Turkmenistan 0.10 0.03 0.35 0.17 1.05 0.06 0.73 0.26 0.22 0.12 
Venezuela, 
RB 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.12 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 
Vietnam 0.01  0.05  0.05  0.09  0.06  
Yemen, Rep. 0.04  0.15  0.16  0.08  0.29  
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Average 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.09 0.18 0.07 
Notes: NoSWF – without oil funds; WithSWF – with oil funds. 
Variables: 𝑦 - real GDP; 𝑔 - real government consumption; 𝑝 – price; 𝑚 - money supply; 𝑞 - real 
exchange rate. 
4.3.2 The roles of oil funds and institutional quality 
In a VAR framework, the response of government consumption to an unanticipated 
increase in GDP determines the extent of fiscal cyclicality (see Ilzetzki and Végh, 
2008). Macroeconomic volatility can be measured by the standard deviation of the 
impulse responses to a structural shock (e.g., oil price shock) over a time horizon (see 
Husain et al., 2008). To investigate both the roles of oil funds and institutional quality in 
reducing fiscal procyclicality and macroeconomic volatility, the empirical strategy is to 
classify the country-year observations into four groups and estimate the panel VAR 
model in eq. (4.1) separately: (i) no oil funds and high IQ; (ii) no oil funds and low IQ; 
(iii) with oil funds and high IQ; and (iv) with oil funds and low IQ. For example, data 
for Norway prior to 1990 are in the ‘no oil funds and high IQ’ group, and data from 
1990 onwards are in the ‘with oil funds and high IQ’ group. For Nigeria, which is 
classified as a country with low institutional quality and whose oil fund was established 
in 2004, the data prior to 2004 are in the ‘no oil funds and low IQ’ group and data 
thereafter in the ‘with oil funds and low IQ’ group. There is therefore a clear distinction 
between low and high IQ countries, as well as between periods with and without oil 
funds. In essence, the coefficients of the variables in the panel VAR model, Γ1 in eq. 
(4.1), are allowed to differ across the four groups. The differences in the impulse 
responses across the groups determine whether oil funds and/or institutional quality are 
important or not. 
It is worth stating that oil funds are heterogeneous in many aspects—stated 
objectives, transparency and governance, asset size, investment strategy, and operational 
rules. One might argue that the size of the oil funds matters: countries with large 
accumulated funds should be in a better position to manage oil price shocks compared 
to those with small funds. However, fund size is not used as a control since panel data is 
not available. Besides, many low IQ countries (e.g., Iran, Libya) have larger oil funds 
than high IQ countries (e.g., Canada, Mexico), but their macroeconomic performance 
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appears to be worse (see Figs 4.2a and 4.2b). This is why the literature emphasizes the 
importance of institutions rather than fund size. 
4.3.2.1 Macroeconomic volatility 
Figure 4.3 displays the impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables following an 
oil price shock normalized to 10% to allow comparison across the groups and also for 
ease of interpretation of the results.38
The first row of panels shows the responses during periods without oil funds in 
high and low IQ countries. As is expected for oil-exporting countries, real GDP 
increases in response to an oil windfall. The response of real government consumption 
is positive, suggesting that fiscal policy is procyclical. There is an expansion in money 
supply and an increase in domestic prices.
 The impulse volatility calculations and the results 
of the hypothesis tests that the variances are equal are shown in Table 4.6; these results 
are based on standard variance ratio F-tests. 
39
The second row of panels compares the volatility performance in periods with and 
without oil funds in high IQ countries. There is no statistically significant difference in 
volatility reduction with oil fund as shown in the second row in Table 4.6; however, this 
does not mean oil funds are ineffective. A more logical reasoning is that volatility in 
 The real exchange rate also appreciates, 
displaying Dutch disease symptoms. It is clear from the figure that these responses are 
sharper in low IQ countries, i.e., higher macroeconomic volatility, which is confirmed 
statistically in the first row in Table 4.6. This constitutes evidence that institutional 
quality plays an important role in macroeconomic stability. 
                                                 
38 The results presented are based on a positive oil price shock. With the plunge in oil prices since June 
2014, one might be interested in a negative oil price shock. Given the linearity of the model, the effects of 
positive and negative shocks are symmetric, i.e., the responses are of equal magnitude but with opposite 
signs. 
39 Interestingly, the response of domestic price is smaller in low IQ countries in the first two periods. A 
plausible reason is the composition of the CPI basket. The nominal appreciation of the exchange rate in 
response to an oil price shock implies that imports become cheaper in local currency terms. If this effect 
dominates the general price increase of the other components of the CPI basket (which could also be 
price-sticky), the result would be an overall price decline. 
  
152 
Fig. 4.3 Impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to a 10% oil price shock 
 
Notes: NoSWF_HighIQ – high institutional quality without oil funds; NoSWF_LowIQ – low institutional quality without oil funds; WithSWF_HighIQ – high institutional 
with oil funds; WithSWF_LowIQ – low institutional quality with oil funds. 
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Table 4.6 Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock  
 𝜟𝒚 𝜟𝒈 𝜟𝒑 𝜟𝒎 𝜟𝒒 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.09 0.21** 0.16** 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.30 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.21 0.16 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.28 0.12 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.30 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.15 0.32^ 0.09 0.48 0.20^ 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.09 0.17* 0.09 0.28* 0.12* 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.15 0.32 0.09 0.48 0.20 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
high IQ countries is already considerably low due to sound macroeconomic policies and 
therefore the scope for further volatility reduction through oil funds is limited.40
The third row of panels compares the volatility performance in periods with and 
without oil funds in low IQ countries. An important observation is that oil funds are 
associated with reduced macroeconomic volatility of all the variables, and the difference 
is statistically significant for government consumption and the real exchange rate as 
 A key 
point to note from the figure is that there is some indication of countercyclical fiscal 
policy during periods with oil funds in high IQ countries—GDP and government 
consumption move in opposite directions after the impact period. 
                                                 
40 The response of domestic prices appears to be larger during periods with oil funds. This should not be 
immediately taken to say that oil funds cause higher inflation. A cursory look at data on oil price changes 
and inflation in oil-exporting countries shows a higher correlation from the 1990s. This could be due to 
relatively loose monetary conditions (either domestic or imported). Since many oil funds were set up in 
the late 1990s, higher inflation might be picked up in the oil funds group. 
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shown in the third row in Table 4.6. This highlights the potency of oil funds in volatility 
reduction. 
The last row of panels shows the responses during periods with oil funds in high 
and low IQ countries. It is clear that institutional quality is important as even in the 
presence of oil funds, volatility is still smaller in high IQ countries as seen in the last 
row of Table 4.6. The importance of oil funds is also obvious, as the volatility difference 
between low and high IQ countries is much smaller with oil funds in place. 
4.3.2.2 Fiscal cyclicality 
Based on the definition of fiscal policy procyclicality and the discussion in Section 
4.2.1, the extent of fiscal procyclicality is determined by examining the response of real 
government consumption to a GDP shock. The impulse responses of real government 
consumption to a GDP shock normalized to 1% are displayed in Fig. 4.4. The results of 
the hypothesis tests that the coefficients of (lagged) GDP growth are equal are shown in 
Table 4.7; these are based on standard t-tests.41
The first row of panels in Fig. 4.4 and Table 4.7 show that there is no statistically 
significant difference in fiscal procyclicality in low and high IQ countries during 
periods without oil funds, i.e., oil exporters tend to run procyclical fiscal policy on 
average before the establishment of oil funds regardless of institutional quality.
 
42
The third row of panels displays the responses of the low IQ groups: one with oil 
funds and the other without. The responses of government consumption suggest that  
 The 
success of oil funds in reducing the extent of procyclical fiscal policy is revealed in the 
second row of panels—the response of government consumption to a GDP shock is 
negative during periods with oil funds in high IQ countries, which indicates 
countercyclical fiscal policy, and this is statistically validated in the hypothesis test (the 
negative sign of the coefficient indicates countercyclicality). 
                                                 
41 Since the panel VAR estimation consists of only one lag, a t-test can be used to test the null hypothesis 
that the responses of government consumption in the two groups are the same. For two or more lags, a F-
test or Wald test can be used to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients in all the lags are the same. 
42 However, macroeconomic volatility is smaller in high IQ countries without oil funds (see the first row 
of panels in Table 4.6) as they have better institutions that presumably foster economic stability. 
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Fig. 4.4 Impulse response of government consumption to a 1% GDP shock 
 
Notes: NoSWF_HighIQ – high institutional quality without oil funds; NoSWF_LowIQ – low institutional 
quality without oil funds; WithSWF_HighIQ – high institutional with oil funds; WithSWF_LowIQ – low 
institutional quality with oil funds. 
fiscal policy is procyclical in both groups, but the response is more muted during 
periods with oil funds. The coefficient in Table 4.7 likewise indicates that fiscal 
procyclicality is lower in the oil funds group, though from a statistical point of view 
there is no difference at conventional significance levels. As will be seen in Section 4.5, 
this procyclical bias is also smaller in all the robustness checks, pointing to the potency 
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of oil funds. It would be interesting to see if stronger evidence emerges as more data 
becomes available. The last row of panels compares the periods with oil funds in high 
and low IQ countries. It is clear that institutional quality matters even after controlling 
for the presence of oil funds—fiscal policy is still significantly less procyclical in high 
IQ countries. 
Table 4.7 Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock 
Groups Coefficient of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.435 
0.330 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.534 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.435 
2.139** 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.183 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.534 
1.368 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.183 
2.240** 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. ***, **, *, ^ 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
4.4 Further issues 
4.4.1 Measurement of fiscal cyclicality 
Some studies use the cyclical components of GDP and government consumption (e.g., 
Frankel et al., 2013) in their regression equations instead of GDP growth and 
government consumption growth (e.g., Woo, 2009) to test whether fiscal policy is 
procyclical. As Fatás and Mihov (2009) point out, the disparity in the findings on fiscal 
procyclicality could be due to how it is measured. Therefore as a robustness check, the 
cyclical components of GDP and government consumption extracted using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter are used in the panel VAR model to see if the results differ from that using 
log differences in Section 4.3.2. 
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Figure 4.B1 in Appendix 4.B displays the impulse responses of the cyclical 
component of government consumption to a 1% shock in the cyclical component of 
GDP. The effectiveness of oil funds in reducing fiscal procyclicality in high IQ 
countries is still evident. In fact, fiscal policy is countercyclical only in high IQ 
countries when oil funds are in place. Hence regardless of measurement issues, the 
finding that oil funds are effective particularly in high IQ countries remains robust. 
4.4.2 Endogeneity of institutions 
In Section 4.3.1 the classification of the county-year observations by oil funds and 
institutional quality implicitly assumes that institutions are exogenous to the 
macroeconomy and do not change over time. The growth literature recognizes the 
potential endogeneity of institutions and the usual approach is to instrument institutional 
quality using settler mortality rates and latitude in growth regressions (see Acemoglu et 
al., 2001). The issue on endogeneity of institutions is explored here using the panel VAR 
approach. The institutional quality data set in Kunčič
Figure 4.B2 in Appendix 4.B shows the impulse responses of government 
consumption to an increase in the institutional quality score by 0.1. An improvement in 
institutional quality in the group without oil funds still results in procyclical fiscal 
policy but countercyclical fiscal policy is observed in the oil funds group, suggesting 
the effectiveness of oil funds even after controlling for the endogeneity of institutions. 
 (2014) is useful as it allows using 
IQ as a variable in a panel data setting. IQ is therefore added to the vector of 
endogenous variable in the panel VAR model in eq. (4.1), which now consists of seven 
variables, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = �Δ𝑜𝑖,𝑡  ,Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑞𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡�′, where Δ𝑖𝑞 is the change 
in institutional quality and is ordered last. However, IQ data is only available from 1990 
to 2010; hence the analysis is restricted to this sample period. 
43
 
 
 
                                                 
43 The estimation results based on the baseline model in Section 4.3.1 remain qualitatively unchanged 
even with a shorter time period. The finding here with endogenous IQ is therefore not driven by the time 
period. 
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4.4.3 Oil funds, institutional quality, and investment 
The analysis thus far focuses on the cyclicality of government consumption and the 
effects oil funds and institutional quality have on the conduct of fiscal policy. A related 
question of interest is whether investment also displays procyclical behaviour, which 
could amplify the domestic financial cycle and exacerbate macroeconomic 
fluctuations.44
 Figures 4.B3 and 4.B4 in Appendix 4.B display the impulse responses of 
government consumption and gross capital formation to a 1% GDP shock respectively. 
Adding investment into the panel VAR model does not alter the response of government 
consumption by much. Government consumption is still procyclical in all the groups 
except during the periods with oil funds in high IQ countries, whereby government 
consumption is countercyclical. However, such countercyclical behaviour is not 
observed in gross capital formation—it is procyclical across all groups, i.e., investment 
increases during good times and falls during bad times. Nevertheless, this procyclical 
bias is least pronounced in high IQ countries with oil funds in place, again 
demonstrating the effectiveness of oil funds and the importance of good institutions in 
macroeconomic stabilization. 
 A natural extension is to include investment into the panel VAR model. It 
would be ideal to be able to separate investment into government investment and private 
investment. Unfortunately, data is not available for many developing countries. Instead, 
gross capital formation is used as the investment variable. 
4.5 Robustness checks 
In this section, nine robustness tests are performed. First, besides global oil prices, oil-
exporting countries are vulnerable to other external shocks such as the global demand 
for oil and U.S. monetary policy (many oil-exporting countries operate on pegs to the 
U.S. dollar or have tightly managed exchange rates). Since these shocks are not 
explicitly identified in the panel VAR model, a robustness check is necessary to see if 
the inclusion of these variables affects the results. The vector of endogenous variable in 
eq. (4.1) now consists of eight variables, 
                                                 
44 See Aghion et al. (2010) on the adverse effects of procyclical investment on long-term growth.  
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𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = �Δ𝑜𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑔𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ,Δ𝑞𝑖,𝑡�′, where Δ𝑖𝑝 is the first log 
difference of industrial production in the advanced economies (as a proxy of global 
demand) and Δ𝑟 is the change in the U.S. interest rate. Second, the ordering of GDP and 
government consumption is reversed. Another specification is to change the ordering of 
CPI and money supply. Third, two lags are used instead of one to allow for different 
system dynamics. Fourth, advanced economies are excluded from the sample. Many 
studies have documented the success of Norway’s oil fund in delivering macroeconomic 
stability and allowing the government to smooth expenditures (e.g., Ekeli and Sy, 2011). 
There is also empirical evidence that OECD countries tend to run countercyclical fiscal 
policy (e.g., Lane, 2003). A robustness check that excludes developed countries will 
ascertain whether the results are influenced by these countries. Fifth, the sample period 
from 1990 to 2014 is used. This avoids earlier periods in which data is sparse. 
Sixth, hyperinflation periods are removed. Many hyperinflation episodes occurred in 
the 1980s and 1990s; periods in which most countries do not have oil funds in place. 
Therefore, including these periods will tend to bias the results such that macroeconomic 
volatility appears higher without oil funds when in fact these hyperinflationary episodes 
are purely exogenous, e.g., the breaking up of the Soviet Union, which led to 
hyperinflation in the transition countries. In the analysis here, a country is defined to 
experience hyperinflation in year 𝑡 if Δ𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 1, i.e., if annual inflation is at least 100%. 
The hyperinflation periods are Angola (1992–97, 1999–2000), Argentina (1975–78, 
1983–85, 1988–90), Azerbaijan (1993–95), Indonesia (1965–66), Iraq (1991, 1993–95), 
Kazakhstan (1993–95), Russia (1993–95), Turkmenistan (1993–95), and Vietnam 
(1986–88). This definition picks up more inflationary periods (years) than in Hanke and 
Krus (2012) whereby the authors define hyperinflation periods as months with inflation 
exceeding 50%. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) define extreme inflation in which the 12-
month inflation is at least 40%. According to their definition, more observations will 
have to be excluded. The robustness test here takes the middle ground. 
Seventh, the effectiveness of oil funds might not be observed immediately as there 
are usually kinks to iron out in the initial years of institutionalization and policy 
implementation. To take this into account, the first three years from the oil fund 
establishment year are excluded to avoid contamination due to the ‘ineffective’ period. 
The periods without oil funds remain unchanged (i.e., the three excluded years are not 
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piled into the non-oil funds period but are discarded). Eighth, instead of using a 
common real oil price series for all the countries, national real oil prices constructed by 
converting the crude oil price into national currency and deflating by national CPI is 
used. Finally, ninth, the effectiveness of oil funds might only be observed in the face of 
large oil price shocks. An oil price shock is defined to be large if the absolute value of 
the annual change is at least 20%. In the panel VAR model,  Δ𝑜𝑖,𝑡 is replaced by Δ𝑜𝑖,𝑡𝐿  
defined as: 
Δ𝑜𝑖,𝑡𝐿 = �Δ𝑜𝑖,𝑡   𝑖𝑓 |Δ𝑜𝑖,𝑡| ≥ 0.20        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒         (4.5) 
The findings that oil funds are effective in reducing fiscal procyclicality particularly 
in high IQ countries are robust to these nine specification variations.45
4.6 Conclusion 
 Statistical test 
results of these robustness checks are in Appendix 4.C.  
Oil-exporting countries face challenges in reducing fiscal policy procyclicality and 
macroeconomic volatility as a result of volatile oil prices that cause boom-bust cycles. 
This problem is exacerbated by rent-seeking behaviour especially in countries with low 
institutional quality that can undermine governance and make the process of building 
growth-enabling institutions more difficult. The standard policy advice is to set up oil 
funds to delink the economy from volatile oil revenues. Oil funds, which are usually 
established with the objectives of either saving for the future or stabilising the economy, 
gained increasing popularity starting from the late 1990s when oil prices were booming. 
However, the effectiveness of oil funds remains open to debate. 
This paper examines the roles of oil funds and institutional quality in reducing 
fiscal procyclicality and macroeconomic volatility in 42 oil-exporting countries from 
1960 to 2014 using panel vector autoregression techniques. By comparing periods with 
and without oil funds, the results show that fiscal procyclicality is significantly reduced 
in the presence of oil funds in countries with high institutional quality; in fact, fiscal 
policy is countercyclical in these countries after the establishment of oil funds, on 
                                                 
45 For the fifth robustness test, i.e., time period restricted to 1990–2014, statistical significance suffers as 
the sample is reduced by half. 
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average. There is also a reduction in the procyclical bias in those with low institutional 
quality but the evidence is less compelling. Nevertheless, oil funds are associated with 
reduced volatility of government consumption and the real exchange rate in countries 
with low institutional quality. These findings therefore provide evidence that oil funds 
are a potentially useful policy instrument in the conduct of fiscal policy to stabilize the 
economy. More importantly, the results highlight the central role of institutional quality 
in effecting appropriate fiscal policies to manage volatile oil windfalls. Oil funds are 
therefore not a panacea and are not a substitute for prudent fiscal discipline, sound 
macroeconomic management, and political commitment. Their effectiveness could also 
depend on the design of the transparency and accountability rules in the operation of the 
fund as some scholars argue; further research in this area should provide more refined 
answers.  
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Appendix 4.A 
Table 4.A1 List of oil-exporting countries 
Country Groupa Net oil exportsb 
Oil exports 
% Exportsc 
Oil exports 
% GDPc 
Oil rents % 
GDPc 
Algeria DEV 954.3 92.5 37.9 17.4 
Angola DEV 1,359.9 93.0 69.2 53.5 
Argentina DEV 128.5 12.4 2.8 3.7 
Azerbaijan DEV 495.2 82.7 44.7 43.9 
Bahrain DEV -225.4 59.7 54.1 18.0 
Brunei 
Darussalam DEV 171.1 85.5 62.3 30.5 
Cameroon DEV 36.1 35.9 9.8 8.6 
Canada ADV 1,039.0 15.4 5.3 2.3 
Chad DEV 96.5 78.3 37.5 34.3 
Colombia EME 337.9 28.1 4.8 6.2 
Congo, Rep. DEV 251.8 83.8 67.5 64.2 
Denmark ADV 151.9 6.0 3.0 1.9 
Ecuador DEV 324.6 46.2 13.5 18.5 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. EME 75.0 18.4 4.5 8.7 
Equatorial 
Guinea DEV 295.6 97.4 100.8 74.8 
Gabon DEV 237.5 79.9 46.8 45.0 
Indonesia EME 80.8 9.7 3.0 4.2 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. DEV 2,289.0 85.0 22.0 29.4 
Iraq DEV 1,740.6 N/A 42.6 53.7 
Kazakhstan DEV 911.0 52.4 26.1 30.1 
Kuwait DEV 1,520.9 81.5 49.6 50.3 
Libya DEV 1,184.2 100 59.4 49.5 
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Malaysia EME 172.4 7.2 7.4 6.7 
Mexico EME 1,703.6 12.4 3.5 5.7 
Nigeria DEV 2,162.1 97.7 38.5 28.3 
Norway ADV 2,235.8 30.6 13.2 12.0 
Oman DEV 731.3 81.0 45.4 37.8 
Papua New 
Guinea DEV 30.3 22.4 12.5 15.5 
Qatar EME 875.8 87.4 53.6 22.2 
Russian 
Federation EME 4,571.6 41.0 13.5 15.5 
Saudi Arabia DEV 6,888.5 83.9 42.9 44.1 
Sudan DEV 294.0 79.8 13.8 16.9 
Syrian Arab 
Rep. DEV 168.5 34.4 12.5 22.8 
Timor-Leste DEV 59.4 N/A N/A N/A 
Trinidad and 
Tobago DEV -23.4 32.7 21.6 12.1 
Turkmenistan DEV 44.5 75.0 37.0 28.8 
Tunisia DEV 47.8 9.6 4.5 3.6 
United Arab 
Emirates EME 2,113.9 40.6 27.8 19.4 
United 
Kingdom ADV 88.2 6.2 1.8 1.1 
Venezuela, RB DEV 1,767.2 82.7 25.0 28.0 
Vietnam DEV 294.0 15.3 10.3 8.4 
Yemen, Rep. DEV 252.4 79.0 27.5 28.4 
Notes: a Advanced economies (ADV) are based on the classification in IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO), October 2016; Emerging economies (EME) are those included in the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) Emerging Markets Index; Developing countries (DEV) are the remaining 
unclassified countries. 
Source: b Thousand barrels per day, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA); 2000–2012 average. 
c Oil exports from IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO); Total exports, oil rents and GDP from World 
Bank World Development Indicators (WDI); 2000–2012 average. N/A denotes not available. 
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Table 4.A2 Variables and data sources 
Variablesa Definition Symbol Sourceb 
Real oil price Crude oil price (U.S. dollars per barrel); deflated using U.S. CPI 𝑜 IFS 
Real GDP Gross domestic product (constant local currency in billions) 𝑦 WDI, WEO 
Real 
government 
consumption 
Government consumption expenditure, 
(current local currency in billions); 
deflated using national CPI 
𝑔 WDI, IFS 
Price Consumer price index (CPI) (2010=100) 𝑝 
WDI, IFS, 
WEO 
Money supply Money and quasi money, M2 (current local currency in billions) 𝑚 WDI 
Real exchange 
rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
(2007=100) 𝑞 Darvas (2012)  
Notes: a All variables are expressed in natural logarithm. 
b IFS – IMF International Financial Statistics, WDI – World Bank World Development Indicators, WEO – 
IMF World Economic Outlook. The primary source of the domestic variables is WDI, but if a longer time 
series is available in IFS or WEO, the alternative database is used. Data on government consumption and 
M2 for Turkmenistan are obtained from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). REER for Timor-Leste is 
calculated using weights of its top 20 trading partners, with CPI as the deflator. CPI for United Arab 
Emirates is obtained from the UAE National Bureau of Statistics. 
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Appendix 4.B 
Fig. 4.B1 Impulse responses of the cyclical component of government 
consumption to a 1% shock in the cyclical component of GDP 
 
Notes: NoSWF_HighIQ – high institutional quality without oil funds; NoSWF_LowIQ – low institutional 
quality without oil funds; WithSWF_HighIQ – high institutional with oil funds; WithSWF_LowIQ – low 
institutional quality with oil funds. 
 
 
Fig. 4.B2 Impulse responses of government consumption to an increase in 
institutional quality score of 0.1 
 
Notes: NoSWF – without oil funds; WithSWF – with oil funds. 
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Fig. 4.B3 Impulse responses of government consumption to a 1% shock in GDP 
 
Notes: NoSWF_HighIQ – high institutional quality without oil funds; NoSWF_LowIQ – low institutional 
quality without oil funds; WithSWF_HighIQ – high institutional with oil funds; WithSWF_LowIQ – low 
institutional quality with oil funds. 
 
 
Fig. 4.B4 Impulse responses of gross capital formation to a 1% shock in GDP 
 
Notes: NoSWF_HighIQ – high institutional quality without oil funds; NoSWF_LowIQ – low institutional 
quality without oil funds; WithSWF_HighIQ – high institutional with oil funds; WithSWF_LowIQ – low 
institutional quality with oil funds. 
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Appendix 4.C 
Table 4.C1a Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock with global demand and U.S. interest rate included 
in the model 
Groups Coefficient of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.486 
0.100 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.519 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.486 
2.065** 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.183 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.519 
1.346 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.241 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.183 
2.183** 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.241 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. 
 
Table 4.C1b Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock 
with global demand and U.S. interest rate included in the model 
 𝜟𝒚 𝜟𝒈 𝜟𝒑 𝜟𝒎 𝜟𝒒 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05*** 0.15*** 0.06** 0.23*** 0.11*** 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.18 0.46 0.14 0.54 0.30 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.23 0.11 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.07 0.24 0.04 0.36 0.16 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.18 0.46 0.14 0.54 0.30 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.12^ 0.32^ 0.04*** 0.50 0.20^ 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.07* 0.24 0.04 0.36 0.16 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.12 0.32 0.04 0.50 0.20 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: variance ratio = 1 vs. 𝐻𝑎: variance ratio < 1. 
***, **, *, ^ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.C2a Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock with the order of GDP and government consumption 
reversed 
Groups Coefficient of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.435 
0.330 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.534 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.435 
2.139** 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.183 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.534 
1.368 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.183 
2.240** 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. 
 
Table 4.C2b Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock 
with the order of GDP and government consumption reversed 
 𝜟𝒚 𝜟𝒈 𝜟𝒑 𝜟𝒎 𝜟𝒒 
No oil funds and 
high IQ 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.09 0.21** 0.16** 
No oil funds and 
low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.30 
No oil funds and 
high IQ 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.21 0.16 
With oil funds and 
high IQ 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.28 0.12 
No oil funds and 
low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.30 
With oil funds and 
low IQ 0.15 0.32^ 0.09 0.48 0.20^ 
With oil funds and 
high IQ 0.09 0.17* 0.09 0.28* 0.12* 
With oil funds and 
low IQ 0.15 0.32 0.09 0.48 0.20 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: variance ratio = 1 vs. 𝐻𝑎: variance ratio < 1. 
 
***, **, *, ^ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.C3a Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock with two lags in the model 
Groups 
Coefficients of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
1st lag 2nd lag 1st lag 2nd lag 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.269 0.204 
0.867 0.763 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.477 -0.014 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.269 0.204 
1.483^ 1.208 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.086 -0.121 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.477 -0.014 
0.933 0.716 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.274 -0.157 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.086 -0.121 
1.661*  0.209 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.274 -0.157 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal.  
 
Table 4.C3b Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock 
with two lags in the model 
 𝜟𝒚 𝜟𝒈 𝜟𝒑 𝜟𝒎 𝜟𝒒 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05*** 0.14*** 0.16 0.37^ 0.17** 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.19 0.51 0.15 0.56 0.35 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.37 0.17 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.08 0.24 0.07** 0.50 0.19 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.19 0.51 0.15 0.56 0.35 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.48 0.11 0.48 0.12*** 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.08** 0.24** 0.07 0.50 0.19 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.48 0.11 0.48 0.12 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: variance ratio = 1 vs. 𝐻𝑎: variance ratio < 1. 
 
***, **, *, ^ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.C4a Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock with advanced economies excluded 
Groups Coefficient of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.387 
0.454 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.534 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.387 
1.894* 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.209 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.534 
1.368 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.209 
2.345** 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. 
 
Table 4.C4b Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock 
with advanced economies excluded 
 𝜟𝒚 𝜟𝒈 𝜟𝒑 𝜟𝒎 𝜟𝒒 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.08** 0.16*** 0.09 0.32^ 0.25 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.30 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.32 0.25 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.12 0.28 0.11 0.38 0.10*** 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.30 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.15 0.32^ 0.09 0.48 0.20^ 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.12 0.28 0.11 0.38 0.10** 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.15 0.32 0.09 0.48 0.20 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: variance ratio = 1 vs. 𝐻𝑎: variance ratio < 1. 
 
***, **, *, ^ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.C5a Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock with the sample period restricted to 1990–2014 
Groups Coefficient of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.281 
0.500 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.588 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.281 
0.947 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.256 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.588 
1.195 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.153 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.256 
1.462^ 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.153 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. 
 
Table 4.C5b Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock 
with the sample period restricted to 1990–2014 
 𝜟𝒚 𝜟𝒈 𝜟𝒑 𝜟𝒎 𝜟𝒒 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.11 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.28^ 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.12 0.49 0.22 0.41 0.44 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.28 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.09*** 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.12 0.49 0.22 0.41 0.44 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.18 0.49 0.13* 0.47 0.22** 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.17 0.15*** 0.13 0.23** 0.09*** 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.18 0.49 0.13 0.47 0.22 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: variance ratio = 1 vs. 𝐻𝑎: variance ratio < 1. 
 
***, **, *, ^ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.C6a Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock with hyperinflation periods removed 
Groups Coefficient of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.447 
0.090 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.475 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.447 
2.130** 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.183 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.475 
1.102 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.183 
2.240** 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. 
 
Table 4.C6b Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock 
with hyperinflation periods removed 
 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒎 𝚫𝒒 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05*** 0.13** 0.06 0.19*** 0.19^ 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.06 0.54 0.31 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.19 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.28 0.12^ 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.06 0.54 0.31 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.15 0.32^ 0.09 0.48 0.20^ 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.09 0.17^ 0.09 0.28* 0.12* 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.15 0.32 0.09 0.48 0.20 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: variance ratio = 1 vs. 𝐻𝑎: variance ratio < 1. 
 
***, **, *, ^ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.C7a Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock with the first three years of the oil fund period 
excluded 
Groups Coefficient of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.435 
0.330 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.534 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.435 
1.911* 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.141 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.534 
0.320 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.466 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.141 
2.829*** 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.466 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. 
 
Table 4.C7b Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock 
with the first three years of the oil fund period excluded 
 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒎 𝚫𝒒 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.09 0.21** 0.16** 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.30 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.21 0.16 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.10 0.16 0.05* 0.29 0.18 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.30 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.32^ 0.08 0.40 0.11*** 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.10 0.16** 0.05 0.29 0.18 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.32 0.08 0.40 0.11 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: variance ratio = 1 vs. 𝐻𝑎: variance ratio < 1. 
 
***, **, *, ^ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.C8a Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock with national real oil price series 
Groups Coefficient of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.381 
0.605 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.560 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.381 
1.979** 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.188 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.560 
1.510^ 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.188 
2.273** 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.250 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. 
 
Table 4.C8b Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock 
with national real oil price series 
 𝚫𝒚 𝚫𝒈 𝚫𝒑 𝚫𝒎 𝚫𝒒 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05** 0.17 0.06 0.39 0.50^ 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.13 0.23 0.06 0.28 0.77 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.39 0.50 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.09 0.24 0.08 0.41 0.07*** 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.13 0.23 0.06 0.28 0.77 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.14 0.29 0.03** 0.51 0.62 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.09^ 0.24 0.08 0.41 0.07*** 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.14 0.29 0.03 0.51 0.62 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: variance ratio = 1 vs. 𝐻𝑎: variance ratio < 1. 
 
***, **, *, ^ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.C9a Hypothesis testing of the difference in the response of government 
consumption to a GDP shock under large oil price changes 
Groups Coefficient of 𝜟𝒚 t statistic 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.433 
0.361 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.542 
No oil funds and high IQ 0.433 
2.139** 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.188 
No oil funds and low IQ 0.542 
1.275 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.274 
With oil funds and high IQ -0.188 
2.370** 
With oil funds and low IQ 0.274 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: coefficients are equal vs. 𝐻𝑎: coefficients are not equal. 
 
Table 4.C9b Impulse volatility (over 8 periods) in response to a 10% oil price shock 
under large oil price changes 
 𝜟𝒚 𝜟𝒈 𝜟𝒑 𝜟𝒎 𝜟𝒒 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.06*** 0.17*** 0.03** 0.23*** 0.25 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.55 0.06 0.58 0.31 
No oil funds 
and high IQ 0.06 0.17 0.03 0.23 0.25 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.10 0.27 0.06 0.35 0.19 
No oil funds 
and low IQ 0.16 0.55 0.06 0.58 0.31 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.12 0.27** 0.11 0.44 0.14** 
With oil funds 
and high IQ 0.10 0.27 0.06* 0.35 0.19 
With oil funds 
and low IQ 0.12 0.27 0.11 0.44 0.14 
Notes: Hypothesis test of 𝐻𝑜: variance ratio = 1 vs. 𝐻𝑎: variance ratio < 1. 
 
***, **, *, ^ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15% levels respectively. 
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Chapter 5 
Fiscal cyclicality in Brunei Darussalam 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the conduct of fiscal policy in Brunei from 2003Q1 to 2014Q2, 
focusing on the cyclical patterns in government expenditure. The results from a 
structural vector autoregression model provide evidence that fiscal policy in Brunei is 
procyclical, which has an expansionary effect on output and thus exacerbates the 
business cycle. This behaviour is primarily driven by procyclical current expenditure 
while capital expenditure is largely acyclical. The government should exercise caution 
to avoid adding cyclical pressures to the economy already afflicted by volatile oil prices. 
A key policy recommendation would be to adopt clear fiscal rules to better integrate 
Brunei’s oil funds into the budgetary framework to delink government spending from 
volatile oil revenue. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The plunge in crude oil prices over the past two years, from US$110 per barrel in June 
2014 to US$45 per barrel in September 2016, is putting heavy pressure on the fiscal 
balance of oil-exporting countries. Brunei is no exception. The oil and gas sector 
accounts for 90% of the government’s revenue. Brunei’s projected fiscal deficit for 2016 
stands at B$3.85 billion, an astounding 26% of GDP (IMF, 2016a). The economy 
contracted by 0.6% in 2015, following a decline of 2.1% and 2.3% in 2013 and 2014 
respectively.46
The large fall in oil prices necessitates short-run macroeconomic adjustments. 
According to economic theory dating back to Friedman (1953) and Poole (1970), oil-
exporting countries with a flexible exchange rate regime can adjust through an exchange 
rate depreciation, which increases the domestic price of oil exports when its 
international price has fallen. This helps to soften the impact of adverse oil prices and 
hence stabilizes output. However, this is not a viable policy option for the country since 
the exchange rate regime is based on a currency board arrangement in which the Brunei 
dollar is pegged at par to the Singapore dollar. Both countries have openly committed to 
maintaining the Currency Interchangeability Arrangement (CIA) signed in 1967 (see 
Rajak, 2015). 
  
Fiscal policy, therefore, has to bear the bulk of the macroeconomic adjustment 
costs. Brunei has accumulated surplus oil revenues in its General Reserve Fund (GRF) 
under the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA), which was set up in 1983. Besides the 
saving for future generations, the GRF can also be used to finance budgetary shortfalls 
(IMF, 1999). According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, BIA’s assets are valued 
at US$40 billion (SWFI, 2016).47
                                                 
46 Besides the fall in oil prices, Brunei’s oil production has also been declining due to protracted closure 
of wells and pipelines for maintenance. 
 This fiscal buffer is large enough to absorb fiscal 
deficits of the projected magnitude for 2016 for about 20 years. In 2008, the country 
47 Before the global financial crisis of 2007–8, BIA’s assets were estimated at US$100 billion (Demange, 
2009). Estimates of the fund size are highly imprecise since asset holdings are not disclosed. The fund has 
a Linaburg-Maduell transparency rating of 1, indicating that is highly secretive. Foreign investment 
income from the BIA accruing to the General Reserve Fund is also not recorded in the government budget 
(IMF, 1999). 
178 
 
established the Sustainability Fund Act which comprises three trust sub-funds. One of 
the sub-funds is the Fiscal Stabilization Reserve Fund (FSRF) to make up for 
government revenue shortfalls. Despite not having explicit fiscal rules, it can be inferred 
from the objectives of the GRF and FSRF that the government aims to maintain a 
neutral fiscal stance (i.e., acyclical fiscal policy) so that government expenditure is not 
disrupted by volatile oil revenue. This is a prudent macroeconomic stabilization 
measure since procyclical fiscal policy exacerbates the business cycle and therefore 
cannot be optimal from either a Keynesian or neoclassical theoretical perspective (see 
e.g., Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008).  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the conduct of fiscal policy in Brunei, in 
particular, to assess the extent of fiscal cyclicality and its impact on output. This has 
important policy implications. For instance, if fiscal policy is procyclical, it amplifies 
the business cycle by increasing output volatility. In this case the government should 
consider exercising fiscal restraint by adopting clear fiscal rules and strengthening the 
governance of the reserve funds to ensure government expenditure does not co-move 
with oil prices. This would allow smoother execution of the planned projects in the five-
year national development plans. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents a brief 
overview of the literature on fiscal procyclicality in resource-rich countries. Section 5.3 
takes a preliminary look at fiscal cyclicality in Brunei. Section 5.4 describes the 
econometric methodology, Section 5.5 discusses the empirical results, and Section 5.6 
concludes. 
5.2 Procyclical fiscal policy in resource-rich countries 
Fiscal policy is defined as procyclical if government spending increases in good times 
and falls in bad times. This is dubbed the ‘when it rains, it pours’ phenomenon by 
Kaminsky et al. (2004). The fact that fiscal policy is procyclical in developing countries 
has been documented in several studies (e.g., Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky et al., 
2004; Talvi and Végh, 2005; Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008; Carneiro and Garrido, 2015).45
                                                 
45 On the other hand, fiscal policy in advanced economies is countercyclical or acyclical (see Arreaza et 
al., 1998; Lane, 2003). 
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This phenomenon is also observed when the sample is restricted to resource-rich 
countries (e.g., Céspedes and Velasco, 2014). The two main explanations in the 
literature on why countries would pursue a procyclical fiscal policy are: (i) borrowing 
constraints during bad times and hence the need to cut back spending; and (ii) political 
economy arguments, for example, fiscal profligacy during good times in response to 
pressures to distribute windfalls. 
Frankel et al. (2013) find that a third of the developing world has ‘graduated’ from 
fiscal procyclicality over the past decade. Almost half of this cohort consists of oil-
exporting countries, and coincidentally, this period corresponds to the proliferation of 
oil funds. Several papers investigate whether oil funds, or resource funds more 
generally, are associated with reduced fiscal procyclicality, but the empirical evidence is 
mixed (e.g., Ossowski et al., 2008; Coutinho et al., 2014). A key conclusion from these 
studies emphasizes the role of good institutions in implementing sound macroeconomic 
policies to stabilize the economy. Thus the macroeconomic stabilization effect of 
resource funds, if any, is achieved not only through the operation of the funds but also 
via political incentives. 
A case in point is Norway, often cited for the success of integrating its oil fund, 
known as the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), into the country’s overall 
macroeconomic policy. Norway’s GPFG, with assets of US$885 billion (SWFI, 2016), 
is independently managed by the Norges Bank Investment Management within the 
central bank with clear mandates on investment holdings, accumulation and withdrawal 
rules, and clear lines of reporting, accountability, and transparency.46
5.3 Stylized facts on fiscal cyclicality in Brunei 
 The transparent 
governance structure and the integration mechanism with fiscal policy are key factors in 
achieving macroeconomic stability (Ekeli and Sy, 2011). 
Figure 5.1 plots the cyclical component of real government expenditure and real GDP of 
Brunei using quarterly data from 2003Q1 to 2014Q2. The data series are seasonally 
adjusted using the X-12 census method and the cyclical components are extracted using 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The variables and data sources are summarized in Table 
                                                 
46 Norway’s oil fund has a maximum Linaburg-Maduell transparency rating of 10. 
 180 
 
5.A1 in Appendix 5.A. As seen in Fig. 5.1, the co-movement of government expenditure 
and GDP is evident in some periods. The correlation between the two series is 0.34.47 
Another view of fiscal cyclicality is to look at the percentage changes (growth rates) of 
real government expenditure and GDP. This is shown in Fig. 5.2. Similarly, some co-
movement is observed, with a correlation of 0.10.48
Fig. 5.1 Cyclical component of real government expenditure and GDP 
  
 
However, a positive correlation does not indicate causality from the business cycle 
to fiscal policy. The pattern could also be explained by reverse causality, in which fiscal 
policy drives output. Procyclical fiscal policy can only be inferred if the observed 
positive relationship remains after properly accounting for this endogeneity problem. 
There are generally two methodological approaches used in the empirical literature: (i) 
using instrumental variables for output in a regression of a fiscal policy measure on 
                                                 
47 The Hodrick-Prescott filter is the standard method for removing trends in the business cycle literature 
(Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). The positive correlation between the cyclical components of real GDP and real 
government expenditure is also observed using alternative filters. They are 0.68, 0.66, and 0.31 using the 
Baxter-King, Christiano-Fitzgerald, and Butterworth filters respectively. 
48 ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ times in the literature are normally defined as an increase and decrease in GDP, 
respectively. For Brunei’s case, GDP can also be replaced with government revenue such that an increase 
(a decrease) in government revenue from oil price booms (busts) is considered good (bad) times. The 
correlation of the cyclical component of real government expenditure and real government revenue is 
0.24, while it is 0.23 using percentage changes instead. Regardless of the definition, this positive 
correlation is still observed. 
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output; and (ii) using vector autoregression (VAR) in which all the variables are 
endogenous. Both approaches are adopted in the analysis in the following section, but 
the primary focus is on the dynamic impulse responses of the VAR model. 
Fig. 5.2 Percentage changes of real government expenditure and GDP 
 
5.4 Econometric specifications 
5.4.1 Ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrument variables (IV) 
The following empirical model specification is first specified: 
∆𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Δ𝑦𝑡 + 𝜃Δ𝑜𝑡 + 𝛿Δ𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡       (5.1) 
where 𝑔𝑡 is the log of real government expenditure, 𝑦𝑡 is log of real GDP, 𝑜𝑡 is log of 
the real oil price, and ∆ is the difference operator. Taking the first difference of log 
variables approximates growth rates. The real oil price is obtained by converting the oil 
price in US$ per barrel into local currency and then deflated using Brunei’s CPI (see 
Table 5.A1 in Appendix 5.A for details on variables and data sources). Equation (5.1) 
can be viewed as a fiscal reaction function in which fiscal policy responds to 
contemporaneous GDP growth, oil price changes, and lagged government expenditure. 
Oil price change is included to control for exogenous oil price shocks and the lagged 
dependent variable allows mean reversion of fiscal behaviour. 
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Fiscal cyclicality is determined by the sign and magnitude of the 𝛽 coefficient, 
which measures the elasticity of government expenditure with respect to GDP growth. A 
positive value indicates that fiscal policy is procyclical, a value of zero represents 
acyclical fiscal policy, while a negative value corresponds to countercyclical fiscal 
policy. In the case of Brunei being highly dependent on oil, the 𝜃 coefficient also 
provides some indication of cyclicality. During oil price booms, which should benefit 
Brunei’s economy, an increase in government spending is also symptomatic of 
procyclical fiscal policy. 
As mentioned in Section 5.3, there is potential reverse causality between output and 
government expenditure. The usual approach is to estimate eq. (5.1) using two stage 
least squares (2SLS). Following Ilzetzki and Végh (2008), the trade-weighted GDP 
growth of Brunei’s main trading partners is used to instrument for output.49
A variation to eq. (5.1) is to specify a lagged fiscal rule instead. This is perhaps 
more appropriate with the use of quarterly data since GDP data is usually released after 
a quarter. In this case, Δ𝑦𝑡 is replaced by Δ𝑦𝑡−1 in eq. (5.1), i.e., government 
expenditure responds to lagged output. The coefficients can be estimated consistently 
using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
 As argued in 
Jaimovich and Panizza (2007), this is a valid instrument since trading partners’ growth 
rate should be correlated with Brunei’s output (e.g., Korea’s demand for Brunei’s oil 
and gas increase as its economy grows) while Brunei’s government spending has no 
effect on the growth rates of its trading partners. 
5.4.2 Vector autoregression (VAR) 
The next empirical framework used is based on the structural VAR approach. A three-
variable VAR consisting of oil price, government expenditure, and GDP is used, and the 
focus is on the dynamic impulse responses of government expenditure to an 
                                                 
49 Brunei’s main trading partners are Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, China, 
United States, the Euro Area, Indonesia, India, and the United Kingdom. 
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unanticipated output shock.50
𝑍𝑡 = 𝐴0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑗𝑍𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑗=1          (5.2) 
 The reduced-form VAR model of order 𝑝 (i.e.,  𝑝 number 
of lags) has the following specification: 
where  𝑍𝑡 = (∆𝑜𝑡 ,∆𝑔𝑡 ,∆𝑦𝑡)′ is the vector of stationary endogenous variables, 𝐴0 is the 
intercept vector, 𝐴𝑗 is the  𝑗𝑡ℎ matrix of autoregressive coefficients for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝, and 
𝑒𝑡 is a vector of reduced-form residuals. 
Since the reduced-form residuals are correlated and cannot be interpreted as 
structural shocks, a block-recursive structure is imposed on the contemporaneous 
relationship between the reduced-form residuals and the structural innovations to 
orthogonalize the shocks:    
𝑒𝑡 = �𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑒𝑡𝑔
𝑒𝑡
𝑦
� = �𝑎11 0𝑎21
𝑎31
𝑎22
𝑎32
    00
𝑎33
��
𝜀𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝜀𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝜀𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 �      (5.3) 
The zeros in the top row correspond to the small open economy assumption, in 
which domestic variables have no effect on the global oil price (block exogeneity 
restriction). The zero in the second row reflects the assumption that GDP does not have 
a contemporaneous effect on government expenditure, but GDP can affect government 
expenditure after one period (quarter). This is the usual identification approach 
following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in which policymakers take more than a quarter 
to learn about a GDP shock. The impulse response of government expenditure to a GDP 
shock after one quarter captures the 𝛽 coefficient in the fiscal reaction function in eq. 
(5.1). 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 These three variables are most relevant in the context of examining fiscal procyclicality in oil-exporting 
countries. Husain et al. (2008) also use a three-variable specification. 
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5.5 Empirical results 
5.5.1 Is fiscal policy in Brunei procyclical? 
The estimation results of eq. (5.1) using both OLS and 2SLS are shown in Table 5.1. 
The point estimate of the 𝛽 and 𝜃 coefficients are positive in all the specifications; 
however, the standard errors are large. From a statistical standpoint, the results are 
inconclusive because of the relatively small sample size (46 observations).51
Table 5.1 Estimation results using OLS and 2SLS 
 
Nevertheless, the consistency of the positive coefficient estimates is suggestive of 
procyclical fiscal policy. 
 Dependent variable: 𝚫𝐠𝐭 
Variables OLS OLS IV 
Δ𝑦𝑡 0.564 
(0.624) 
 
0.317 
(1.58) 
Δ𝑦𝑡−1  
0.571 
(0.592) 
 
Δ𝑜𝑡 0.080 
(0.105) 
0.100 
(0.106) 
0.084 
(0.109) 
Δ𝑔𝑡−1 -0.533*** 
(0.136) 
-0.511*** 
(0.133) 
-0.547* 
(0.334) 
constant 0.012 
(0.015) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.229 0.231 0.215 
Notes: 𝑜,𝑔,𝑦 are log of real oil price, real government expenditure, and real GDP, respectively. IV – 
output instrumented using contemporaneous and three lags of trade-weighted GDP growth of Brunei’s 
main trading partners. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, 10% level. 
Turning next to the VAR model in eq. (5.2), the lag length selected based on the 
Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) is two. Unit root tests using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests (see Dickey and Fuller, 
                                                 
51 Quarterly GDP data for Brunei is only available from 2003Q1, thus the small sample size of 46. 
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1979; Phillips and Perron, 1988) suggest that the variables in first log differences are 
stationary. The results are summarized in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Unit root tests 
 ADF test PP test 
Variables C C&T C C&T 
Δ𝑜𝑡 -4.20*** -4.36*** -5.26*** -5.29*** 
Δ𝑔𝑡 -4.66*** -5.14*** -12.05*** -12.43*** 
Δ𝑦𝑡 -6.95*** -6.87*** -8.55*** -8.41*** 
Notes: 𝑜,𝑔,𝑦 are log of real oil price, real government expenditure, and real GDP, respectively. ADF – 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller; PP – Phillips-Perron. C denotes the unit root test with a constant term and 
without a trend. C&T denotes the unit root test with both a constant term and trend. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
Figure 5.3 plots the cumulative impulse responses of the variables to the structural 
shocks. Oil price and fiscal shocks are normalized to 10% while GDP shock is 
normalized to 1%. This is roughly the size of one standard deviation of the respective 
shocks and allows easier interpretation of the results. The solid lines are the mean 
responses while the dotted lines correspond to the 90% error bands. 
In response to a 10% oil price shock, government expenditure increases and reaches 
a peak of 2.7% after a quarter. GDP also increases with a peak of 0.7% after two 
quarters. These positive effects are statistically significant. The increase in government 
expenditure also has an expansionary effect on GDP. This can be seen in the response of 
GDP to a 10% fiscal shock, in which the peak increase in GDP is 0.9% after a quarter.52
 
 
In response to a 1% GDP shock, government expenditure increases by 1.2% after a lag 
and the positive response is statistically significant. Taken together, the results here 
provide evidence of procyclical fiscal policy in Brunei, which reinforces the business 
cycle. 
 
                                                 
52 Note that the oil price is not affected by fiscal and GDP shocks, reflecting the imposed block 
exogeneity assumption (i.e., domestic shocks have no impact on global oil price). 
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5.5.2 Does the composition of government spending matter? 
Although procyclical fiscal policy is undesirable from both neoclassical and Keynesian 
perspectives, the situation is aggravated if spending on capital investment is also 
procyclical, especially if it is scaled down during cycle downturns. In this section, the 
analysis is extended to examine the composition of government spending. Government 
expenditure can be broadly classified into current and capital expenditure. Current 
expenditure consists of items such as wages and salaries, royalties, and pensions (i.e., 
government consumption). Capital expenditure is mainly spending on infrastructure and 
development projects (i.e., government investment). The correlation between the 
cyclical component of real government current expenditure and GDP is 0.32, while the 
correlation is 0.15 between real government capital expenditure and GDP. Using 
percentage changes instead, the correlations are 0.19 and -0.02. The correlations suggest 
current expenditure is more procyclical compared to capital expenditure. 
The VAR model in eq. (5.2) is now estimated separately with the government 
expenditure components. Figure 5.4 shows the cumulative impulse responses with 
government current expenditure in the VAR model. The results appear similar to Fig. 
5.3. In response to an oil price shock, government current expenditure increases 
significantly. Likewise, it increases in response to a GDP shock though the error bands 
suggest that the effect is not statistically significant. Figure 5.5 plots the cumulative 
impulse responses with government capital expenditure. A striking observation is that 
the responses are now different from Figs 5.3 and 5.4. Oil price shocks do not have any 
statistically significant impact on government capital expenditure. Similarly, an increase 
in GDP does not lead to an increase in government capital expenditure. These findings 
clearly show that while current spending is procyclical, capital spending is largely 
acyclical. 
The results here tell an important story. Public capital investment in development 
projects such as building roads, schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure is vital to 
enhancing productivity and economic growth as documented in several studies (e.g., 
Aschauer, 1989; Romp and de Haan, 2007). Procyclical public capital spending in 
which development projects are pushed ahead during good times but are being cut back 
during bad times would have had a damaging impact on the economy. Although 
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Fig. 5.3 Cumulative impulse responses to structural shocks 
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Notes: Solid lines are the mean impulse responses; dotted lines are the 90% error bands. 
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Fig. 5.4 Cumulative impulse responses to structural shocks, with real government current expenditure 
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Notes: Solid lines are the mean impulse responses; dotted lines are the 90% error bands. 
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Fig. 5.5 Cumulative impulse responses to structural shocks, with real government capital expenditure 
    Oil price shock    Fiscal shock GDP shock 
   
   
   
   
  G
D
P 
   
   
   
   
   
G
ov
t c
ap
ita
l e
xp
en
d.
   
   
   
   
 O
il 
pr
ic
e 
   
  
 
Notes: Solid lines are the mean impulse responses; dotted lines are the 90% error bands. 
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policymakers in Brunei can take comfort that government capital spending does not 
experience boom and bust cycles that can be harmful to economic health, they should be 
wary about the procyclical current spending behaviour. Current expenditure makes up 
about 80% of total government expenditure, and its procyclical nature exacerbates the 
business cycle. Fiscal consolidation, especially in reducing current spending, is already 
a recurrent theme in the IMF Article IV consultations with Brunei. The finding that 
government current expenditure amplifies the business cycle should further push fiscal 
spending reform higher up in the national agenda. There is also a need to develop 
explicit fiscal rules and better integrate the reserve funds into the government budgetary 
framework. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The current episode of falling oil prices is straining Brunei’s public finances. Brunei’s 
fiscal deficit is projected to be B$3.85 billion in 2016, an alarming 26% of GDP. Oil 
prices are expected to remain low through 2017 and there is a need for short-run 
macroeconomic adjustments. While oil exporters with flexible exchange rates can adjust 
through currency depreciations, fiscal policy is Brunei’s main policy tool. The 
budgetary shortfall can be financed by transfers from Brunei’s oil fund, which is large 
enough to sustain such deficits for about 20 years. This would help to prevent drastic 
cuts in government spending which can amplify output volatility. 
This paper examines the conduct of fiscal policy in Brunei, in particular, in 
assessing the cyclical patterns in government expenditure. Using quarterly data from 
2003Q1 to 2014Q2, the primary focus is on the dynamic impulse responses of 
government expenditure to oil price and GDP shocks based on the structural vector 
autoregression approach. The empirical results provide evidence of procyclical fiscal 
policy having an expansionary effect on output, thus amplifying output volatility. The 
results also show that government capital spending is acyclical, and the procyclical 
nature of fiscal policy is largely driven by government current spending. With current 
expenditure making up about 80% of total fiscal spending, the procyclical behaviour 
which exacerbates the business cycle is of policy concern. 
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The government should weigh the costs of procyclical current expenditure on the 
economy against the benefits. While balancing such considerations is beyond the scope 
of this paper, a compelling reason as to why the costs could outweigh the benefits 
centres on the structure of Brunei’s economy.  Being a small, open economy highly 
dependent on oil and gas, Brunei is already subjected to volatile international prices. 
Adding cyclical pressures through a procyclical fiscal stance is clearly undesirable. In 
this respect, the passing of the Sustainability Fund Act to set up a reserve fund for fiscal 
stabilization is certainly an encouraging move. However, policymakers need to devise 
explicit fiscal rules and better integrate the oil reserve fund into the budgetary 
framework to decouple government spending from volatile oil revenue to prevent boom 
and bust cycles. A neutral fiscal stance would then allow smoother execution of 
Brunei’s five-year national development plans. 
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Appendix 5.A  
Table 5.A1 Variables and data sources 
Variables Definition Symbol Sourcea 
Real oil price 
World crude oil price (U.S. dollars per 
barrel) converted to Brunei dollars and 
deflated by Brunei CPI 
𝑜 IFS 
Real GDP Gross domestic product (constant local currency in billions) 𝑦 
IMF country 
report 
Real 
government 
expenditure 
Government expenditure, (current local 
currency in billions); deflated using 
national CPI 
𝑔 IMF country report 
Notes: a IFS – IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF country report – Brunei Darussalam Statistical 
Appendix, where the primary data source is from Brunei’s Department of Economic Planning and 
Development and the Ministry of Finance. 
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Chapter 6 
Sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in 
Brunei Darussalam 
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in Brunei 
Darussalam from 2003Q1 to 2014Q3 using a structural vector autoregression model. 
Shocks are identified by imposing block exogeneity and long-run restrictions motivated 
by an open economy model that includes oil prices. The results show that oil price 
shocks account for only a small proportion of output fluctuations while productivity 
shocks have the largest share. Real exchange rate movements are largely driven by 
demand shocks while monetary shocks explain most of the variability in prices. 
Economic policies should focus on productivity improvement and capital investment to 
increase output in the long run, and the conduct of fiscal policy should take into account 
the impact on real exchange rate volatility. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Brunei Darussalam, like many other oil-exporting countries, is facing immense 
pressures on public finances with oil prices plummeting from US$110 per barrel in June 
2014 to US$45 per barrel as of September 2016, and is projected to see a budget deficit 
of B$3.85 billion in 2016, an astounding 26% of GDP (IMF, 2016a). In addition to 
declining oil prices, oil production in Brunei has also dwindled to 122 thousand barrels 
per day (tbpd) in 2015Q3 from a recent peak of 228 tbpd in 2006Q3 due to supply 
constraints as oil wells are depleted. Adding to these woes is the decline in labour 
productivity and a low rate of capital investment (Koh, 2014). It is therefore not 
surprising that Brunei has only achieved GDP growth of 0.7% averaged over the past 
decade, a far cry from the nation’s target of 6%. To design effective macroeconomic 
policies, it is important to first understand the underlying forces of macroeconomic 
fluctuations and their impact on the economy. 
Identifying the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations and assessing the relative 
importance of shocks in the propagation of business cycles is an important strand of 
applied macroeconomic research. In particular, the role of oil price shocks has attracted 
considerable attention since the seminal work of Hamilton (1983). Structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) models are a popular approach used in studying business cycles. 
Early SVAR work that includes oil prices focus on the U.S. economy (e.g., Shapiro and 
Watson, 1988; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996), and it is only in the past decade or so 
that other advanced economies (e.g., Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sanchez, 2005; Kilian, 
2008), emerging economies (e.g., Hoffmaister and Roldos, 2001; Huang and Guo, 
2007), and oil-exporting countries (e.g., Bjørnland, 2004; Mehrara and Oskoui, 2007) 
gain much coverage in the literature. 
The findings from these studies show that in oil-importing countries, oil price 
shocks lead to a fall in output and an increase in prices, supply shocks increase output 
but decrease prices, and demand shocks increase both output and prices.56
                                                 
56 Blanchard and Galí (2009) find that the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks have in fact declined 
over time in advanced economies. 
 The effects 
on the real exchange rate are somewhat mixed. However, oil price shocks account for 
only a small proportion of macroeconomic fluctuations. Supply shocks account for most 
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of output variability, while demand and/or monetary shocks explain most of real 
exchange rate and price fluctuations. These findings are generally echoed in studies of 
oil-exporting countries, except for the fact that oil price shocks increase output as 
expected.57
The objective of this paper is to provide answers to the following questions: (i) 
What are the sources of fluctuations in Brunei’s GDP, real exchange rate, and prices?; 
and (ii) To what extent do oil price shocks influence the Brunei economy, and how 
important are they compared to domestic shocks? The results from a SVAR model with 
shocks identified using block exogeneity and long-run restrictions show that oil price 
shocks account for only a small proportion of output fluctuations; the bulk of output 
movements are explained by productivity (supply) shocks. Real exchange rate 
movements are largely explained by demand shocks while price fluctuations are due to 
monetary shocks. These findings are consistent with those of existing studies, and 
highlight the fact that oil price shocks are not as important compared to other sources of 
shocks. Focusing on structural reforms such as improving productivity, increasing 
capital investment in oil and gas exploration and production to boost supply capacity, as 
well as devising clear fiscal rules to avoid incurring excessive real exchange rate 
volatility should therefore be accorded high priority in the government’s policy agenda. 
  
An implicit assumption in many SVAR studies is that exogenous changes in the oil 
price result from oil supply shocks (‘traditional’ view). More recently, Kilian (2009) 
argues that oil price fluctuations, like all other commodity prices, are driven by both 
global demand and supply shocks and therefore determining the underlying cause of oil 
price increases is important (‘modern’ view). As such, recent studies focus on the 
impact of different types of oil shocks (e.g., Peersman and van Robays, 2012; Cashin et 
al., 2014). For instance, Cashin et al. (2014) find that the economic consequences of a 
supply-driven oil price shock are different from those of a demand-driven shock, and 
                                                 
57 There are a few exceptions; e.g., Mehrara and Oskoui (2007) find that oil price shocks are the main 
cause of output fluctuations in Saudi Arabia and Iran, but Dibooğlu and Aleisa (2004) and Korhonen and 
Mehrotra (2009) find that supply shocks explain most of output fluctuations in these countries, in 
accordance with the findings in most studies. A possible reason is the sample period considered in 
Mehrara and Oskoui (2007) which covers the two oil crisis in the 1970s (Arab embargo in the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973–74 and the Iranian revolution in 1979). 
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the effects also vary for oil importers compared to oil exporters. While oil-importing 
countries experience a fall in economic activity in response to a supply-driven oil price 
increase, the impact is positive for oil-exporting countries with large proven oil 
reserves. However, such cross-country differences are absent when faced with a 
demand-driven oil price increase. 
As this paper is the first attempt in understanding the sources of macroeconomic 
fluctuations in Brunei, which has received scant attention in the empirical 
macroeconomics literature, the methodology used follows the more traditional SVAR 
approach, allowing results to be compared to existing SVAR studies of oil-exporting 
countries (see Table 6.A1 in Appendix 6.A).  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a brief overview 
of the Brunei economy. Section 6.3 develops a simple open economy model that 
includes oil prices. Section 6.4 discusses the identification and estimation of the SVAR 
model. Section 6.5 presents the empirical results and Section 6.6 concludes with policy 
recommendations. 
6.2 The economy of Brunei Darussalam 
Brunei is heavily dependent on oil and gas, which account for more than half of its GDP 
and over 90% of exports and government revenue. Despite considerable efforts to 
diversify the economy from hydrocarbons since the 1960s, success has remained 
elusive. GDP growth averaged 1.2% over the past three decades, the lowest among 
ASEAN peers and high income oil-exporting countries. Brunei’s hydrocarbon-centred 
economy is still vulnerable to volatile international oil prices and fluctuations in oil 
production, which can have significant effects on government finances and hence GDP, 
particularly if fiscal policy is procyclical such that government spending increases 
during oil price booms and decreases during busts.58
Brunei has a sovereign wealth fund, set up in 1983, which invests accumulated 
fiscal surpluses. The fund is estimated at US$40 billion as of 2016 and has a Linaburg-
 
                                                 
58 Brunei’s non-oil sector is largely dependent on government spending. The correlation between non-oil 
GDP and government expenditure from 2003Q1 to 2014Q3 is 0.80. 
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Maduell transparency rating of 1, indicating that it highly non-transparent (SWFI, 
2016).  As such, there is little public information on the fund’s strategies and asset 
holdings. A fiscal stabilization fund was also established in 2008. These fiscal buffers 
can potentially be used to smooth government expenditure and therefore help to 
stabilize output. However, the effectiveness of the oil funds remains an open question as 
there are no clear and transparent rules on how they are utilized. Brunei also has long-
term supply contracts, most notably with Japan and Korea, to cushion fluctuations in 
crude oil prices.  
Brunei operates on a currency board agreement in which the Brunei dollar is 
pegged at par to the Singapore dollar, which has been in effect since 1967, and therefore 
its monetary policy commits to maintaining the exchange rate parity. This means Brunei 
does not have monetary sovereignty and Singapore’s monetary policy can have an 
influence on Brunei’s economy, particularly in exchange rate movements and hence 
inflation, depending on the degree of pass-through. Being a welfare state, Brunei has a 
wide array of universal subsidies and administered price controls. As such, domestic 
prices are somewhat sheltered from external shocks. This has helped to keep inflation 
low at an average of 1.3% over the past three decades. 
6.3 A stochastic rational expectations open economy model 
This section develops a stochastic rational expectations open economy Keynesian 
model that includes oil prices, drawing primarily from Clarida and Galí (1994), Weber 
(1997), Bjørnland (2004), and Huang and Guo (2007). More specifically, the theoretical 
model extends the four-equation model in Clarida and Galí (1994), which consists of an 
aggregate demand function, a price setting equation, a money demand function, and 
uncovered interest parity, to include a supply side production function and labour 
demand and supply schedules as in Weber (1997), an exogenous evolution of oil prices 
following Bjørnland (2004) and Huang and Guo (2007), augmenting the aggregate 
demand and production equations with oil prices, and adding a foreign monetary policy 
rule which reacts to oil prices. The system is summarized below: 
𝑜𝑡 = 𝑜𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑜                        (6.1) 
𝑦𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜂(𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡∗ − 𝑝𝑡) − 𝜎�𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡(𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡)� + 𝜙𝑜𝑡                (6.2) 
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𝑑𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑑                      (6.3) 
𝑝𝑡 = (1 − 𝜃)𝐸𝑡−1𝑝𝑡𝑒 + 𝜃𝑝𝑡𝑒                    (6.4) 
𝑦𝑡
𝑠 = 𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑜𝑡                   (6.5) 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝐴                      (6.6) 
𝑙𝑡
𝑑 = −𝜌(𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡)                     (6.7) 
𝑙𝑡
𝑠 = 𝜑�𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡(𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡)� + 𝛾(𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡)                  (6.8) 
𝑚𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡                         (6.9) 
𝑚𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑚𝑡−1𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡𝑚                                    (6.10) 
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝐸𝑡(𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒𝑡)                    (6.11) 
𝑟𝑡
∗ = 𝜇𝑜𝑡 + 𝜒𝑡                                (6.12) 
𝜒𝑡 = 𝜒𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝜒                    (6.13) 
𝑦𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑦𝑡𝑠 = 𝑦𝑡                    (6.14) 
𝑙𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑙𝑡𝑠 = 𝑙𝑡                    (6.15) 
𝑚𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑚𝑡𝑠 = 𝑚𝑡                    (6.16) 
where 𝑜 is log of the real oil price, 𝑦 is log of real output, 𝑑 is an aggregate demand 
shock, 𝑒 is log of the nominal exchange rate, 𝑝∗is log of the foreign price level (trade-
weighted), 𝑝 is log of the domestic price level, 𝐸 is the expectations operator, 𝑖 is the 
nominal domestic interest rate, 𝐴 is log of technology, 𝑙 is log of labour input, 𝑘 is log 
of capital stock, 𝑤 is log of the wage rate, 𝑚 is log of the money supply, 𝑖∗ is the 
nominal foreign interest rate (trade-weighted), 𝑟∗ is real foreign interest rate (trade-
weighted), 𝜒 is a stochastic component reflecting foreign monetary policy rules (trade-
weighted), and the 𝜀’s are serially uncorrelated orthogonal shocks, normally and 
independently distributed with zero mean and finite variance, with 𝜀𝑜, 𝜀𝑑, 𝜀𝐴, 𝜀𝑚, and 
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𝜀𝜒 representing oil price shock, demand shock, technology (or productivity) shock, 
monetary (or velocity) shock, and foreign monetary policy shock respectively. 
Equation (6.1) shows the evolution of the real oil price as a random walk, assumed 
to be exogenous. Equation (6.2) is a standard output demand function (IS curve) with 
the real exchange rate (𝑞𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡∗ − 𝑝𝑡) and real interest rate �𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 −
𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑡+1−𝑝𝑡 as its main arguments, augmented by the real oil price. It is expected that  
𝜂 < 0 such that a depreciation of the real exchange rate leads to an improvement in the 
trade balance. Due to the dominance of the oil sector in Brunei which benefits from oil 
price increases, it is expected that  𝜙 > 0. The aggregate demand shock evolves as a 
random walk as in eq. (6.3). Equation (6.4) is a price setting equation such that the 
current price level is an average of the price expected in the previous period to prevail in 
the current period, 𝐸𝑡−1𝑝𝑡𝑒, and the price that would actually prevail in the current 
period, 𝑝𝑡𝑒. When 𝜃 = 0, prices are fixed and when 𝜃 = 1, prices are fully flexible. In the 
long run, it is assumed that prices are flexible. The supply side in eq. (6.5) assumes that 
in the long run, firms have a Cobb-Douglas production function with labour, capital, 
and oil price as factor inputs, augmented by the level of technology that is modelled as a 
random walk process in eq. (6.6). 
Labour demand is a negative function of real wages as shown in eq. (6.7), while 
labour supply in eq. (6.8) depends positively on the real interest rate and real wages. 
Equation (6.9) is a standard money demand function (LM curve) whereby real money 
demand has income and nominal interest rate as its main arguments, with a demand 
shock component. Money supply follows a random walk process in eq. (6.10).  
Uncovered interest rate parity is assumed to hold in eq. (6.11), where the risk 
premium term is excluded.59
                                                 
59 For simplicity, the risk premium is excluded following Clarida and Galí (1994) and Weber (1997). 
However, the risk premium can be incorporated by modeling it as a non-stationary stochastic process and 
the identifications in this section follow through. 
 Equation (6.12) is a (trade-weighted) foreign monetary 
policy rule whereby foreign monetary authorities react to the real oil price and includes 
a stochastic component that follows a random walk in eq. (6.13) reflecting different 
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rules in the trade partner countries.60
Equations (6.1) to (6.16) can be solved under the flexible price equilibrium to yield: 
 If foreign central banks tighten monetary policy to 
stem inflation from rising due to oil price increases, 𝜇 > 0 and output is expected to 
fall. If an expansionary policy is pursed to offset the impact of oil prices on output, 
𝜇 < 0 with nominal GDP and inflation growing. It can also be the case where nothing is 
done such that 𝜇 = 0, accepting some inflation. Equations (6.14), (6.15), and (6.16) 
show the goods, labour, and money market equilibrium respectively. 
Δ𝑜𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡𝑜                                (6.17) 
Δ𝑟𝑡
∗ = 𝜇𝜀𝑡𝑜 + 𝜀𝑡𝜒                               (6.18) 
Δ𝑦𝑡 = � 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽 � 𝜀𝑡𝑜 + 𝛼𝜌𝜑(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) 𝜀𝑡𝜒 + 11 − 𝛽 𝜀𝑡𝐴 (6.19) 
Δ𝑞𝑡 = � 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇𝜂(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽𝜂(1 − 𝛽) + 𝜎𝜇 − 𝜙𝜂 � 𝜀𝑡𝑜+ � 𝛼𝜌𝜑
𝜂(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 𝜎𝜂� 𝜀𝑡𝜒 + 1𝜂(1 − 𝛽) 𝜀𝑡𝐴 − 1𝜂 𝜀𝑡𝑑 
 
(6.20) 
Δ𝑝𝑡 = �𝜆𝜇 − 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽 � 𝜀𝑡𝑜+ �𝜆 − 𝛼𝜌𝜑(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾)� 𝜀𝑡𝜒 − 11 − 𝛽 𝜀𝑡𝐴 + 𝜀𝑡𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡𝑚 
 
(6.21) 
Details on the derivation can be found in Appendix 6.B. Notice that the long-run 
solution of the model exhibits a triangular structure, which provides motivation for the 
identifying restrictions in the next section. 
 
 
                                                 
60 Brunei’s major trading partners have different monetary policy rules; for instance, Australia has an 
inflation target, China has a crawl-like arrangement and Singapore operates a managed float. The random 
walk specification is a naïve and simplified exposition to model the (trade-weighted) rules. 
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6.4 The SVAR approach and identification of structural shocks 
The reduced form of the structural model in Section 6.3 can be expressed as: 
𝑍𝑡 = Θ(𝐿)𝜀𝑡                    (6.22) 
where 𝑍𝑡 = (Δ𝑜𝑡 ,Δ𝑟𝑡∗,Δ𝑦𝑡 ,Δ𝑞𝑡 ,Δ𝑝𝑡)′ is the vector of stationary variables, Θ(𝐿) denotes 
a lag polynomial matrix, and 𝜀𝑡 = (𝜀𝑜, 𝜀𝜒, 𝜀𝐴, 𝜀𝑑, 𝜀𝑚)′ denotes the structural shocks 
with 𝐸(𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡′) = I5.  
Consider the long-run effects by setting 𝐿 = 1 in eq. (6.22), and by virtue of the 
orthogonality of the structural shocks, the model can be summarized as: 
 
⎝
⎜
⎛
Δ𝑜
Δ𝑟∗
Δ𝑦
Δ𝑞
Δ𝑝⎠
⎟
⎞ =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝜃11(1) 0 ⋮
𝜃21(1) 𝜃22(1) ⋮
⋯
𝜃31(1)
𝜃41(1)
𝜃51(1)
⋯
𝜃32(1)
𝜃42(1)
𝜃52(1)
⋮
⋮
⋮
⋮
    
0 0 00 0 0
⋯
𝜃33(1)
𝜃43(1)
𝜃53(1)
⋯0
𝜃44(1)
𝜃45(1)
⋯00
𝜃55(1)⎠⎟
⎟
⎞
⎝
⎜
⎛
𝜀𝑜
𝜀𝜒
𝜀𝐴
𝜀𝑑
𝜀𝑚⎠
⎟
⎞
             (6.23) 
The long-run matrix containing 𝜃’s, the long-run multipliers, has a lower triangular 
structure and is partitioned into external and domestic components.61
The small open economy assumption prevents domestic variables from affecting 
external variables in both the short and long run, which is appropriate given the size of 
the Brunei economy, i.e., domestic shocks (productivity, demand and monetary) have no 
effect on external variables (real oil price and foreign real interest rate) in all periods.  
The block exogeneity of 𝜀𝑜 and 𝜀𝜒 is specified such that 𝜃(𝑘)𝑖𝑗 = 0 for 𝑖 = 1,2 and 
 Since the model 
consists of five variables, 5(5 − 1)/2 = 10 restrictions need to be imposed for exact 
identification. The identification strategy consists of the small open economy 
assumption by imposing block exogeneity restrictions such as that suggested by 
Cushman and Zha (1997) and long-run restrictions as in Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
                                                 
61 Note that a labour supply shock could have been added in eq. (6.8) and identified in the SVAR model 
with Δ𝑙 ordered before Δ𝑦, but data constraints prohibit this from being done. What this implies is that the 
role of labour supply shocks will be attributed to productivity shocks. However, this does not change the 
major thrust of the findings that supply shocks account for most of output fluctuations (see Section 6.5.2). 
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j= 3,4,5 for 𝑘 = 1,2, … ,∞. This is represented by the zeros in the northeast quadrant, 
which provide six restrictions. 
The long-run restrictions are informed by the theoretical model developed in 
Section 6.3. The zeros in the southeast quadrant are the restrictions imposed such that 
demand and monetary shocks do not affect output in the long run, and monetary shocks 
do not affect the real exchange rate in the long run. No restrictions are placed on the 
price level. In the northwest quadrant, the zero is the restriction imposed such that 
foreign monetary policy shocks have no effect on the real oil price in the long run. This 
restriction is reasonable since long-run oil prices should be influenced by demand and 
supply factors, e.g., the availability of alternative energy sources or exploration and 
production capacities. These assumptions therefore provide four additional restrictions 
for exact identification. 
6.5 Empirical results 
Quarterly data from 2003Q1 to 2014Q3 (47 observations) are used in the estimation.62
 
 
The variables and data sources are summarized in Table 6.A2 in Appendix 6.A. 
Preliminary data analyses are performed to ensure that the variables are specified in 
accordance with their time series properties (i.e., the variables are stationary and their 
levels are not cointegrated). Figure 6.1 plots the log real oil price, trade-weighted 
foreign real interest rate, log oil production, log real effective exchange rate (REER), 
and log consumer price index (CPI) in levels and first differences. Results of unit root 
tests using the Zivot-Andrews single structural break (see Zivot and Andrews, 1992) 
and the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (see Dickey and Fuller, 1979) tests are shown 
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. Based on the Zivot-Andrews test, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root in all the variables. The ADF tests suggest that the variables in 
levels are non-stationary but their first differences are stationary. 
 
                                                 
62 Brunei has adopted a new series of national accounts with base year 2010, but revisions of past data 
series are only available from 2010. This paper uses data with base year 2000 to allow a sufficiently long 
time series for econometric analysis. As such, GDP data is available only from 2003Q1 to 2014Q3. 
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Fig.6.1 Data series plots of the variables in levels and first differences 
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Table 6.1 Zivot-Andrews unit root test with a single structural break 
Variable Period Minimum t-statistics 
a Variable Period Minimum t-statistics 
b 
𝑜 2008Q4 -3.96 𝑜 2005Q4 -3.73 
𝑟∗ 2008Q4 -5.19* 𝑟∗ 2005Q4 -2.50 
𝑦 2008Q1 -4.39 𝑦 2012Q4 -4.07 
𝑞 2012Q4 -3.92 𝑞 2012Q1 -3.04 
𝑝 2007Q4 -2.95 𝑝 2012Q2 -3.20 
Notes: a Break in intercept; 5% critical level is -4.80. 
b
* denotes rejection at the 5% significance level. 
 Break in trend; 5% critical level is -4.42. 
Table 6.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests 
Variable ADF (lags) a test-statistic Variable ADF (lags) b test-statistic 
𝑜 ADF (2) -2.42 ∆𝑜 ADF (1) -6.25* 
𝑟∗ ADF (1) -2.15 ∆𝑟∗ ADF (2) -3.29* 
𝑦 ADF (4) -2.18 ∆𝑦 ADF (1) -6.86* 
𝑞 ADF (3) -1.75 ∆𝑞 ADF (1) -4.43* 
𝑝 ADF (2) -0.99 ∆𝑝 ADF (1) -5.74* 
Notes: a A constant and time trend included in the regression. 
b
* denotes rejection at 5% significance level. 
 A constant included in the regression. 
Since the theoretical model does not provide any guide on dynamics, the lag order 
is determined using the Akaike information criteria (AIC) test, which suggests using 
two lags.63
 
 Johansen’s (1988, 1991) trace statistic and maximum eigenvalue likelihood 
tests indicate there is no evidence of cointegration. Results are displayed in Table 6.3. 
 
 
                                                 
63 The SVAR model is also estimated using alternative lag lengths; the main results are invariant to the 
use of up to four lags.  
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Table 6.3 Johansen’s cointegration tests 
𝑯𝟎 𝑯𝟏 
Critical 
value 5%  
𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 
Critical 
value 5%  
𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙
 
𝝀𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒆 𝝀𝒎𝒂𝒙 
𝑟 = 0 𝑟 ≥ 1 68.52 33.46 65.43 29.98 
𝑟 ≤ 1 𝑟 ≥ 2 47.21 27.07 35.46 17.87 
𝑟 ≤ 2 𝑟 ≥ 3 29.68 20.97 17.58 8.36 
𝑟 ≤ 3 𝑟 ≥ 4 15.41 14.07 9.22 8.10 
𝑟 ≤ 4 𝑟 ≥ 5 3.76 3.76 1.12 1.12 
Notes: 𝑟 denotes the number of significant cointegrating vectors under the null and alternative hypotheses. 
 6.5.1 Impulse responses 
The cumulative effects of the domestic macroeconomic variables to the structural 
shocks are shown in Fig. 6.2, with the dotted lines representing 90% error bands. 
An oil price shock leads to a permanent output expansion in Brunei.64 This positive 
effect is expected for oil-exporting countries and is reported in several studies (e.g., 
Dibooğlu and Aleisa, 2004; Mehrara and Oskoui, 2007), though the error bands indicate 
that the long-run effect is only marginally statistically significant. The real exchange 
rate also appreciates as expected due to terms of trade gains, but the effect is not 
statistically significant. There is minimal impact on the CPI level, largely due to 
government-administered price controls and subsidies. The real exchange rate 
appreciation also helps to keep imports cheaper in local currency terms. Though the 
focus is on domestic variables, it is worthwhile to mention that in response to an oil 
price shock, the foreign real interest rate increases, suggesting that foreign central banks 
attempt to offset the inflationary impact of oil price increases through contractionary 
monetary policy.65
                                                 
64 Global crude oil price is used in the analysis with the implicit assumption that the law of one price 
holds for Brunei. This is reasonable as the crude oil market is an integrated one, with low transportation 
costs and largely interchangeable crude oil products of different geographic origins (Nordhaus, 2009). 
 
65 A related strand of research is on the endogenous response of monetary policy to oil shocks. Bernanke 
et al. (1997) argue that the Fed’s interest rate responses to inflationary pressures induced by oil shocks are 
an important source of fluctuations in the U.S. economy, but opposing views can be found in Hamilton 
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Fig.6.2 Cumulative impulse responses to structural shocks 
              Oil price shock         Foreign monetary policy shock 
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Notes: Solid lines are the mean impulse responses; dotted lines are the 90% error bands. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
and Herrera (2004) and Kilian and Lewis (2011). Since Brunei does not have monetary independence and 
the domestic interest rate is not an active monetary policy instrument, this research area is excluded from 
the study. 
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Fig.6.2 Cumulative impulse responses to structural shocks (continued) 
        Productivity shock    Demand shock       Monetary shock 
 
Notes: Solid lines are the mean impulse responses; dotted lines are the 90% error bands. 
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Following a foreign monetary policy shock, the real exchange rate appreciates but 
the effect is not statistically significant. Prices fall as a result of an increase in the 
interest rate, which is expected of how conventional monetary policy works. The real 
appreciation partially reflects Brunei’s fixed exchange rate regime (currency board 
arrangement with Singapore) whereby Singapore has a relatively large weight in 
Brunei’s REER.66
A productivity shock has a large permanent positive impact on output, while the 
real exchange rate depreciates, conforming to theoretical predictions, since domestic 
prices fall. This can be explained by the standard textbook AD-AS model, in which a 
productivity shock shifts the AS curve to the right, resulting in an increase in output and 
a fall in prices. The real depreciation comes via a price adjustment rather than a nominal 
exchange rate adjustment due to the peg to the Singapore dollar. 
 An increase in Singapore’s interest rate and an appreciation of the 
Singapore dollar would simultaneously lead to an increase in Brunei’s interest rate and 
hence an appreciation of the Brunei dollar for the parity rate to be maintained. While 
there is a one-to-one correspondence of the nominal exchange rate, the response of the 
real exchange rate can differ depending on how prices react. In the case here, prices fall 
and hence the real exchange rate appreciation is muted. 
The response of output to a demand shock is positive but the effect is transitory and 
not statistically significant after the initial quarter. The real exchange rate appreciates 
but there is no significant impact on prices. The responses can be explained by the 
Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model. For instance, an expansionary fiscal policy which 
shifts the IS curve to the right leads to an increase in the interest rate and hence an 
exchange rate appreciation. The transitory output effect suggests that expansionary 
fiscal policy to stimulate the economy is only effective in the short run. A possible 
reason is the deterioration of the trade balance due to the real exchange rate appreciation 
which leaves output unchanged in the long run. A similar temporary effect is also 
observed for Saudi Arabia (Dibooğlu and Aleisa, 2004) and Iran (Korhonen and 
Mehrotra, 2009). However, the findings for other oil exporters show that demand shocks 
do not increase output (see Table 6.A1 in Appendix 6.A).  
                                                 
66 There is a high correlation (0.904) between Singapore’s real interest rate and the constructed trade-
weighted foreign real interest rate. The results are roughly the same with either series in the SVAR model. 
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A monetary shock does not have any statistically significant impact on output while 
prices increase due to the money supply increase. The real exchange rate depreciates 
immediately but then appreciates and overshoots back to the long-run equilibrium, 
showing evidence of Dornbusch’s (1976) overshooting model. These responses are 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model. 
An increase in money supply shifts the LM curve to the right, resulting in a fall in the 
interest rate and an exchange rate depreciation. To maintain the exchange rate peg, the 
monetary authority would have to sell foreign reserves, bringing the LM curve back to 
its equilibrium position. As a consequence, output remains unchanged. 
6.5.2 Variance decompositions 
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of the domestic variables are 
displayed in Table 6.4. FEVD gives the proportion of the variance of the forecast error 
attributed to each of the structural shocks at various horizons, i.e., the relative 
importance of each shock in the fluctuations of output, real exchange rate, and prices.  
Oil price shocks account for about 11% of output fluctuations in the long run while 
productivity shocks account for three-quarters of output variability. The low FEVD of 
output due to oil price shocks might appear puzzling given Brunei’s high dependence on 
oil, but this is a typical finding in other oil-exporting countries, e.g., Saudi Arabia (see 
Dibooğlu and Aleisa, 2004), Norway (see Bjørnland, 2004), Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
and Venezuela (see Korhonen and Mehrotra, 2009).67 The importance of supply shocks 
in explaining Brunei’s output fluctuations is in fact not surprising since supply side 
constraints in oil production has been inhibiting growth.68
                                                 
67 Mehrara and Oskoui (2007) argue that oil price shocks explain only a small proportion of output 
fluctuations in Kuwait due to the success of its oil fund. It is conceivable that Brunei’s oil fund has helped 
to stabilize output; however, there is no evidence to suggest so. Besides, there are no explicit fiscal rules 
on the use of these funds. 
 In addition, the relationship 
between oil prices and Brunei’s oil production (and also real GDP) has also changed 
over the years: there is a positive correlation from 1994 to 2005 but this relationship is 
68 Oil production in 2014 is half of the quantity produced in 2006. It is also worth noting that the 
emphasis of Brunei’s current national development plan (2012–2017) to accelerate economic growth is on 
enhancing productivity and innovation. 
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non-existent from 2006 onwards. This helps to explain the low contribution of oil price 
shocks in explaining output fluctuations. Another likely explanation is Brunei’s long-
term supply contracts, which help to mitigate aggressive oil price movements. However, 
it is worth mentioning that the present analysis, which does not distinguish between oil 
demand and supply shocks, may be causing a somewhat relatively smaller contribution 
of oil price shocks in explaining Brunei’s output fluctuations. 
Table 6.4 Variance decomposition of domestic variables (%) 
Quarters 
FEVD of output due to shocks to 
OP MP* PR AD MO 
1 0.9 0.1 94.0 4.8 0.2 
2 11.0 1.3 80.9 4.2 2.6 
4 10.7 3.2 75.0 8.3 2.8 
8 10.7 3.8 74.3 8.5 2.7 
20 10.7 3.8 74.3 8.5 2.7 
 
Quarters 
FEVD of REER due to shocks to 
OP MP* PR AD MO 
1 1.1 0.3 3.8 91.2 3.6 
2 1.1 1.9 4.8 87.2 5.1 
4 1.8 2.7 11.5 74.1 10.0 
8 2.0 2.9 12.0 73.1 10.0 
20 2.0 2.9 12.0 73.1 10.0 
 
Quarters 
FEVD of CPI due to shocks to 
OP MP* PR AD MO 
1 0.0 3.4 3.9 0.1 92.5 
2 0.0 3.4 4.0 2.2 90.4 
4 1.4 6.1 4.3 2.1 86.0 
8 5.5 6.2 4.4 2.0 81.8 
20 5.7 6.2 4.4 2.0 81.6 
Notes: OP – oil price; MP* – foreign monetary policy; PR – productivity; AD – demand; MO – monetary. 
Fluctuations in the real exchange rate are mainly attributed to demand shocks—
over 90% in the short run and about three-quarters in the long run. Productivity and 
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monetary shocks explain only a small proportion in the short run, but in the long run 
they account for a significant one-fifth of real exchange rate movements. The negligible 
contribution of external shocks (oil price and foreign monetary policy) is not surprising 
since these shocks do not have statistically significant effects on the real exchange rate 
as the impulse responses in Section 6.5.1 illustrate. The importance of demand shocks in 
explaining real exchange rate movements in oil-exporting countries is similarly 
documented in various studies (see Table 6.A1 in Appendix 6.A).  
Oil price shocks explain less than 6% of the variability in prices, since domestic 
prices of petroleum products are highly subsidized and therefore changes in the 
international oil price have limited effect on Brunei’s CPI. Most of the fluctuations in 
prices are due to monetary shocks, accounting for more than 90% in the short run and 
80% in the long run. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in Brunei from 
2003Q1 to 2014Q3 using a structural vector autoregression model. A stochastic rational 
expectations open economy model that includes oil prices is developed, which 
motivates the use of long-run identifying assumptions and block exogeneity restrictions 
based on the small country assumption. The results show that oil price shocks account 
for only a small proportion of output fluctuations, while productivity shocks account for 
the largest share. Fluctuations in the real exchange rate are driven mainly by demand 
shocks while variability in prices is due to monetary shocks. 
These results are in line with empirical findings in other oil-exporting countries. 
They have important policy implications as policymakers must decide how closely to 
track external and domestic developments. Some economists advocate that oil-exporting 
countries adopt more flexible exchange rate regimes to stabilize output fluctuations 
caused by terms of trade shocks (e.g., Frankel, 2005; Setser 2008). The relatively small 
role of oil prices in influencing the Brunei economy suggests that the government need 
not be too concerned about a change in exchange rate policy to reduce macroeconomic 
volatility. Furthermore, Brunei’s accumulated reserves in oil funds can be used to 
smooth oil price shocks. On the other hand, the importance of supply shocks in driving 
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output calls for more attention into structural reforms such as improving productivity, as 
well as increasing infrastructural and technological investments in offshore oil fields to 
increase oil production capacity. In addition, the conduct of fiscal policy should take 
into consideration the impact on real exchange rate volatility. 
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Appendix 6.A  
Table 6.A1 Selected SVAR studies on oil-exporting countries 
Author Country Sample period Shocks
Impulse response
a 
 b Forecast error variance decomposition (%) 
Output Real exch rate Price 
 Output Real exch rate Price 
SR LR SR LR SR LR  SR LR SR LR SR LR 
This paper Brunei 
2003Q1
–
2014Q3 
OP 0 + 0 0 0 0  1 11 1 2 0 6 
MP* 0 0 0 0 − −  0 4 0 3 3 6 
AS + + − 0 − −  94 74 4 12 4 4 
AD + 0 + + 0 0  5 9 91 73 0 2 
MO 0 0 − 0 + +  0 3 4 10 93 82 
Bjørnland 
(2004) Norway 
1972Q1
–
1994Q4 
OP + 0 − 0 0 +  4 14 4 1 4 3 
PR + + + + + +  17 16 12 21 1 1 
LS + + + 0 − −  40 60 12 9 67 40 
AD 0 0 + + + +  1 1 67 69 1 21 
MO + 0 − 0 + +  38 10 5 1 27 35 
Dibooğlu 
and Aleisa 
(2004) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1980Q1
–
2000Q1 
OP + + + + + +  1 35 14 79 0 64 
AS + + − 0 − +  85 65 11 4 2 18 
BP + 0 − 0 + 0  11 0 12 2 2 1 
AD + 0 + + + 0  2 0 62 15 8 0 
MO 0 0 − 0 + +  0 0 1 0 88 17 
Mehrara 
and 
Oskoui 
(2007) 
Iran 1970− 2002 
OP + + − 0 0 +        
AS + + − − − −        
AD + 0 + + + +        
MO − 0 − 0 + +        
Indonesia 1970− 2002 
OP + 0 + + 0 0        
AS + + − − − −        
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AD 0 0 + + − −        
MO + 0 0 0 + +        
Kuwait 1972− 2002 
OP + + − − − −        
AS + + − − − −        
AD 0 0 + + − −        
MO + 0 0 0 + +        
Saudi 
Arabia 
1971– 
2002 
OP + + + + + +        
AS + + − − − −        
AD 0 0 + + 0 +        
MO − 0 0 0 + +        
Korhonen 
and 
Mehrotra 
(2009) 
Iran 
2000Q4
–
2005Q1 
OP 0 0 + +    4 5 12 19   
AS + + − −    80 73 14 12   
AD + 0 + +    15 19 73 68   
MO 0 0 0 0    2 3 1 1   
Kazakhstan 
2000Q4
–
2006Q3 
OP 0 + 0 0    2 9 4 5   
AS + + + +    58 6 10 17   
AD − 0 + +    21 17 78 65   
MO + 0 + 0    20 15 7 14   
Russia 
2001Q1
–
2006Q4 
OP 0 + 0 0    1 15 0 3   
AS + + − 0    90 77 6 8   
AD 0 0 + +    0 1 93 87   
MO + 0 + 0    8 7 2 2   
Venezuela 
2002Q3
–
2007Q4 
OP 0 + 0 +    8 21 0 11   
AS + + + +    89 46 7 11   
AD 0 0 + +    3 17 67 50   
MO 0 0 + 0    0 16 26 29   
Berument 
et al. 
(2010) 
Algeria 1952–
2005 OP 
+ 0            
Bahrain 0 0            
Iran + 0            
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Iraq + 0            
Kuwait + 0            
Libya + 0            
Oman 0 +            
Qatar + 0            
Syria + 0            
UAE + 0            
Notes: a SR and LR refer to short run and long run respectively. OP – oil price shock; MP* – foreign monetary policy shock; AS – supply shock; AD – demand shock; MS 
– monetary shock; PR – productivity shock; LS – labour supply shock; BP – balance of payment shock. 
b Impulse responses to a positive unit shock. + denotes an increase (appreciation for real exchange rate); − denotes a decrease (depreciation for exchange rate); 0 denotes at 
equilibrium or unchanged. 
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Table 6.A2 Variables and data sources 
Variables Definition Symbol Sourcea 
Ex
te
rn
al
 Real oil price 
World crude oil price (U.S. dollars 
per barrel) converted to Brunei 
dollars and deflated by Brunei CPI 
𝑜 IFS 
Foreign real 
interest rate 
Trade-weighted foreign real interest 
rate 𝑟
∗ b 
IFS, 
Author’s 
calculations 
D
om
es
tic
 Output Real GDP
 𝑦 IFS 
Prices Consumer price index (CPI) 𝑝 IFS 
Real 
exchange 
rate 
Real effective exchange rate (REER) 𝑞 b 
IFS, 
Author’s 
calculations 
Notes: a IFS – IMF International Financial Statistics.  
b
 
 Brunei’s top 12 trading partners are, in descending order: Japan, Singapore, Korea, Indonesia, Australia, 
Malaysia, China, US, Thailand, UK, India, and New Zealand; making up more than 95% of total trade 
over the period 2003–2014.The REER is calculated as the trade-weighted exchange rate with the top 12 
trading partners. The trade-weighted foreign real interest rate is calculated analogously. 
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Appendix 6.B  
Details on the derivation of the long-run solution of the model in Section 6.3 are 
provided here. 
From the price setting equation in eq. (6.4), set 𝜃 = 1 such that in the long run, prices 
are fully flexible and output is supply determined. 
From eqs (6.1), (6.12), and (6.13), we have 
Δ𝑜𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡𝑜                              (6.B1) 
Δ𝑟𝑡
∗ = 𝜇𝜀𝑡𝑜 + 𝜀𝑡𝜒                              (6.B2) 
Defining the real exchange rate as 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡∗ − 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑟 as the domestic real interest 
rate, the interest rate parity in eq. (6.11) can be written as 
𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
∗ = 𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡)                             (6.B3) 
Next, from the labour demand, supply, and market equilibrium equations in eqs (6.7), 
(6.8), and (6.15) and using eq. (6.B3) we can obtain 
𝑙𝑡 = 𝜌𝜑𝜇𝜌 + 𝛾 𝑜𝑡 + 𝜌𝜑𝜌 + 𝛾 𝜒𝑡 + 𝜌𝜑𝜌 + 𝛾 𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡) (6.B4) 
By making the assumption that the long-run steady state capital-output ratio is constant 
𝑘𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜅                   (6.B5) 
and substituting eq. (6.B5) into eq. (6.5) yields 
𝑦𝑡
𝑠 = 𝛽𝜅1 − 𝛽 + 11 − 𝛽 𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼1 − 𝛽 𝑙𝑡 + 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽 𝑜𝑡 (6.B6) 
Next, substitute eq. (6.B4) into eq. (6.B6) to obtain the supply side equation 
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𝑦𝑡
𝑠 = 𝛽𝜅1 − 𝛽 + � 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽 �𝑜𝑡 + 𝛼𝜌𝜑(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾)𝜒𝑡+ 11 − 𝛽𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼𝜌𝜑(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾)𝐸𝑡(𝑞𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡) 
From eqs (6.2), (6.12), and (6.B3), we can obtain the output demand function 
 
(6.B7) 
𝑦𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑑𝑡 + (𝜙 − 𝜎𝜇)𝑜𝑡 − 𝜎𝜒𝑡 + (𝜂 + 𝜎)𝑞𝑡 − 𝜎𝐸𝑡𝑞𝑡+1 (6.B8) 
Combining eqs (6.B7) and (6.B8) with the goods market equilibrium condition in eq. 
(6.14) yields 
𝑞𝑡= 𝛼𝜌𝜑 + 𝜎(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾)(𝜂 + 𝜎)(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝐸𝑡𝑞𝑡+1+ 𝛽𝜅(𝜌 + 𝛾)(𝜂 + 𝜎)(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 𝛼𝜌𝜑+ 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇 + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + (𝜎𝜇 − 𝜙)(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾)(𝜂 + 𝜎)(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 𝛼𝜌𝜑 𝑜𝑡+ 𝛼𝜌𝜑 + 𝜎(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾)(𝜂 + 𝜎)(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 𝛼𝜌𝜑 𝜒𝑡 + 𝜌 + 𝛾(𝜂 + 𝜎)(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝐴𝑡
−
(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾)(𝜂 + 𝜎)(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 𝛼𝜌𝜑 𝑑𝑡 
 
 
 
 
     
(6.B9) 
This is a stochastic difference equation in 𝑞𝑡. Using the method of undetermined 
coefficients, conjecture a guess linear solution 
𝑞𝑡 = 𝐺1𝑜𝑡 + 𝐺2𝜒𝑡 + 𝐺3𝐴𝑡 + 𝐺4𝑑𝑡              (6.B10) 
Take the time 𝑡 conditional expectations on both sides and use eqs (6.1), (6.3), (6.6), 
and (6.13) to get 
𝐸𝑡𝑞𝑡+1 = 𝐺1𝑜𝑡 + 𝐺2𝜒𝑡 + 𝐺3𝐴𝑡 + 𝐺4𝑑𝑡                          (6.B11) 
Substitute eqs (6.B10) and (6.B11) into eq. (6.B9) and equating coefficients of the 
variables to get 
𝐺1 = 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇𝜂(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽𝜂(1 − 𝛽) + 𝜎𝜇 − 𝜙𝜂  
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𝐺2 = 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜂(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 𝜎𝜂 
𝐺3 = 1𝜂(1 − 𝛽) 
𝐺4 = − 1𝜂 
Therefore we obtain 
Δ𝑞𝑡 = � 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇𝜂(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽𝜂(1 − 𝛽) + 𝜎𝜇 − 𝜙𝜂 � 𝜀𝑡𝑜+ � 𝛼𝜌𝜑
𝜂(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 𝜎𝜂� 𝜀𝑡𝜒 + 1𝜂(1 − 𝛽) 𝜀𝑡𝐴 − 1𝜂 𝜀𝑡𝑑   (6.B12) 
Substituting eqs (6.B10) and (6.B11) into eq. (6.B5) yields  
Δ𝑦𝑡 = � 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽 � 𝜀𝑡𝑜 + 𝛼𝜌𝜑(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) 𝜀𝑡𝜒+ 11 − 𝛽 𝜀𝑡𝐴 (6.B13) 
Next, to solve for price, substitute eqs (6.B7), (6.11), (6.B3), and (6.12) into eq. (6.9) to 
get 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆 𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝜅(1 + 𝜆)(1 − 𝛽)+ 𝜆𝜇(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) − 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇 − (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝜆)(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) 𝑜𝑡+ 𝜆(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) − 𝛼𝜌𝜑(1 + 𝜆)(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) 𝜒𝑡 − 1(1 + 𝜆)(1 − 𝛽)𝐴𝑡+ 1(1 + 𝜆)𝑑𝑡 + 1(1 + 𝜆)𝑚𝑡 
 
 
 
(6.B14) 
In a similar fashion, conjecture a linear solution 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝐻1𝑜𝑡 + 𝐻2𝜒𝑡 + 𝐻3𝐴𝑡 + 𝐻4𝑑𝑡 + 𝐻5𝑚𝑡             (6.B15) 
and taking conditional expectations at time 𝑡 on both sides to get 
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𝐸𝑡𝑝𝑡+1 = 𝐻1𝑜𝑡 + 𝐻2𝜒𝑡 + 𝐻3𝐴𝑡 + 𝐻4𝑑𝑡 + 𝐻5𝑚𝑡                       (6.B16) 
Equating coefficients yield 
Δ𝑝𝑡 = �𝜆𝜇 − 𝛼𝜌𝜑𝜇(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾) + 1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽1 − 𝛽 � 𝜀𝑡𝑜+ �𝜆 − 𝛼𝜌𝜑(1 − 𝛽)(𝜌 + 𝛾)� 𝜀𝑡𝜒 − 11 − 𝛽 𝜀𝑡𝐴 + 𝜀𝑡𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡𝑚  (6.B17) 
The complete solution is given by eqs (6.B1), (6.B2), (6.B12), (6.B13), and (6.B17). 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis consists of five essays in empirical macroeconomics. Each essay contributes 
new empirical results to the literature. In this concluding chapter, I summarize the key 
findings and discuss the policy implications as well as suggest avenues for further 
research. 
In Chapter 2, I find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, fiscal multipliers are not 
necessarily smaller in countries that are relatively open to trade and financial flows and 
operating under flexible exchange rate regimes. The relationship between the size of 
fiscal multipliers and the three dimensions of openness—trade openness, capital 
mobility, and exchange rate flexibility—hinges on the response of the real exchange 
rate and the degree of monetary policy accommodation. It should therefore not be taken 
for granted that, with increasing global integration and countries transitioning to flexible 
exchange rates, fiscal stimulus would become less effective as a policy tool. This ought 
to be comforting for policymakers, especially in developing countries, to continue 
pushing reforms to integrate with the world economy. The interaction of fiscal and 
monetary policy is important in understanding the transmission of fiscal shocks to the 
economy. In the prevailing environment with nominal interest rates close to the zero 
lower bound, an expansionary fiscal policy could have a large leverage in stimulating 
the economy as monetary policy is fully accommodated. However, the lack of fiscal 
space and debt build-up after the GFC might limit the size of fiscal stimulus packages. 
An extension to the analysis on the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli in Chapter 2 is to 
use an interacted panel VAR model (see Towbin and Weber, 2013), where the 
coefficients are time-varying, to allow the model parameters to interact with an 
important variable, such as fiscal space. An application of this technique can be found in 
Huidrom et al. (2016). An alternative approach is to identify government spending 
shocks as a first step, and then use the estimated shocks in a second step in a fixed-
effects panel regression with conditioning variables. This is the approach in Corsetti et 
al. (2012a), which has similarities to the local projections method (see Jorda, 2005; 
222 
 
Teulings and Zubanov, 2014) used in Riera-Crichton et al. (2015). A potential research 
avenue is to examine the effects of different fiscal instruments. Several studies on 
advanced economies find that tax cuts have a larger effect on GDP than spending 
increases (see e.g., Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). Another 
aspect pertains to the composition of government expenditure (i.e., consumption vs. 
investment). Ilzetzki et al. (2011) find that the multiplier on government investment is 
larger than government consumption in a small subset of developing countries. As data 
on tax rates and government investment become more readily available in developing 
countries, such analyses would be very much welcome.  
In Chapter 3, I provide evidence that flexible exchange rates and oil funds help oil-
exporting countries to better adjust to a decline in oil prices. This finding supports the 
views of the IMF and the World Bank, and related studies (see Baffes et al., 2015; 
Husain et al., 2015; IMF, 2015; World Bank Group, 2015). Indeed, several oil exporters 
have recently transitioned to more flexible exchange rates after the plunge in oil prices, 
e.g., Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria. Oil funds have also been set up in 
many countries during the oil price boom since the beginning of the new millennium.  
In Chapter 4, I find that oil funds are effective in reducing fiscal procyclicality in 
countries with high institutional quality. There is also a reduction in the procyclical bias 
in countries with low institutional quality but the evidence is less compelling. This is an 
important finding as several studies highlight that good institutions, and not oil funds 
per se, are associated with lower fiscal procyclicality (e.g., Ossowski et al., 2008; Bova 
et al., 2016). My results show that, controlling for institutional quality, oil funds do in 
fact contribute to reducing the extent of the procyclical fiscal stance. As oil funds are 
now utilized to weather adverse oil prices, it would be interesting to see if stronger 
evidence emerges. 
A potentially fruitful line of enquiry on oil price declines is to examine the 
differential effects of the nature of the shocks, as the unfolding of supply-driven and 
demand-driven shocks are inherently different. Several papers examine the effects of oil 
price increases (see e.g., Peersman and Van Robays, 2012; Cashin et al., 2014) but oil 
price changes could have asymmetric effects. In my preliminary analysis on a country-
by-country basis, I find that, generally, a decline in oil prices due to an unanticipated 
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increase in global oil production has a relatively mild effect on output contraction in oil-
exporting countries compared to a decrease in global demand. This would suggest that 
policymakers should pay attention to the driving forces of oil price changes and tailor 
policy responses accordingly. Another important consideration is whether the shocks 
are perceived to be temporary or permanent. A temporary oil price decline would induce 
policymakers to turn to fiscal buffers for adjustments, whereas a permanent scenario 
would necessitate structural reforms such as strengthening medium-term expenditure 
frameworks and phasing out energy subsidies.  
In Chapter 5, I provide evidence of procyclical fiscal policy in Brunei, in spite of 
the availability of relatively large fiscal buffers in its oil reserve funds. The procyclical 
stance has an expansionary effect on output and thus exacerbates the business cycle. 
This behaviour is primarily driven by procyclical current expenditure while capital 
expenditure is largely acyclical. Adopting clear and transparent fiscal rules to better 
integrate the oil funds in the country’s macroeconomic policy framework to delink 
government spending from volatile oil revenue would help to stabilize the economy. 
In Chapter 6, I find that oil price shocks account for only a small proportion of 
output fluctuations while productivity shocks have the largest share. Real exchange rate 
movements are largely driven by demand shocks while monetary shocks explain most 
of the variability in prices. While several oil-exporting countries have recently moved 
towards more flexible exchange rate regimes, the relatively small contribution of oil 
price shocks in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations in Brunei suggests that there is 
no urgent need to abandon the existing currency peg to the Singapore dollar. Instead, 
economic policies should focus on productivity improvement and capital investment to 
increase output in the long run, and the conduct of fiscal policy should take into account 
the impact on real exchange rate volatility. 
A future research project is to examine the effects of macroeconomic shocks on the 
Brunei economy under alternative fiscal and monetary policy arrangements in a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. This would allow an 
assessment of how different fiscal rules (e.g., budget balance rule, expenditure rule) and 
monetary frameworks (e.g., exchange rate target, inflation target, nominal income 
target) contribute to macroeconomic stability. Important features of the calibrated 
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DSGE model would include a natural resource sector, accumulation of fiscal surpluses 
in a sovereign wealth fund, provision of oil subsidies by the government, a central bank 
operating on a currency board arrangement, and other real and nominal rigidities such as 
price stickiness, non-Ricardian households, and inefficiency of public investment.  
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